Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-39. We are, in fact, treading familiar grounds, as a bill concerning Split Lake, which was passed by this House over a year ago, contained more or less the same provisions.
York Factory is one of five Cree communities covered by the agreement under consideration today. We are therefore in familiar territory.
As is my habit, I did a little research this afternoon because I like looking at things in context, rather than jumping straight into something that is very arid. I read about the customs and the people in that location, how long they have been there, and so on. I discovered that some 200 years ago, when the first Europeans arrived, they referred to the Cree as the "Cristinos". I do not know whether my hon. colleague from Churchill already knows any of this, but that was what they were called in those days. It appears that, over time, the "Cristinos" became the Cree.
Let us say that these people have claimed an extremely large territory that I will be happy to describe for you. It could even be argued-as they do, probably with good reason-that the First Nations have occupied this territory for the past 15,000 years. They have been there for a very long time indeed. As I said, this territory is huge, extending from the east side of James Bay to all the rivers in the north leading to James Bay, to the northernmost point of Lake Winnipeg.
Interesting discoveries were made there. Anthropologists and archaeologists have found, among other things, pottery at least 1,000 years old, created by these people's ancestors. I mentioned earlier that the Cree claim to have been living on this land for nearly 15,000 years now. At the time of European contact 200 years ago, there were more than 15,000 Cree Indians here, who spoke Cree; today there are still 11,000 Cree in five communities who still use the Cree language.
As for their culture and their art, which are still alive today, several pieces of embroidery were found, especially pieces made with moose and reindeer hair. Artefacts from that time were found and today still, the mark of their art is recognizable. Just by looking at Cree art and clothing, you can see how important embroidery was and still is in their culture.
I have also found how Europeans described the Cree at the time. Two hundred years ago, the Cree were said to be a dashing people, with elegance, great people skills and a way with words. These features were easy to recognize in Mr. Coon-Come and other Cree leaders from Manitoba, with whom I have regular contact. It is clear that these people are born diplomats who proudly speak up for their culture and the people they represent. They are indeed very eloquent.
All you have to do to convince yourself is to listen to Mr. Coon-Come speak Cree, because that is the tradition at these kinds of meetings: they speak together in their mother tongue at first. I am always dazzled by how rich the Cree language is. We will be listening to what they are saying through the voice of an interpreter and, now and them, we will take off our earpiece, just for the pleasure of hearing this rich language. It is always very nice to see these people speak their own language at first.
After these few words of introduction, allow me to move on. I do not wish to get into the bill per se right away, because this is not a very complicated bill, with its seven or eight clauses. I am more interested in what drives this bill.
In the case of this bill, as with the one on Split Lake, we had to look at what is called the Northern Flood Agreement. This agreement was reached in 1977. It was signed a bit hurriedly, because Hydro Manitoba had started the project seven years earlier. At some point, someone thought: "Maybe we should reach an agreement with the aboriginals who are claiming these reserves and who live close to the huge project going on".
So, the Northern Flood Agreement was signed in 1977 by a few parties, namely the Department of Indian Affairs, the Province of Manitoba and the Northern Flood Committee. At the time, the five aboriginal communities had appointed a group to represent them and to speak on their behalf. These communities were Split Lake, which has already reached the agreement regarding which a bill was passed here. Now, it is the turn of York Factory, to be followed a little later on this evening by Nelson House. I imagine the other two communities, Norway House and Cross Lake, are negotiating and have not yet reached an agreement.
So, after signing the agreement in 1977, Hydro Manitoba quickly flooded 11,861 acres of land, or almost 10 per cent of the claimed Cree territory. Environmental studies showed that this measure had a rather disastrous impact on the traditional aboriginal land, including the land used for trapping and hunting.
Let us not forget that we are dealing here with a mentality different from ours, particularly mine. Indeed, I come from an urban setting and, while I enjoy canoeing on the Richelieu River, I am not interested in hunting and fishing as a way of life. The federal government stopped the funding in May, an action that undermined the solidarity that existed between natives and the five communities against the federal government. Obviously, with the demise of the committee, things started to fall apart, and communities began negotiating on an individual basis. But on the aborigi-
nals' side, it must be understood that this is a way of life and an important tradition for them. I have often said that what probably matters most now in our society is a happy marriage between modern life and aboriginal tradition.
So a major portion of their traditional hunting, trapping and fishing activities was destroyed. All along, there were attempts to remedy that with all kinds of committees, but in the end what I will describe to you is not very pretty picture either because you have to see how the government proceeded.
The government proceeded by looking at the main harmful impacts. It looked for a means of arbitration to do it. What was provided for initially in the convention was a form of consensus; it is traditional, among aboriginal people, to try to attain one's goals by consensus. By setting up an arbitration mechanism to decide on all the harmful impacts-which were not even defined as I will explain later on-we ended up with conflict instead of consensus. That was a very bad move.
It must be realized that once a convention is concluded, there should be some current implementation. The aboriginals were relying on the Northern Flood Committee which was looked on as a precursor to bring aboriginal nations together to face up to giants like Manitoba Hydro, the Manitoba government and the Department of Indian Affairs.
So the Northern Flood Committee, in a sense, had an enforcement role for all aspects of the convention. Since there was now someone to ensure the day to day enforcement of the convention, it was quickly realized how important funding was. That is where things started to go wrong. I inform you that the Northern Flood Committee was disbanded in May.
The government managed a breakthrough by slowly isolating the communities. Split Lake was the first to sign, not without a few skirmishes with other communities around these megaprojects. The Indian affairs committee summoned communities who told us they did not like the Split Lake agreement, and that the megaprojects would have an impact on them as well as on the Split Lake community, and that signing the agreement had broken up the five communities' coalition.
The funding ended on April 1st, and the solidarity was undermined. I am not the only one making these allegations. Someone was asked to make a program review as part of the task force on program review. That individual said:
"Internal DIAND reports indicate that from 1977 to 1983 NFA bands received $10,000 per capita in benefits while other Manitoba bands received $26,000 per capita".
The second quotation is much more important.
"If one wanted to emasculate the terms of the agreement and deny the benefits of it to those entitled, all one would have to do is see that the NFC, the Northern Flood Committee, does not function by denying it operating funding or expertise".
By and large, that is what happened. The funding was simply stopped, solidarity disappeared and the communities were trapped into negotiating on an individual basis, with the result we know today.
Let me turn now to the scope and impact of the hydro development project. It is a major project. James Bay, in Quebec, is often talked about because it supposedly devastated the landscape, and disturbed the Cree traditional way of life. I do not deny those problems, but there is always something subjective in such an assessment.
One thing is certain, the Manitoba Northern Flood Agreement project has had major environmental impacts. Concerning river diversions, Hydro Manitoba has diverted up to 90 per cent of the Churchill River into the Nelson. Why? Because the power stations along the Nelson River needed a higher water rate. So the Churchill River was diverted into the Nelson River and that had an impact on Lake Winnipeg.
Extensive work was done in that area. It is understandable that this caused a disruption for the native peoples. The department itself recognizes the adverse effects of this project. As I said earlier, 2,134 square kilometres of land where 10,000 Treaty Crees lived were flooded and some commercial and recreational zones deteriorated.
I talked a little while ago about the hunting and trapping territories. Thanks to their hunting and trapping activities, these people had developed commercial zones that were disrupted by the diversion I have just told you about.
There was a decrease in the quality and quantity of fish, including higher mercury contamination. Of course, when rivers like these are diverted, huge surfaces have to be flooded, bringing out the mercury. And then the food chain becomes more and more contaminated.
Drinking water is contaminated. I will come back to this a little later on. You will see that an extensive infrastructure was needed to stop this drinking water contamination.
There was less and less wildlife to hunt and trap. I think I was very clear on that.
It became more risky to travel by boat because of the lower water level.
It became more risky to travel in wintertime, since it was now impossible to predict how safe the ice was because of the abnormal water levels.
You see, natives who have been living there for 15,000 years know these rivers. They know exactly how to travel in the summertime and the wintertime, by canoe or on foot, on these waterways.
In the wintertime, there is a danger that the ice will melt or that their usual ice bridges will no longer be safe. This was even recognized by the department. These were the department's words, not just mine.
Therefore, through the Northern Flood Agreement, Canada recognized its responsibilities. In fact, you know that section 35 recognizes a certain number of rights, and also authorizes a provincial body to take or to use Indian lands with the consent of the governor in council and under the conditions he sets down.
Therefore, with the bill before us and the Split Lake bill, it was the responsibility of the federal government to act in this manner.
In addition, the Government of Canada undertook to play an active role in implementing measures to ensure the viability of the communities affected. In this regard, I will describe to you a bit later the basis on which the government proceeded. I think that there were certain problems of application on the part of the government as far as any benefit to these communities was concerned.
There was also a great deal of ambiguity in the provisions of the Northern Flood Agreement. What happened was totally bizarre. An agreement was signed, and then, some six years later, given the difficulty of application, it was decided to ask for a legal analysis. A legal analysis six years after the signing of an agreement is almost inexplicable. Furthermore, they hired legal experts to explain the different percentages of responsibility of each of the levels involved. The agreement itself contains close to a hundred pages, and is backed up by interpretation documents of close to two hundred pages which were more or less applied.
Among other things, what is said about the water supply is far from accurate. Reference is made to Canada's obligation to provide a continuous supply of drinking water, and Manitoba Hydro's obligation to bear 50 per cent of the costs.
There is nothing whatsoever about payment schedules, finishing projects, or routing the water. As we speak, Canada has footed the entire bill and Manitoba Hydro has not yet coughed up a single cent. So there are certain problems of application.
The Canadian taxpayers are paying for Manitoba's infrastructures. I must tell you, moreover, that Quebec did not do it this way. Hydro-Québec's commitments concerning James Bay were respected to the letter. Representations were even made to the federal government for it to pay its fair share in Quebec, because there have been several points of dispute recently, including the education of James Bay Cree children. In that case it was the Government of Canada which was defaulting on payments to the Government of Quebec, whereas this time it is the Government of Manitoba which is defaulting on payments to Canada.
So Manitoba Hydro gave nothing and we are even told further down that there was no expiry date to the agreement as such. It is therefore taken for granted that the agreement will come to an end once the five communities have signed. It is nevertheless strange that almost 20 years later, since the agreement was signed in 1977, the relevant legislation is still not completed and there is still no deadline for the Northern Flood Agreement.
Furthermore, there has been many flaws in the implementation of the agreement as such. I raised earlier the issue of consensus versus conflict. It is easy to be full of good intentions at the outset and say that a consensus will be reached. The five communities agree with Manitoba Hydro. They speed things up a bit for the signature of the agreement because they know that work started seven years earlier. They say a consensus will be reached, they sign and there is consensus. Later, they find themselves in arbitration with 150 complaints. We can see, as I have said earlier, that consensus has been replaced by conflict. I believe this was not the intent at the outset but unfortunately the agreement was signed rather haphazardly and many problems ensued.
You cannot even say that problems are resolved today as I will show later when dealing with environmental impacts. People still have to deal with the environmental impacts. There has been numerous allegations of non compliance with the agreement. The issue of damages due to mercury contamination was not specific enough so they decided to quarrel about costs, who should pay, who is responsible and who should do the environmental follow-up. There are also no environmental monitoring mechanisms and reports. There are shortcomings as regards the provision of drinking water and a lack of commitment to corrective measures.
Therefore, even with the contribution of legal experts and legal studies, we are still wondering who is responsible for it, and the problems remain. Furthermore, Canada issued five complaints against Manitoba and Manitoba hydro. Earlier I mentioned the figure of $88 million, which was invested in a system to provide drinking water. The total bill in 1984-and I return to 1984-was $160 million. So the Canadian government has $160 million in claims against Manitoba. I mentioned the figure of $80 million earlier, but the Government of Canada has put a lot more money in this project. In the end, the taxpayers of Canada paid for the people of Manitoba.
Naturally, the auditor general also criticized a number of things I think I ought to raise here. A number of problems arise from the fact that there was no acceptable implementation plan. Among other things, the agreement should have concerned slightly more strategic issues, that is, the priorities and time frames for its implementation. There is nothing like this in the Northern Flood Agreement. Agreements were therefore signed without time frames or priorities. So people began in one place, did not finish and carried on somewhere else. Since there was no time frame, there was no rush. There were certain problems in implementing the agreement. With no implementation plan, problems started to surface.
As for the sources of funding for the various commitments, of course, in the terms of the agreement there were commitments by Canada, by Hydro Manitoba, the Government of Manitoba, the aboriginal people, but there was not enough put down in writing. As a result, there is now a free-for-all involving the various parties to the agreement, and people are coming up against difficulties because no one wants to pay the bills.
The parties did not put in place an appropriate monitoring mechanism, or implementation evaluation criteria or procedure for that matter. So, we ended up with relatively serious problems, that the auditor general condemned on several occasions. He also indicated that there were deficiencies in terms of monitoring as well. There were environmental monitoring groups, among others, checking and looking at the impacts on the environment.
This impact could be seen but, as you know, this type of megaproject requires a rigorously monitored environmental process so we can detect problems that are not necessarily apparent at first sight. There have been many problems in that regard. We realized that a federal interdepartmental committee had been put in place and that various federal departments could consult one another, but that no specific follow-up was provided for.
As for the burden of proof, the parties recognize that the lands, activities and lifestyles of the people living on these reserves may continue to be adversely affected. Manitoba Hydro was responsible for this jurisdiction. Manitoba Hydro has since refused to assume any responsibility, arguing that, because there is no definition of "harmful effects", it did not have to pay for the effects that could be considered harmful.
But these harmful effects can be seen. I made a few comments about this earlier. There is the effect of mercury contaminating the food chain. All this led to enormous problems.
I must keep a few arguments in reserve as Bill C-40 will be before us in a few minutes. Bill C-40 is very similar to the bill now under consideration. These two bills deal with two neighbouring communities. Tonight's bill applies to York Factory, and Bill C-40 to Nelson House.
I do not want to go on and on about the agreement as such, but I would like to refer back to it during debate on Bill C-40. There are questions relating to the Northern Flood Agreement that must be raised. It is very easy to draft a bill with eight clauses. However, as the official opposition, we must say that certain things continue to be questionable. The fact that agreements are being reached with the five communities does not mean our homework is done. There are still many things that need to be corrected.
The York Factory bill provides that land currently in fee must not become reserves under section 35 of the Indian Act. I will tell you about it in other speeches, but for each acre used, four are given back. Based on my information, the process is not yet completed, but we must make sure this land is not turned into Indian reserves.
The bill also provides that the amounts paid will not be paid to the crown as stated in the Indian Act, but to an aboriginal trust. We fully agree with that. I remember making a speech on Split Lake and saying that the aboriginals were not people living on some southern islands. This was in response to what a Reform Party member had said. Personally, I believe aboriginal people are quite capable of being responsible for a trust.
When these people gain financial independence, they develop their own businesses and they certainly do not need the authorization of the Department of Indian Affairs to build a house or a school. It is incredible to see what happens on a reserve when aboriginal people become financially independent.
Last summer, I visited a reserve called Les Escoumins, in Quebec. Its people developed a beautiful hotel complex on the shores of the St. Lawrence River. During the summer, it is packed with tourists. There are also several outfitting operations. In my opinion, with this money, they are developing one of the most beautiful reserves in Quebec. They are even ready to expand and to purchase private land.
Once financially self-sufficient and no longer subject to the Indian Act, natives can manage on their own with remarkable results.
Under this bill, Canada can also use the Manitoba Arbitration Act to settle all disputes. I was unable to study the issue further. I imagine the Manitoba Arbitration Act must be a model for arbitration. If York Factory and the government agree to ask Manitoba to act as a mediator, under the Manitoba Arbitration Act, the situation must be appropriate and the work done by this agency properly evaluated.
I conclude on this, because I will have to come back later-as will my hon. colleague, I guess-on Bill C-40. The Bloc Quebecois members will vote in favour, even if they know that the agreement was ratified by the York Factory representatives last December, I think. It was ratified recently. We must pass the enacting law. Since everything has been concluded to the satisfaction of both parties, York Factory and the federal government, the Bloc Quebecois will vote for Bill C-39.