moved that Bill C-270, an act to amend the Financial Administration Act (session of Parliament), be read the second time and referred to a committee.
Madam Speaker, the purpose of this bill is fairly straightforward. It is to prevent the kind of abuse that the House suffered under the former government in 1989 when Governor General's special warrants were used and the regular supply proceedings available to the government were avoided.
I believe this bill finds support in all parties. I am delighted that is the case. It is one which I introduced in the previous Parliament, following the unfortunate events that I am about to describe. I understand from one of my colleagues from Edmonton this circumstance also took place in the early sixties when another Conservative government was in office.
This is an unusual bill. Perhaps I could explain it briefly.
Governor General's special warrants are available to a government to use during election time. That part is fairly clear. It has always been the case. When Parliament is dissolved and is unable to be called together to vote supply to enable the government to defray expenses of the public service, it is normal to have a mechanism in place whereby a government may access public funds from the treasury for the purpose of paying the bills. The method by which this money is made available is by Governor General's special warrant. It has been commonplace to make those warrants available between sessions of Parliament.
Members will recall there was an election on November 21, 1988. Parliament was convened on December 12 of that year. The session lasted for about two weeks. Aside from the speech from the throne and a brief debate on it, which was never completed, no supply was voted during the two-week session. The free trade bill was introduced and passed in all stages with the multiple use of closure.
The passage of that bill ended the session. The Commons adjourned for Christmas to a fixed date in February. Parliament was then prorogued immediately before the fixed date in February until a date in April. Since no supply had been voted, no final supplementary estimates had been approved and, indeed, no mid-term supplementary estimates had been approved, the government
chose to help itself to the funds in the treasury by way of Governor General's special warrants.
Three special warrants were granted. The first was for $80 million in January 1989. The second was for $500 million and change in February 1989. Then, on April 1, since Parliament was sitting on April 3 and interim supply was urgent and required, a third warrant was issued for $6.2 billion. When the House got together, supply was finally voted, although a special order was adopted in the House delaying the approval of main supply.
I raised a question of privilege on the legitimacy of special mandates on April 6, 1989. In ruling on May 2 of the same year, the Speaker's finding was that "-the government has respected all the procedures required by the House".
The question is whether this practice should be allowed to continue.
I drafted an amendment to the Financial Administration Act which defines the time when Parliament is deemed to be not in session. These are available when Parliament is not in session only. Therefore, the deeming section will say that Parliament is not in session from the date of dissolution until the day two weeks prior to the first day fixed by the proclamation summoning Parliament to meet for the dispatch of business.
In other words, up to two weeks before a new Parliament begins warrants will be available. Once that two-week period starts running, warrants will no longer be available. The date will be fixed at the time of dissolution. Every dissolution proclamation includes not just the date of the dissolution, which is the date it is issued, it specifies the date for the summoning of a new Parliament. That date will be the one on which the government must attend for the purpose of helping itself to supply during the election period.
Of course, a government would be free to vote supply for the full year before an election is called and obviate the necessity for further recourse to the House for additional assistance. However, the fear is that if we do not put in place such a procedure as this, we may find ourselves in a situation where a government could call Parliament together, have a speech from the throne and announce that it does not need any legislation from the House, adjourn the House of Commons and then one year later call the House back and spend the rest of the year thriving on Governor General's special warrants.
It would have to prorogue the House before it could do that under the current law, but prorogation could occur whenever the government ran out of money. From then on we could run on warrants until the House was called back into session.
In my view this would be a flagrant abuse of the Constitution and quite improper. Under the current law which is so open ended that is exactly what a government could do. Frankly it is the exact procedure followed by the previous government in the period between February and April 3, 1989 when Parliament reconvened.
In my view it was an abuse of the rules. It is something that we as defenders of parliamentary liberties ought to act on and bring to an end. The bill is designed to bring it to an end. It will prevent the situation that occurred in 1989 from recurring. It will also prevent a government from feeling that it has the right to step into a situation such as I have described and do without the House of Commons sitting for an extended period of time.
It is not in the interest of Canadians. It is certainly not in the interest of representative democracy. It is not in the interest of any opposition and not in the long term interests of any government.
I am pleased to propose the bill today. If the wording of bill causes any members concern, it is something that could be looked at, at committee stage of the bill where it can be studied thoroughly and the wording gone over with some care.
Some members have raised the issue of using these special warrants for borrowing purposes. It could also be examined if the draft bill impinges on that area. I am unaware that it does but it may. If so, I would be happy to have a full discussion of the issue in committee.
When the procedure was last used in 1989 there was some attempt by me and a few other members to raise the matter in committee and look at the way funds were used based on the reports tabled by the government following the use of the warrants. The questions were put before one of the standing committees of the House, but they were treated contemptuously by many members on the government side who regarded them as improper and as interfering in what they regarded as an unfettered right of the government to use this kind of discretion.
It is time a limit was placed on this kind of discretion. The limit proposed in the bill is fair and reasonable to government and to opposition. I hope it commends itself to all hon. members.