Mr. Speaker, the debate triggered by Resolution No. 12 in this House on term 17 of the Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada has, as the hon. member for Mercier said in her speech, brought to light all the misgivings we may have concerning constitutional change, particularly when it appears that a category of persons protected under the Constitution will find its rights diminished, if not done away with altogether, without its consent.
The question before us is not a partisan one, but a matter of analyzing the protection of categories of persons.
I do not wish to interfere in the matter of the administration of Newfoundland's schools, but I can still analyze the situation. Obviously, their school system is a complicated one. To all intents and purposes, term 17 gives the legislator of the province of Newfoundland, what is, after all, a limited power over education in that it cannot legislate unless the various religious denominations are respected. Strange situations occur, like having six different school buses picking up children of six different religious denominations in one small locality, because these denominations must be given equal treatment. Perhaps, in 1996, this needs reviewing.
A position definitely needs to be taken, when all is said and done. The more the debate progressed-and I have listened attentively, either in my office or in this House, to my hon. colleagues who have spoken on this-the more it struck me that it was not all that obvious that, in the September 5, 1995 referendum, each and every religious denomination constitutionally protected by term 17
of the Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada had given consent.
I cannot state the contrary, either, that every religious denomination refused to consent. In some parts of Newfoundland, people voted massively against the Newfoundland government's proposal, while in others they voted massively in favour. The vote was very divided, and the final vote was also very divided. So much so that basically, it is up to those who are primarily concerned to pass a final judgement on this issue. The Newfoundland government, rightly or wrongly, thought that on the basis of a referendum held on September 5, 1995, it had a mandate to pass a constitutional resolution to amend term 17 and ask the governor in council to refer the same question to this House, which is what happened.
History will have to realize we did not initiate these proceedings, that the Newfoundland legislature acted first, and that the Government of Newfoundland drew its conclusions from the outcome of the referendum. I respect its decision although I have quite a few questions.
It will be up to the voters of Newfoundland, if the government or the legislature did not act wisely, to pass judgment on their elected representatives who adopted the constitutional resolution before the House today.
The situation that will be created by the vote in this House is not irreversible, in that a new legislature in Newfoundland, with different concerns, may request a constitutional amendment to revert to the previous legal position.
In that respect, we are not doing anything irreparable. It would not be like amending the Canadian Constitution to say that from now, bills and court rulings will be in English only. That would be irreversible. So there is still a certain amount of flexibility here.
In the end, although we are extremely reticent, because this is a mine field and we might be accused of having created a precedent today, in the end perhaps we can, by stretching our tolerance to the limit, accept the resolution before the House.
However, this precedent should not be used to attack the rights of Franco-Ontarians or the rights of francophones in Manitoba or anywhere else, but especially in those two provinces where they enjoy constitutional protection, as in the province of New Brunswick, which subsequently protected its francophone minorities.
The question is of course a sensitive one where Quebec is concerned, as the hon. member for Mercier said earlier.
We know that in Quebec we have provisions governing schools and minority rights, which are now out of date. The only way to get around this would be perhaps to have section 93 of the Constitution amended, while ensuring that those protected under this section are in agreement. There are ways to do so and these ways have already been used in other circumstances.
I also understand the reticence of the Government of Quebec to apply under the amending formula of 1982, which it and all political parties in Quebec never recognized. I can understand its reticence in not joyously rushing, with honour and enthusiasm, to pass a resolution to call on this House to pass one as well to amend section 93, which would make things so much simpler in Quebec, as the hon. member for Mercier pointed out earlier, by enabling us to update our system of education.
However, the Government of Quebec has not acted in order to show how touchy constitutional change is with respect to minorities, because a fairly strong consensus is emerging in Quebec. There is of course the 1982 padlock, which is more of a yoke than a padlock, obliging us to live with this situation.
Those like me who were raised in a rural municipality of Quebec, where, two or three times a year, a collection was taken up in school for the survival of French-the hon. member for Mercier must remember that-get a little nervous when there is talk of taking rights away from classes of persons protected by the Constitution.
That is why, as this debate draws to a close, I am telling you that, because of this uncertainty and in spite of all the misgivings I have, in the end, I could probably vote in favour of the proposal before us, while at the same time expressing the wish that the provisions contained in the Constitution that protect minority rights not be changed without first obtaining the consent of the minorities concerned.