Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to this private member's bill. Bill C-250 would set fixed dates for a federal election and byelections in Canada.
This would indeed be a major and significant departure from the current regime under which elections are called, a regime which, I might add, has evolved over several hundreds of years of parliamentary practice.
The practice is for the Prime Minister to select what he regards as a precipitous time for an election and to advise the governor general to dissolve the House in time for that election.
In the normal situation, the Prime Minister still has the confidence of the House. He is simply seeking an earlier renewal of his or her government's mandate than would be provided by the operation of our Constitution, in particular by section 4 of the 1982 amendments.
This provision works consistently with the conventions of our Constitution and provides for a maximum duration of Parliament of five years barring exceptional circumstances such as war or other national crises.
At the core of this regime is this important relationship between the House of Commons and the executive branch of government. I would like to draw the attention of hon. members to the roles that are played by the cabinet, the House of Commons and the Prime Minister in our parliamentary democracy.
Our system cannot be understood solely by examining the written words of our Constitution. It is important to underlie the constitutional conventions that are just as important as the written conventions and our written Constitution in understanding how our system works.
A key constitutional concept is ministerial responsibility. Ministers are individually and collectively responsible to the House of Commons. When we talk about collective responsibility we are in a practical sense referring to the role of cabinet. In discussing this particular private member's bill my colleague, the hon. member for Ottawa-Vanier, has said that the cabinet is ultimately responsible to the House of Commons. The leadership provided by the cabinet is crucial to the work of a parliamentary session. I reiterate that this is within the overall context that Parliament is summoned and dissolved on the advice of the Prime Minister to the governor general, usually after consulting with his or her members of cabinet.
There are ample opportunities for the House of Commons to hold the government accountable, applying the principles of individual or collective ministerial responsibility. This includes the debates of this House, the daily question period, the budget debates, the important work of parliamentary committees and bills and resolutions introduced by private members. Most important, a government cannot hold on to power after it has lost the support of the members of our House of Commons.
My colleague from Ottawa-Vanier has put his finger on another important dimension to the workings of our parliamentary democracy. He has referred to the role of the Prime Minister which he describes as primus inter pares, first among equals. This does not mean that we have a presidential system such as other countries. However, the Prime Minister is able to give direction to the government's policies and to a legislative agenda and to bring about cabinet solidarity, fostering cohesion among caucus members. I believe that this places our Prime Minister in his authority to call a general election in its proper context. It is consistent with the Prime Minister's pivotal leadership role and it reflects the conventions of our constitution on collective responsibility. This has served Canadians well for 130 years.
Under Bill C-250 general elections for the House of Commons would be held ever four years on the third Monday of October. The Prime Minister would not seek dissolution of Parliament by the governor general except on a motion of non-confidence. A similar regime would apply to byelections which would be held if necessary.
My colleagues on the opposite side of the House have put forward a number of arguments in support of fixed date elections. Among the benefits they see flowing from Bill C-50 are fairness, accountability, greater certainty and cost savings. We have also heard criticisms about the current regime for calling byelections, that the period between a vacancy being created and the calling of a byelection is either too long, detrimentally affecting constituents or too short and favouring the re-election of a member.
It is important to draw the House's attention to the Lortie commission report. None of these arguments that my hon. colleague has presented is new. In fact, as my hon. colleague will
know, the Lortie royal commission on party financing and electoral reform heard and considered these arguments in 1990 and in 1991.
The Lortie commission pointed to several drawbacks which it felt were persuasive. The Lortie commission did not recommend adoption of a fixed date system as has been represented in Bill C-250. It did not do that for a number of reasons.
First, the commission was not convinced that a system of fixed date elections would remove the advantage of the governing party in being able to call an election at a time most favourable to its political interests. Any governing party could still take steps to engineer its own defeat in the House at any time and force a general election.
The other concern that the commission expressed was that fixed date elections might lead to a lengthy and in fact more costly election campaign. Certainly the experience in the United States with fixed date elections and longer campaign periods is a very good case in point for us in this Chamber.
The commission referred to the rising costs of the United States presidential elections, which are often launched 18 months or more before an election date.
The Lortie commission also found some precedents for fixed term approaches to elections. However, it is most important to underline the clear pattern that was uncovered. For the most part, fixed terms are a feature of congressional or presidential systems. We are all familiar with the United States precedent. While not uncommon in democracies, fixed terms appear to be quite rare in parliamentary democracies.
As noted, we do not have a system of strict separation of legislative and executive functions as we find in systems such as that of the United States.
The commission also referred to many of the points outlined on the role of the House of Commons in holding the executive accountable and in ensuring the confidence of the executive is continued. It referred to the role of the Prime Minister and the importance of the constitutional conventions pertaining to the dissolution of the House.
It also referred to the maintenance of the authority of the Prime Minister and the maintenance of caucus loyalty. As the commission noted, elimination of that convention could adversely affect the role and responsibilities of the Prime Minister and disrupt the balance between the executive and the elected legislature.
In my view, it is prudent that we maintain a system that has served Canadians well for hundreds of years.
With respect to the argument that fixed date elections would lead to a more representative government, let me say that I do not view this as-