Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his question and also for the dispassionate way in which he presented it in a debate which has become too heated on all sides of the House. I will try to respond in the same spirit.
I agree, if the facts which the hon. member cites are correct, that if letterhead was used for a non-parliamentary purpose, that there is a breach of the privileges of the House. However, it probably would come within the nature of trivial abuse; no more serious than perhaps the way in which many members misuse parliamentary letterhead. It would not bring in the gravamen of the offence being alleged against the hon. member.
I have noted the precedent of 1891. I would tell the House that it would meet the classic test of something committed within the rayon of Parliament in the capacity of the minister in the public works department. It simply brings back the issue that in dealing with old precedents they have to be re-interpreted creatively in the light of changed circumstances and the evolution of the concepts of what Parliament can and should do to its members, including opposition members. The precedents have to be interpreted in the light of their creative growth. The trend is clearly to restrict parliamentary powers, not to extend them.
The hon. member said, and I hope he will not mind my correcting him, that Parliament can do whatever it wants. I think the best answer to that is the answer which Chief Justice Coke gave to King James I, that one is under God and the law. One is bound by the constitutional law of Parliament. That is what we are trying to decide today. That is what this debate is all about.
Frankly, the committee on procedure and House affairs would do us a service if it set out coolly, clearly and without passion the limits of parliamentary power today. If it thinks those powers should be restated, let it indicate, on the basis of expert opinion, how it thinks that should be done. However, it would commit a grave error if it attempted to set itself up as a court of law hearing the substance of the alleged offence. That would be beyond the precedents as they now exist, properly interpreted.