Debates of June 19th, 1996

Supply

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Madam Speaker, those are the types of questions the Western Grain Marketing Panel has been addressing in the course of its hearings and town hall meetings across western Canada and in all of its deliberations.

I think it is import to first have a process by which everyone can participate in a full, open and transparent way and then allow the panel to do its work, conduct its analysis and provide the very best possible advice.

On the issue of polling, it is my understanding that market research in western Canada has indicated that if the board is at stake, if it is not an issue of having your cake and eating it too, if it is clearly a case of one or the other, to pick or choose one marketing system or another, often the support for the Canadian Wheat Board rises to over 65 per cent or 70 per cent.

[Jean-Guy Chrétien, Bloc, Frontenac, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am delighted to rise in the debate on the motion by the member for Kindersley-Lloydminster in this opposition day.

First, we should stress the importance the Reform caucus appears to be giving to the Canadian Wheat Board, since last week there was a full dress debate in this House, a very technical one, however, on the operation and the internal workings of this para-public organization.

We are forced to acknowledge that the spirit of this motion transcends the confusion and incoherence reigning within the Reform Party, which is even hoping to form the government at the time of the next elections. It is rather distressing to see what the Reform members in their efforts to defend the interests of the people in the west. It is a bit like having a member for Quebec or Ontario demanding an end to supply management in the case of eggs, poultry or milk.

The member for Lisgar-Marquette last week tabled a bill to change the internal audit system of the Canadian Wheat Board. Overall this bill was in response to an obvious need for the CWB to be transparent and efficient to the thousands of farmers it represents and who depend primarily on its actions and marketing expertise.

So here we have one of his fellow party members introducing a motion that nullifies the member's commendable efforts to directly help farm producers, who simply swallow the decisions made by the Canadian Wheat Board more often than not.

We are well aware that this organization's basic aim is to promote Canadian wheat in the international marketplace and thus obtain the best possible prices. In these terms, the direct effect of today's motion would be to cause greater damage to producers wanting to make their own way in this jungle of grain speculation, more than it would be to really provide profitable wheat and barley marketing opportunities, as the member for Kindersley-Lloydminster would have us believe.

The motion undoes, after many long and difficult years, the considerable efforts put out by the industry to maximize profits in the sale of Canadian wheat with the simple aim of maintaining production standards. The reforms proposed for the internal operation of the Canadian Wheat Board bear witness to the desire of all interested parties to find a better commercial niche for wheat producers.

I have a question: would it really benefit producers to free up the market so that each of them could go as far as their ambitions would take them? Knowing the vulnerability of this industry personally, and particularly all the factors outside of simple grain production, I can only say that this measure would mean financial suicide for any individual wanting to go it alone.

How can we consider making a special provision whereby producers could choose not to have their crops marketed by the CWB for a two-year period, when this marketing is the board's essential function? How will we explain the return to the collective of farmers who, having tested the market, recognize that the real profits to be made arise from the marketing efforts of the Canadian Wheat Board?

This alternative defies understanding. It would allow producers to compete, to a certain extent, with their colleagues, until such time as they understand that the real financial advantage lies in agricultural and commercial union. Is this morally acceptable? I strongly doubt it.

If we looked for a different image to express the same idea, the first one to come to mind would likely be the parable of the prodigal son, for this situation is rooted in the frustrations of a number of producers operating businesses along the Canada-US border. The temptation to sell their harvest directly to local mills is strong, given the attraction of on-the-spot payment in American dollars.

This practice is completely acceptable in a period of prosperity and economic growth. But what would become of this mercenary attitude if, overnight, the price of wheat fell dramatically?

It is important to remember that this situation is entirely plausible and that one of the reasons the Canadian Wheat Board was created was to play a stabilizing role. The Canadian Wheat Board's monopoly on the sale of wheat creates a significant balance for producers, who can thus count on an income that is constant and independent of market fluctuations.

During prosperous periods, it is legitimate to question the relevance and benefit of remaining within an organization governing all areas of production, which, to make matters worse, do not correspond to current modern practice. However, it is becoming essential to take a much more moderate, and often much less dramatic, approach to the issue. And, while we are on the topic, I would like to reiterate my scepticism regarding the rationality of such an initiative. The financial security of many grain producers is involved, without mentioning the impacts that will result from the coming passage of Bill C-38 on mediation in the case of farm debt. We will see a tightening of conditions of eligibility for government support in cases of debt. We should not mistakenly plunge farmers into a situation that could drive them to bankruptcy.

For the benefit of farmers and members of the public in Quebec, I would like to give a brief overview of the Canadian Wheat Board, because it has authority over four provinces only, three in their entirety and one partially.

Grain producers in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and some parts of British Columbia are affected and governed by the Canadian Wheat Board.

The board exports 23 per cent of all world exports. 23 per cent of world exports of wheat and barley are governed and exported by the Canadian Wheat Board and have passed through its hands. It is the granary of the world.

The objectives of the Canadian Wheat Board are important and are comparable to those of the Canadian Dairy Commission, which is well known to everyone in Quebec. It is the Canadian Dairy Commission which is responsible for marketing and buying all the industrial milk produced in Quebec, which represents 47.4 per cent of Canada's total production.

The primary purpose of the Canadian Wheat Board is therefore to maximize the revenues of 130,000 grain producers, whose harvest it sells.

The Canadian Wheat Board obviously needs certain powers, and is, for example, the sole marketing agency for wheat and barley destined for export or for human consumption. Clearly, this means that each bushel of wheat Canada exports must go through the CWB. Bushels of wheat destined for human consumption in Canada must go through the CWB. Therefore, wheat and barley that will be fed to animals, for example, is not governed by the Board.

Sales, to put this in context, vary between 3 and 6 billion dollars annually, so the Board is an important economic power.

The Board's composition upsets me a bit, because of the notorious political appointments. You know how these go. Members of the board of referees of your local CEC, or members of the unemployment insurance office, now the employment insurance office, are political appointees. Usually they are good friends of the regime. The Board is composed of a chairman, a vice-chairman and three commissioners appointed by the government through an order in council.

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Ringuette-Maltais)]

I must apologize to the hon. member for Frontenac but, it being 5:30 p.m., I will allow him a few seconds to sum up. He will have eight minutes more when we resume debate.

[Jean-Guy Chrétien, Bloc, Frontenac, QC]

Madam Speaker, I bow to your directive. I shall resume and complete my address in a few minutes with the eight minutes left to me.

In closing for now, I will say that the advisory committee can play a significant role, since it is made up of 11 members appointed by the producers. These are, generally, 11 grain producers and they know what grain production is all about. Unfortunately, their power is virtually nil. More on this later.

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Ringuette-Maltais)]

It being 5:30 p.m., the House will now proceed to the consideration of Private Member's Business as listed on today's Order Paper.

[Peter Milliken, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Madam Speaker, a point of order. I think if you sought it you might find unanimous consent that the House proceed to deal with Bill S-8, standing in my name on the Order Paper under Private Members' Business and deal with it in all stages today.

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Ringuette-Maltais)]

Is there unanimous consent?

[Some hon. members]

Yes.

Queen's University

[Peter Milliken, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

moved that Bill S-8, an act respecting Queen's University at Kingston, be read the second time and, by unanimous consent, referred to the committee of the whole.

Madam Speaker, I rise to give a very brief summary of the relevant provisions of this bill so that members may be aware of what is going on here.

This is a private bill that was introduced in the Senate to amend the charter of Queen's University. Queen's University was established by royal charter in 1841. As the result of a complicated series of interpretations of the British North America Act and various other acts of Parliament and legislatures, it is an act that is amendable by the federal Parliament and not by the province of Ontario, in which province the university is situate.

The charter has been amended from time to time by various acts of Parliament that have passed through this House. The current bill is the latest such amendment, and deals with various items. If members have questions about any of the items I would be pleased to review them during the committee of the whole if members wish to hear more about it.

Basically, the purpose of the changes is to permit students, staff and faculty of the university to participate in the board of trustees which is the principal governing body of the university. The changes have been adopted in the Senate already where they were reviewed in committee. I do not believe there is any particular difficulty. There was no opposition expressed. The changes are all ones requested by the university to its charter.

In my submission I think they are all ones that would commend themselves to all hon. members. I ask for the adoption of this bill today.

(Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and referred to committee of the whole; bill reported; bill concurred in at report stage. Ringuette-Maltais in the chair.)

[Peter Milliken, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

moved that the bill be read the third time and passed.

[Stephen Harper, Reform, Calgary West, AB]

Just a point of clarification. Several times, Madam Speaker, you referred to Bill C-8. Is it correct that we are discussing Bill S-8?

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Ringuette-Maltais)]

Yes, it is S-8.

(Motion agreed to, bill read the third time and passed.)

Financial Administration Act

[Peter Milliken, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

moved that Bill C-270, an act to amend the Financial Administration Act (session of Parliament), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Madam Speaker, the purpose of this bill is fairly straightforward. It is to prevent the kind of abuse that the House suffered under the former government in 1989 when Governor General's special warrants were used and the regular supply proceedings available to the government were avoided.

I believe this bill finds support in all parties. I am delighted that is the case. It is one which I introduced in the previous Parliament, following the unfortunate events that I am about to describe. I understand from one of my colleagues from Edmonton this circumstance also took place in the early sixties when another Conservative government was in office.

This is an unusual bill. Perhaps I could explain it briefly.

Governor General's special warrants are available to a government to use during election time. That part is fairly clear. It has always been the case. When Parliament is dissolved and is unable to be called together to vote supply to enable the government to defray expenses of the public service, it is normal to have a mechanism in place whereby a government may access public funds from the treasury for the purpose of paying the bills. The method by which this money is made available is by Governor General's special warrant. It has been commonplace to make those warrants available between sessions of Parliament.

Members will recall there was an election on November 21, 1988. Parliament was convened on December 12 of that year. The session lasted for about two weeks. Aside from the speech from the throne and a brief debate on it, which was never completed, no supply was voted during the two-week session. The free trade bill was introduced and passed in all stages with the multiple use of closure.

The passage of that bill ended the session. The Commons adjourned for Christmas to a fixed date in February. Parliament was then prorogued immediately before the fixed date in February until a date in April. Since no supply had been voted, no final supplementary estimates had been approved and, indeed, no mid-term supplementary estimates had been approved, the government

chose to help itself to the funds in the treasury by way of Governor General's special warrants.

Three special warrants were granted. The first was for $80 million in January 1989. The second was for $500 million and change in February 1989. Then, on April 1, since Parliament was sitting on April 3 and interim supply was urgent and required, a third warrant was issued for $6.2 billion. When the House got together, supply was finally voted, although a special order was adopted in the House delaying the approval of main supply.

I raised a question of privilege on the legitimacy of special mandates on April 6, 1989. In ruling on May 2 of the same year, the Speaker's finding was that "-the government has respected all the procedures required by the House".

The question is whether this practice should be allowed to continue.

I drafted an amendment to the Financial Administration Act which defines the time when Parliament is deemed to be not in session. These are available when Parliament is not in session only. Therefore, the deeming section will say that Parliament is not in session from the date of dissolution until the day two weeks prior to the first day fixed by the proclamation summoning Parliament to meet for the dispatch of business.

In other words, up to two weeks before a new Parliament begins warrants will be available. Once that two-week period starts running, warrants will no longer be available. The date will be fixed at the time of dissolution. Every dissolution proclamation includes not just the date of the dissolution, which is the date it is issued, it specifies the date for the summoning of a new Parliament. That date will be the one on which the government must attend for the purpose of helping itself to supply during the election period.

Of course, a government would be free to vote supply for the full year before an election is called and obviate the necessity for further recourse to the House for additional assistance. However, the fear is that if we do not put in place such a procedure as this, we may find ourselves in a situation where a government could call Parliament together, have a speech from the throne and announce that it does not need any legislation from the House, adjourn the House of Commons and then one year later call the House back and spend the rest of the year thriving on Governor General's special warrants.

It would have to prorogue the House before it could do that under the current law, but prorogation could occur whenever the government ran out of money. From then on we could run on warrants until the House was called back into session.

In my view this would be a flagrant abuse of the Constitution and quite improper. Under the current law which is so open ended that is exactly what a government could do. Frankly it is the exact procedure followed by the previous government in the period between February and April 3, 1989 when Parliament reconvened.

In my view it was an abuse of the rules. It is something that we as defenders of parliamentary liberties ought to act on and bring to an end. The bill is designed to bring it to an end. It will prevent the situation that occurred in 1989 from recurring. It will also prevent a government from feeling that it has the right to step into a situation such as I have described and do without the House of Commons sitting for an extended period of time.

It is not in the interest of Canadians. It is certainly not in the interest of representative democracy. It is not in the interest of any opposition and not in the long term interests of any government.

I am pleased to propose the bill today. If the wording of bill causes any members concern, it is something that could be looked at, at committee stage of the bill where it can be studied thoroughly and the wording gone over with some care.

Some members have raised the issue of using these special warrants for borrowing purposes. It could also be examined if the draft bill impinges on that area. I am unaware that it does but it may. If so, I would be happy to have a full discussion of the issue in committee.

When the procedure was last used in 1989 there was some attempt by me and a few other members to raise the matter in committee and look at the way funds were used based on the reports tabled by the government following the use of the warrants. The questions were put before one of the standing committees of the House, but they were treated contemptuously by many members on the government side who regarded them as improper and as interfering in what they regarded as an unfettered right of the government to use this kind of discretion.

It is time a limit was placed on this kind of discretion. The limit proposed in the bill is fair and reasonable to government and to opposition. I hope it commends itself to all hon. members.

[François Langlois, Bloc, Bellechasse, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands for brilliantly defending his Bill C-270 before the Sub-committee on Private Members' Business so that it was declared a votable item.

My analysis of the bill, which contains only one clause, was made easier by the member's kindness in sending me an article he published in the Canadian Parliamentary Review in the summer of 1990 on supply bills and the Governor General's special warrants.

The article is quite detailed and refers to the particular situation the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands described earlier.

I will not linger over the 1988 and 1989 precedents, which I read. Rather, I will try to situate this debate in terms of the cardinal principles of the parliamentary system.

The debate on the sole clause in Bill C-270 means basically going back over the whole of British parliamentary history. In my opinion, we have to go as far back as 1215 to discover the rules governing us today. The issue being raised today was raised in other terms in the baronial rebellion of 1215, which led to the signing of the Magna Carta.

What were the barons after? The possibility of being judged by their peers and the power to control spending by the crown. The year was 1215. Nearly a thousand years later, we are faced with the same problem, the intensity is different and the context is different, but the same thread runs through it.

King John, nicknamed John Lackland, was not without land for no reason: he had sold it for his war effort. The barons did not want to finance him any more; hence his name. Most of his French possessions had been sold and he found himself in a position where his name went into the history books.

King John conceded the Magna Carta in 1215. It was the forerunner of our parliaments and gave the barons the right to control spending. It did not last very long. When the king's situation improved somewhat, he tried once again to impose his priorities. In 1256, new rebellions broke out, and the Provisions of Oxford essentially renewed the Magna Carta's control over spending by the crown and the individual freedoms of the nobility-to be sure. At the time, little if any attention was paid to the ordinary folk, who were in a state of considerable servitude. We have come a long way.

Then what happened? Of course the crown gave the barons and then Parliament the right to control public spending, except no sessions of Parliament were planned. If it had no spending to approve, Parliament was not required to meet. This gave rise, over the centuries, to some strange situations where Parliament did not convene for 20 or 30 years at a stretch. Pressure was again brought to bear, and the people's elected representatives again demanded that Parliament be required to convene at least once a year. That was four or five hundred years ago.

The Constitution Act, 1867 flows directly from these, I was almost going to say medieval, struggles to have Parliament's sittings enshrined in law. Today, section 20 of our Constitution states that Parliament must sit at least once a year, and, since 1982, this obligation has been extended to the provincial legislatures.

Need I point out that another section of our Constitution, section 53, which is based on what was happening in Great Britain at the time, also deals with these questions? When we say that any bill involving financial expenditure or allocation of public money must originate in this House, we are recognizing clearly the control and decision making power of elected representatives over the management of public finances.

Naturally, the government sets its budgetary priorities. This is one of the primary responsibilities in its budgetary policy statement. But in our system of Parliamentary democracy, the government cannot remain in power without the support of members for its budgetary policy statement. One may or may not be in agreement with policies, but one rule that is a well established part of our constitutional conventions, although it is not written down in any text of law, requires that in financial matters, the government must always have the confidence of the House. Over the years, ministerial responsibility has become more relaxed, but certainly not to the extent of not applying when it comes to spending public money.

Of course, as the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands has mentioned, the provisions which make it possible to govern by special warrant of the governor general are set down in law as being measures that must be applied in case of emergency, when there is a requirement to act rapidly and Parliament is unavailable. The best example of Parliament's unavailability, if I may put it that way, Madam Speaker, is when the House has been dissolved. The government cannot summon a Parliament that no longer exists once a writ of election has been issued. It must wait until Parliament has been reconvened, on the date set out in the writ of election.

Outside of these periods, are there any exceptional situations in which government use of Governor General's warrants would be applicable, knowing full well that the government can indeed recall Parliament, even during recess? This is what we shall see in committee, what we must examine in committee. At the second reading stage, we must stick to the principles themselves which underlie this bill, and these are extremely valid ones. When we have heard the witnesses, we will probably be able to re-examine whether the hon. member's bill is too restrictive or not.

I will recall to mind a precedent in 1985-86, when using Governor General's warrants led to a rather odd situation, namely having to borrow money to use the funds authorized by the Governor General's warrant, but since the time allowed to function under Governor General's warrant is very limited, the lending rate reflected this and we had to pay a higher rate of interest. It would have been far simpler to recall the House and get the supply voted.

My concern, which will be addressed in committee, is that adoption of this clause must put us into a situation like the one that prevails in the U.S. There, virtually every year, or every year there is a legislative or presidential election, sometimes both, there is a road block between the White House and the Congress. This means

that, overnight, government employees start to wonder if they will be paid, if social services can be provided and, in many areas, whether such essential services as the administration of justice, police services, airport services can be provided.

These will be some of the questions we will need to address in committee, but in principle I am pleased to support Bill C-270.

[John Williams, Reform, St. Albert, AB]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to speak on the very important topic of the power of Parliament to control public spending.

The Constitution Act, 1867, stipulates that all financial legislation including government expenditures must originate in the House of Commons. Standing Order 80(1) states:

All aids and supplies granted to-the Parliament of Canada are the sole gift of the House of Commons, and all bills for granting such aids and supplies ought to begin in the House, as it is the undoubted right of the House to direct, limit, and appoint in all such bills,

This brings about an interesting question I should like to ask colleagues on both sides of the House. When was the last time as elected representatives of the people of Canada were they able to direct or limit spending in the country? It is an interesting question. Perhaps we could investigate it further.

When was the last time a bureaucrat or a cabinet minister came to a member of the House and asked for help in figuring out what tax dollars could be spent on? When was the last time members of the House other than cabinet members were able to make a choice and say no to one project and yes to another? It is our right in the House under the Constitution.

Let us look at the problems we have had with the estimates. The Prime Minister says that it is confidence: "You have to vote for it. Hold your nose. No questions allowed. Otherwise the government will fail". That type of arm wrestling should not be tolerated by members of the House elected to ensure that Parliament controls the public purse. This House, not the government, controls the spending and the raising of taxes in this country. You would hardly think so on many occasions.

Unfortunately, as I have indicated, seldom is the answer that we can influence or reduce public spending but never has this government trusted us enough to allow us to do our job, which is to represent the will of Canadians and to make the choices on how the government spends tax dollars. What I am trying to point out is there is a clear, complete and absolute separation between this House and the government for this House approves and gives to the government money for it to spend.

Over the last 100 years in Canada the power to control government spending has moved farther and farther away from Parliament. The executive power over the public purse has been expanded. Cabinet and senior civil servants have slowly but surely increased their ability to control what money is spent, where it is spent and why it is spent.

This concentration of power over the tax dollars is wrong. It goes against everything that democracy stands for. Perhaps the ultimate manifestation of the Prime Minister and cabinet's control over our tax dollars lies in the use of Governor General special warrants which the member for Kingston and the Islands has introduced his private members' bill to curtail.

When Parliament is not in session and there is an urgent need for funds, the Financial Administration Act allows for a special warrant in the name of the Governor General to be prepared. We are talking about an urgent need for funds, not a convenient need for funds without recalling the House. There must be a clear and separate difference between the two.

It is not for government to end run Parliament if it finds it inconvenient and it would rather not bring us back here and request us to donate and give to it and it uses the special warrants to circumvent Parliament's authority. In theory the special warrants are to be issued when some unforeseen need arises and Parliament cannot be recalled to deal with the issue. Certainly in the case of war, famine or in an emergency situation the government must not be left without recourse to funding. I think we all agree with that.

History tells us that special warrants are often used as a way to circumvent Parliament. In 1989, as my hon. colleague from Kingston and the Islands pointed out, the Conservative government issued four special warrants to obtain regular appropriations rather than use the supplementary estimates. At the time the House was adjourned and not prorogued.

Special warrant, as we pointed out, is essentially decreed by the Prime Minister's office. It gives the government power to take money from the consolidated revenue fund and use it for whatever reason it so desires. After the special warrant has been issued, there is nothing Parliament can do to recapture the money. Nothing. No checks and balances apply to a special warrant. Clearly the restrictions on the use of the Governor General special warrants need to be tightened.

The role of Parliament in spending tax dollars is crucial. Legally it is Parliament and only Parliament that can approve the spending by appropriating funds. Often this fact is overlooked or explained away by ministers and their officials but it is paramount to a democratic system. Canadians go to the polls every four or five

years because they want to influence the future of our nation, yet the people they elect to express their will have very little input into how decisions are made and even the approval of these decisions. Their input is silenced, avoided or limited.

This bill would be a step in the right direction. It is a direction the Reform Party has been talking about for years. The Reform Party wants to reverse the centralization trend. Reformers want Parliament to exercise its power to control government spending right from the start. This bill reinforces the power of democratically elected representatives. It is an important bill because it enhances accountability in government. It is an important bill because it reinforces the Reform Party principle of accountable government.

The issues addressed in this bill are issues the Reform Party has always been concerned about. Reformers believe that elected representatives should have the final say in government expenditures. We believe in the common sense of the common people and their right to be consulted when we spend their money. Our constituents have a right to directly influence spending. The Reform Party, when it forms a government, will enhance this right. I can see my colleague from Kingston and the Islands is already starting the process.

Raising and spending tax dollars is the lifeblood of Parliament. It is the reason Parliament came about. Reform members take this responsibility seriously. When we spend money and approve expenditures of money in this House, we should all remember that tax dollars are funds held in trust by Parliament and are given to the government to provide services to Canadians.

I support the bill. The Reform Party supports the bill. It will enhance the accountability of Parliament. It will help to remind the executive that the people of Canada still control government expenditures.

There is also a subcommittee of the procedure and House affairs committee, of which I have the privilege to be a member, which deals with the whole business of supply and accountability. I hope we will see in this 35th Parliament a return of powers back to the House which have been allowed to slip away into the hands of the executive, into the hands of cabinet, into the hands of government. They have taken the liberty of expecting us to rubber stamp their initiatives and their requests for money. That has to stop.

I am glad to see this issue being recognized by individual members on the government side through this private members' bill and through the creation of the subcommittee of the procedure and House affairs committee which was formed a year ago. The subcommittee has been doing valuable work. Let us not forget that the subcommittee was formed at the instigation of the Reform Party. The only reason the subcommittee was formed a year ago was that we created enough noise about the approval of the estimates saying that we needed more input.

Canadians and their elected officials need more input into how the House approves money. The House is not a rubber stamp. That message has to be put forth forcefully and clearly in order for this government, the next government and every government thereafter to realize the primacy of this House. We, as the elected representatives of Canadians, are the people who approve the expenditures of government. They are to be held accountable.

Therefore, as I mentioned earlier, I heartily congratulate the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands for bringing forth this private members' bill which will curtail special warrants being issued by the government. Those special warrants circumvent the House. They prevent the House from expressing its democratic opinion on what the government intends to do. The bill will ensure that the House regains responsibility and its primacy over the spending of funds.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Is the House ready for the question?

[Some hon. members]

Question.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

(Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and referred to a committee.)

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Colleagues, since Private Members' Business is completed, I would ask for your consent to revert to orders of the day, the opposition motion, rather than suspending the Chamber until approximately 6.30 p.m. Is there agreement?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

The House resumed consideration of the motion.

Supply

[Jake Hoeppner, Reform, Lisgar—Marquette, MB]

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc member was not finished. Will he speak after me or does he intend to finish?

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

In consideration of the fact that we are proceeding somewhat ahead of schedule, I would hope that the House would permit at a later hour this evening if the member should return to the House and wish to complete his

remarks, that I might have your co-operation in allowing him to complete those remarks. We are proceeding ahead of schedule somewhat, through unanimous consent.

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.