Far too much sense. With this bill the government and the minister have tried to placate the labour movement and the labour representatives in the Bloc and the NDP by bringing in back door anti-replacement worker legislation. It is neither fish nor fowl. It does not allow replacement workers and it does not
disallow replacement workers. It left to the discretion of the board; discretionary powers again.
Every piece of legislation we have seen in the House allows the minister and the governor in council discretionary powers. Here is a piece of legislation that allows the Canadian industrial relations board the discretionary power to rule whether replacement workers are an undermining factor to the existence of the union or whether they will be allowed and in what situations. Here we have another piecemeal situation where neither labour nor management has a clear cut definition of the status on replacement workers.
It has been pointed out many times before that we are talking about roughly 700,000 employees who come under the jurisdiction of the federal government, people in the transportation, telecommunications and banking industries primarily.
It should be noted that this is not legislation that covers all other organized labour in Canada. There are roughly 700,000 people employed in Canada who will be affected by this bill.
Final offer selection arbitration is the one tool that we feel is very useful to both management and labour. It can be equally used. I have explained the mechanism in the House before but I do not mind doing it one more time for clarity. Anything this good bears repetition.
The bargaining process would go on as usual. We all know that in the transportation sector, in particular the railroads, the grain handling industry and the longshoring industry, labour and management do not seem to have much incentive to come to an agreement expediently. I say that because if there is an impasse both labour and management seem to take the position that it does not really matter how earnestly they bargain because if they come to an impasse the government will legislate them back to work. The stoppage, whether a strike or a lockout, will be of short duration. Where is the incentive for them to bargain in earnest?
I believe final offer selection arbitration would encourage them to go through the bargaining process. If they could not find a solution the onus would be on them to name a mutually agreed upon arbitrator, to list the areas in which they agree, to list the areas still in dispute and to present their final positions on those items still in dispute to the arbitrator for a decision. The arbitrator would not say that these are the two positions and he will make his judgment somewhere in the centre. His obligation would be to take all of one position or all of the other position; final offer selection. That is an incentive. That is the incentive for them to say they do not really want to use an arbitrator and get down to brass tacks and settle this thing themselves.
I am not singling out labour and I am not singling out management as being at fault. We have seen as many lockouts disrupt grain shipments as we have seen strikes disrupt the grain industry. This is not simply a plea for the farmers in my area. We are talking about a lot of other goods like potash, coal and even iron ore.
Speaking strictly for the farmers, not only is it an economic hardship to the farmers but it is an economic hardship to the entire country. When we cannot ship our grain to the west coast, get it on the ship and get it to our customers, not only are the farmers the losers but Canadians in general are the losers.
I talked to one of our colleagues the other day who said that while in China they were asked if Canada still produced grain. This was a shocking question. Of course we produce grain. We do not produce enormous quantities but we produce excellent quality grain in malting varieties, milling varieties, pasta varieties; all kinds of grains and oilseeds. The retort was "you would never know it because nobody comes over here to sell the stuff to us".
Canada has a lot of work to do as far as its reputation as an international reliable supplier of a quality product. We have no problem whatsoever with the production of grain. We could produce more grain if there were a market for it. Profit is not a four-letter word. Profit is what among other things keeps this place operating. It is what greases the wheels of industry. It is what puts people to work. It is what pays taxes.
If we cannot continue to be a reliable supplier of products, if our reputation is damaged to the point that buyers of grain in China think that Canada no longer supplies the stuff, our credibility as an international supplier is severely damaged. It is high time we did something about it.
Bill C-66 has provided us with one study after another. We had the west coast ports inquiry. We had the Sims report. I was fortunate to make presentations to both those task forces. I recommended to the Sims inquiry that the final offer selection arbitration be included in the recommendations to be included in the bill. During the Sims inquiry hearings I suggested that the 10-year appointment of the chairman of the CLRB was too long and should be reduced to five years. Perhaps, as it is coming to light, even five years is too long.
I return to my original point. I am appalled at the position the minister takes when he is questioned by my colleague with regard to what he will do about the chairman of the CLRB and his ridiculous expense accounts.
The most recent west coast ports strike in 1994 was estimated to cost around $125 million just in port costs. The indirect costs were said to be in excess of $250 million. Perhaps we have threatened as much as a half a billion dollars in future grain sales.
I have quite forcefully made the point that harmonious labour relations in Canada are certainly important. The bill does not do a lot to improve labour relations in Canada. It might do something to improve relations between the government and the Bloc Quebecois. I am not sure of that but it might. I do not think it gives labour and management the tools they need to resolve their differences.
Perhaps I should make it perfectly clear that we are not advocating government interference should be a factor in settling labour disputes.
We are making the point that final offer selection arbitration used to the ultimate would be not used at all. In other words, if labour and management did not reach an agreement among ourselves, they would say final offer selection is what the legislation obliges them to do. Therefore the onus would be entirely on us and agreement would be achieved between the two parties. That is always the best deal. A negotiated deal is always better than an imposed deal. The ultimate winners in this entire scenario would be the Canadian people.
We are considering the bill at a time when the Canadian economy can ill afford any more blows. We are considering it at a time when there is a high unemployment rate. Unemployment has been in the double digit range for the last 75 or 76 months. It is almost impossible to compare today's situation with what it was in the 1930s. I hope that we never get to that situation again. What is comparable is that at no other time in Canada's history other than the great depression in the thirties did unemployment remain at such unacceptably high levels for such a long period of time.
Anything this place can do to ensure that labour and management are a bit more harmonious or a lot more harmonious would certainly be welcome in the Canadian economy.
I see that my time is quickly drawing to close. I appreciate the opportunity of speaking once again to this important piece of legislation. It has a couple of redeeming factors, but it would have been nice if more members of my caucus could have had an opportunity to express their views.
I conclude by saying once more the co-operation we have shown to the minister in the processing of the bill can hardly be construed as filibustering.