moved that Bill C-52, an act to implement the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, be read the second time and referred to a committee.
Mr. Speaker, in introducing second reading on the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, I think it is very important to remind members of the House of a very important decision that was taken by our predecessors well over 50 years ago. At that time Canada, who had participated in the Manhattan project, had the full capacity, knowledge and resources to become a nuclear power state if it had so desired. Our predecessors, our government of the day and parliament made a decision against that. We were the first country to acknowledge and decide to become a non-nuclear state.
Today we are here to add to that legacy, to make a further commitment in that very historic decision. We are here to continue the work committed to by so many Canadians over the last five decades in dealing with the nuclear threat to the world.
We have done a lot since then to persuade the other countries that nuclear arms are a problem and not a solution to world security. For example, we put a lot of energy into creating a plan to free the world of nuclear arms sooner rather than later, while permitting peaceful uses of nuclear arms to continue.
It is also true that Canada has paid a political and economic price for sticking to its convictions, but its positions have never changed. We have on a number of occasions chosen not to sell our nuclear technology. We have always encouraged countries without nuclear arms and those with them to honour their international obligations.
These difficult achievements are now threatened. The credibility of the non-proliferation regime is being sorely tested.
We all recognize since the spring of this year that once again the nuclear genie has been unleashed in the world. We are faced with a new argument for nuclear realpolitik. The tendency argued now by people in authority in Pakistan and India and with their supporters is that somehow the possession of nuclear weapons should endow one with a new status, a new credibility, that somehow the possession of this nefarious weapon gives one a new position in the world.
This once again puts into play the fact that nuclear weapons are simply becoming a currency in the power play of international politics. This puts at serious risk the progress we have made to turn back the nuclear clock.
Today as we debate this very important piece of legislation, we must rededicate ourselves to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. They still constitute one of the great threats to all humankind.
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan put in harsh perspective the ongoing threat of proliferation. They diminished rather than improved regional security for those nations themselves. In fact increasing instability developed in the region. This was recognized and acknowledged at the regional meetings of the ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum which I attended this summer. All the countries of that region, with the exception of the perpetrators, took a strong stand in denouncing this because of the threat to security in the region itself.
It may have set an example perhaps more serious to those other countries which are tempted to be proliferators. One of the sad facts of life is that the resource, the technology of developing nuclear weapons, is becoming cheaper and easier. With the breakdown of nuclear arsenals in some of the former states, the transfer of knowledge and scientific expertise becomes even more dangerous. In the absence of international censure, recognition of nuclear weapon state status really puts pressure to the expansion of a nuclear club.
I come to this House today in that through our discussions we can alert more Canadians to that threat. This subject cannot be taken lightly. It is not a subject for playing partisan politics. It comes down to the basic fundamental question of the survival of humankind faced with this awesome weapon we have had to live with for over half a century. I know that members of the House will treat this situation with the seriousness and commitment it deserves.
That is why Canada took a stand of strongly condemning these actions. The Prime Minister at the G-8 meetings led the charge. We have rejected justifications and have taken steps to ensure that there will be no rewards given for those who want to acquire the weapons. Proliferation needs to be stopped dead in its tracks.
I look forward to the report that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs is working on in its examination of Canadian interests in a nuclear policy. I understand it could be ready as early as this fall. The committee canvassed Canadian views on this matter. It will be an opportunity for us to once again address this issue and provide a strong Canadian voice in this most crucial of all matters.
I want to make it very clear to the House that it is not simply a matter of stopping those who decide to test and proliferate. It is equally important that we continue the pressure, the argument and the persuasion for those who possess nuclear weapons to maintain and enhance their commitments to nuclear disarmament. That is the other part of the equation. It is not simply enough to stop the spread, we must continue to work toward the reduction. That is also part of the commitment we have to make.
I want to say very clearly that not all nuclear weapon states are living up to their obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. The START II treaty still is stalled. Other commitments being made are discounted. I hope this House can speak with a unified voice on the need not only to arrest proliferation but to pursue an active commitment for the ongoing reduction of nuclear weapons and the dismantling, disjunction and delinking of those weapons so they do not constitute an ongoing threat.
We must as a parliament and as a country stand very firm against the new realpolitik that is being expressed around the world, and we are in a position to do so. Oftentimes in the tough neighbourhood we live in internationally, questions are not always as clear cut as we would like them to be. If 50 years ago our predecessors in this House and the government had the courage to say no to nuclear weapons, we should have that same conviction today and make it clear in terms of what we do in this legislature.
It is important to pay tribute and remind ourselves of how much effort we have put into these initiatives.
In 1995 there was an indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty with the Canadian motion to have it reviewed in a consistent fashion to make sure that the obligations were met. Just a year ago in 1997, we had the entry into force of the chemical weapons convention, another weapon of mass destruction we are trying to put a fence around and trying to control.
Agreement has begun in Geneva to start talks on the production of nuclear materials, fissile materials for nuclear weapons. These are being chaired by one of our distinguished Canadian foreign service representatives. We are also strongly working on and encouraging nuclear weapon states to agree to the Canadian proposal for discussions on nuclear disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Further, we are actively pursuing negotiations on the convention on banned weapons in space. It is important that we bring all these things together in a seamless web, in a context that each part builds a whole.
In this case the legislation before the House today on the comprehensive test ban treaty is an indispensable part of a non-proliferation regime. It is one of the key elements in which international consensus has been developed.
It is clear that nuclear testing undermines the basic goal of non-proliferation. The comprehensive test ban treaty objective is to end all nuclear test explosions in all environments. That is the commitment that has been made.
The CTBT is a strong deterrent to the development of nuclear weapons. It is probably stronger than virtually all other disarmament treaties because it will help constrain the development of new nuclear weapons and any attempt to provide improvements, refinements and more sophistication.
It therefore contains within it the message that nuclear weapons must be reduced and constrained. They cannot be the weapons of choice by an expanding number of countries.
Clandestine testing under this treaty will be virtually impossible to do. States will need to think long and hard about any secret efforts. One of the reasons we took as strong a stand as we did a few months ago on the question of the inspections in Iraq was for that very reason. We cannot allow any state in a clandestine way to perpetrate the growth and expansion of weapons of mass destruction of any kind. That is why we have to be consistent in our approach to this issue.
The CTBT also puts a very important international monitoring system in place, perhaps one of the most detailed networks around the world, to detect nuclear explosions wherever and whenever they may occur. We will participate by having 15 monitoring stations in Canada alone which the Department of Natural Resources will be responsible for. This will make sure that we contribute in a very substantial way with the resources of Canadians to the overall international network to provide that kind of monitoring, warning verification system.
It also establishes a very clear global norm against nuclear testing by all nations. While there are 150 signatories, there are still countries outside. However, as has been made clearly evident in the case of the land mines treaty which is now becoming a treaty into force, once it is there it begins to establish a broad standard that even non-signatories feel obliged to obey.
For the information of members of the House, during the visit last week of the Chinese foreign minister, he announced that while China was not ready to sign the treaty, it was making a financial commitment to the United Nations for de-mining activities. Anyone who says the land mines treaty has not had an impact should have been with me last week when the Chinese foreign minister committed to a major conference and made a major financial commitment for de-mining purposes. This shows that global norms can work.
The conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty fulfils one of the longstanding goals we have been pursuing. We took an active role in the negotiations and if we wish to remain leaders, our actions now must match our words. It is in the power of this chamber to give life and meaning to the commitment we made during those negotiations. Therefore, I want to make the case that the earliest possible ratification of this treaty by this House would be a very strong and powerful message around the world.
The legislation before the House contains all the necessary elements to allow us to fulfil our obligations under the test ban treaty. Once passed, it will criminalize any nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear explosion undertaken in Canada for the purpose of developing or improving nuclear weapons. It is a tough but necessary position in order to make our message clear. It also mandates the respective functions of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, Natural Resources Canada and Health Canada into a comprehensive test ban treaty national authority which will administer Canada's obligations.
It will obligate Canadian industry to report to the national authority chemical explosions of a magnitude of 300 tonnes or greater or TNT equivalent, as these explosions could be confused with nuclear explosions.
It is not an onerous demand on our industry and in our consultations they are certainly more than willing to comply because they recognize that it is in their interest and the interest of the broad international community that we be full participants in this area.
It is not the central aim but it is also important to recognize it provides very important benefits for Canadian technology because much of the verification, monitoring, equipment and facilities are Canadian made and Canadian developed. Therefore we will be able to provide that kind of extension and also have it in place for recognition and use in other forms of verification systems as we pursue our disarmament goals.
Adopting the legislation will allow us to be among the first to ratify and will lend legitimacy to the efforts of this country as we pursue the crucial issue of combating the new conventional wisdom of nuclear realpolitik. It basically says that Canada has not changed its position for 50 years. We stand against proliferation and that by having the treaty in hand and being one of the early ratifiers we will be able to say that our efforts are backed up by the people of Canada through their elected representatives.
I believe Canadians want us to do that. As we touch the mainstream of feeling in the country no issue comes more to the surface than the expectation that through parliament and our government we will use all our energies possible to advance a level of humanitarian law, disarmament activities to provide a safer and secure world for the men, women and children throughout the globe. That is the expectation of Canadians. We have an opportunity to fulfil that today.
There is no better demonstration of Canada's resolve to safeguard non-proliferation to advance the issue of human security and no better reflection of the will of the Canadian public than to support unanimous rapid passage.
I close with a statement by George Washington, the first U.S. president. It is one I have often been reminded of in the work I do. In speaking to his last session of Congress he said: “Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair”. We have that opportunity to raise that standard to which all the wise and honest around the world can repair.