Mr. Speaker, we are debating Bill C-40, the new Extradition Act. As colleagues have pointed out today, this is a substantial rewrite of a century old piece of legislation. It is a good piece of work in my view. It modernizes, streamlines, properly codifies, and takes account of the charter and the many other things we like to see in new legislation. I congratulate the Minister of Justice for bringing the legislation forward.
It was not a recent exercise that created the bill. It is my understanding that this re-write of the Extradition Act has been on the agenda and work list of the Department of Justice for a number of years now, even going back to 1992-93 when the existing act was modified to streamline appeal procedures.
Colleagues have more than adequately outlined the many attributes of the new legislation. I wanted to bring the attention of my colleagues to three sections in the statutes for one reason. As we create laws and as we pass them in the House, we design them on a drawing board, run them through a computer and do our very best to create a statute that will work well and be in the interest of Canadians. We must all take account of the possibility that what we take from the drawing board and put out on the street may contain some things that do not always work well on the street. That is inevitable in any new piece of legislation. There are three areas I thought I would pass comment on, all the while being strongly in support of the legislation.
The first area involves the potential effect of the waiver of extradition concept referred to in section 72 on the section 96 adaptation to accommodate the provisions of the Immigration Act. In section 96 that accommodation essentially backs off the Immigration Act and accedes to the higher priority attached to the Extradition Act so that there will not be dual pieces of litigation at the same time.
The section 96 provision assumes that there are two outcomes of an extradition exercise. One is a discharge of the individual and the second would be an order for surrender of the individual. That is fine. In the order for surrender there is an override provision which is important to note. Where the offence for which the person is being sought for extradition is one that has a term of imprisonment in Canada of more than 10 years, the person would be deemed under the Immigration Act and the refugee procedures to have been found not to be a refugee. Colleagues in the committee and in the House have accepted that concept.
Although the person is deemed not to be a refugee before an order of surrender is executed, the Minister of Justice will review each case to look out for concerns that are already reflected in the refugee procedures and to protect individuals from extradition to jurisdictions where they might be subjected to the same types of difficulties defined in the international convention on refugees.
In any event those two outcomes under section 96 do not appear to take into account the waiver provisions of section 72. The section 96 immigration procedures do not appear to accommodate a person deciding to waive extradition. They do not appear to deal with it. It is arguably an element of unclear practicality which may be resolved practically in the processes that will be there. If there is any difficulty, I am sure a judge somewhere will have an opportunity to assist the parties in interpreting the provisions.
I point out a second area to the House. In the decisions that will be made by the Minister of Justice both prescribed formal and informal consultations will take place among the Minister of Justice who presides over Extradition Act procedures, the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In consulting with those ministers in terms of a particular individual and a particular extradition there is envisaged a consultation and a transmittal of information either about the extraditing country, the individual or organizations in the other country.
It is not clearly visible on the face of our statute that such important information from the point of view of the individual involved in the extradition is made known to the individual. I am reflecting my sense of this as one MP who is voting for the legislation. In all respects information used by the Minister of Justice that is received from foreign affairs or immigration should be disclosed to the individual.
That principle would have to be subject to the occasional instance where significant national security or other security issues would need to be protected. However it is important to note that point. I am confident those who administer the statute will not be hiding the information used by the Minister of Justice in making decisions about extradition or not, surrender or not, under this statute. I suggest somewhat tongue in cheek that in a middle of an extradition hearing a citizen or other person should not be saddled with the need to make a freedom of information act application.
The third area concerns the concept of specific agreement in the statute. In the past countries have extradited based on an existing extradition treaty or extradition agreement between the two states. The bill if passed would provide for a specific agreement which is a one-off extradition agreement between country a and Canada. The only provision in that agreement would be something to the effect that country a wishes to extradite Mr. X and Canada agrees to accept this as an agreement to extradite, provided there are contained in that agreement the relatively minimal elements already set out in the Extradition Act.
That agreement will not be treated like an extradition agreement or treaty. It will not be published in The Canada Gazette . It will not have been published in the treaty series. It will not have been tabled in the House of Commons. It will not have otherwise seen the light of day. It will have received the signatures of both countries and it will name an individual.
My concern was that over time I would not not want the specific agreement to be used more greatly in numbers than the extradition treaties. I believe it should be seen as the exception to the rule. It appears to me from this statute that one could even enter into specific agreements to extradite a person while an extradition treaty existed. There does not appear to be any barrier to entering into a specific agreement to extradite a person even though there is another extradition treaty in existence between the two countries.
Why would one want to avoid the extradition treaty? I am not sure but the existing agreements governing general circumstances often become a little cumbersome or outdated and it is possible that officials in both countries will decide it is easier to set up a specific agreement and avoid the existing treaty. They will use form B, fill it out, send it over, get it signed and fill in the blank with the person's name and that will be our specific agreement, our extradition instrument for this person. Over time I do not know how that will evolve. It would be my hope that we would not have a proliferation of specific agreements but would continue to negotiate appropriate treaties and other agreements.
Those are the three areas I wanted to bring to the attention of the House. I did not feel they were substantial enough matters to suggest amendments to the House. I believe that with officials who administer the act, the processes that would be put into play by the new provisions will adequately allow for a fair evolution in relation to those three areas and that the new statute will serve Canadians and Canada's partners in criminal justice administration well perhaps for another century as the previous act did.