Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak to this motion because, frankly, I was rather surprised by the remarks of the Reform Party member before me.
He accuses the other parties in the House of not responsibly studying this bill and yet, in committee, the model proposed by the Reform Party was shown systematically to not necessarily be sufficient for all Canadians and really had no future here.
Today we are considering an amendment to the bill at report stage aimed at ensuring that action the governor in council may decide to take regarding the management of the investment board be in keeping with the mandate of the board.
I think we have to acknowledge that this is an interesting amendment. I do not think the Reform Party said it either, but I find it a bit surprising, at the stage we have reached in considering the bill and the contribution made by all the parties. I think there has to be some sort of balance in the way return is made on investment in the Canada pension plan, like the Quebec pension plan. Under the bill the investment board would be mandated to ensure profitability only.
A limit has been set so that there will be no more than 20% of foreign investments. An earlier demonstration has explained very well why these things are being put into place.
It can also be understood on the other hand that the present draft amendment is not aimed at changing the basis of the bill, but at improving it, as the person moving it sees it. I believe this point of view can be shared, by saying that, yes, the investment board will be given a clear mandate, in other words to seek the best possible economic return. At the same time, however, we want to make sure that the proposed amendment, when the government brings in regulations on this, will be in keeping with the mandate of the investment board.
In this way there is an attempt to avoid excesses, and perhaps a sudden need by the Canadian government to exceed the mandate of the investment board. This can go both ways. It could be a decision by the government to have the capital invested in projects not directly linked with the clear mandate of the investment board, but it could go the other way as well. If we want to respect the statutory scheme, if we wish to ensure that its logic is respected as the bottom line, this amendment must be considered in order.
Would we not end up in a sort of a dead-end situation, an unacceptable impasse, if the government could adopt regulations which would run counter to the objectives of the investment board? I think that, within its general mandate of good government acting in the best interests of society, the government will always have the opportunity to take decisions which strike it being best for the future of its people, but that expanded power must not necessarily be via regulatory channels. It may be a good thing to retain this right, having it operate via measures which require legislation, in order to ensure that things are not done in a sort of underhanded way.
For this reason, the amendment on the table is worthy of consideration and of being judged on its worth. It must be looked at within the general objective of the statutory scheme. That objective is to ensure that the investment board can maximize its outcome and do so with a government which respects that mandate. This is the spirit in which we will support this amendment.