Madam Speaker, in our view the objectives of the private member's bill now before the House are already well served by the tools provided by common law principles of sentencing and the legislation currently in place.
Bill C-219, an act to amend the Criminal Code, makes it an indictable offence for a person to use a stolen motor vehicle while committing or attempting to commit an offence, or during flight after committing or attempting to commit an offence.
A person found guilty of this indictable offence must be sentenced to one year's imprisonment. This sentence must be served consecutively to any other punishment imposed on the person for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events.
Two mechanisms are currently in place to deal with such a situation. The first is reflected in the common law principles that govern sentencing. On a daily basis judges across Canada impose sentences on offenders convicted of a wide variety of Criminal Code offences, including offences involving the use of a stolen motor vehicle in the commission of an offence. The sentencing process has been repeatedly recognized as an individualized process by courts at all levels in Canada, including the Supreme Court of Canada.
This individualized sentencing process allows the tribunal to exercise its discretionary power based on the facts relating to each specific case. The sentences imposed by any tribunal show that the factors taken into account by the courts include aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the seriousness of the offence, the offender's responsibility and the sentences imposed on other persons for similar offences committed under similar circumstances.
The objectives judges seek to achieve through sentencing include: denouncing the illegal behaviour of offenders, deterring others from offending, recognizing the harm done to the victims and the community, isolating offenders from the rest of society if required, and providing compensation to the victims or community. In fact, it is difficult to determine generally what constitutes an appropriate sentence for a given type of criminal behaviour.
The second mechanism which can be used to deal with the situation described in Bill C-219 is legislation put in place by this government, something the hon. member consistently failed to recognize in his speech. Bill C-41, the Sentencing Reform Act, enacted in 1995, provides judges with the first ever statement of purpose and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code. This statement provides direction to courts on the fundamental purpose of sentencing which is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. The sentencing amendments to the Criminal Code which came into force in September 1996 also identified the objectives which the sentencing of offenders is designed to achieve.
The provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with sentencing also set out a number of basic principles that should guide the courts in achieving sentencing objectives.
According to these principles, the sentence should reflect the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender—the proportionality principle; the courts should take into account aggravating and mitigating circumstances and impose similar sentences for similar actions; excessively long or harsh sentences must be avoided—the totality principle; offenders should not be imprisoned if a more lenient sentence can be imposed; and the courts should consider every possible sentence besides imprisonment that may be justified under the circumstances.
It is within this statutory framework that a sentencing judge would determine the appropriate sanction to impose on an offender who had been charged and convicted of theft of a motor vehicle or who had been charged and convicted of another substantive Criminal Code offence which involved the use of a stolen motor vehicle in the commission, attempted commission or flight following commission of the offence. This statutory framework clearly enables and guides courts in tailoring sanctions appropriate to the conduct of the offender.
Where an offender used a stolen motor vehicle in the commission of an offence, courts would consider this to be an aggravated factor in sentencing and one which would merit the application of the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence. If while in flight in a stolen motor vehicle following the commission of an offence the offender posed a danger to the lives or safety of others due to excessive speed, for example, this too would be considered an aggravating factor meriting a harsher sentence.
The sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code also allow the judge to exercise the discretionary power to impose consecutive sentences if necessary. We believe that the current sentencing process is comprehensive and gives all the flexibility required to adjust sentences to the circumstances surrounding each offender's behaviour.
The proposals contained in Bill C-219 are simply not required at this time to address the conduct of offenders using a stolen motor vehicle in the commission, attempted commission or flight following commission of an offence. We already have the tools at our disposal to deal with the situation.