Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my colleague from Calgary Southeast.
This is a very difficult debate. Any time we engage in a decision that is going to cost people's lives, it is something none of us in this House take lightly.
Clearly the situation we have today is very unlike what occurred in 1991 in gulf war one, if we want to call it that. The parameters are not as clear and the situation is more nebulous. The threat, while there, is not as clear. Nonetheless we have some decisions to make. Should we stay or should we go? Should we bomb or should we not? Should we ask the United Nations to take a different course, or should we support our allies, the United States?
The United States would not have asked us for support publicly if it did not believe it was going to receive it. Clearly the U.S. believes it is going to receive some support in some way and that in all likelihood would be modest and token support to show moral support for the U.S.
However we have some decisions to make so let us deal with the issues as they come up. It is certain that Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons. Of that there is no doubt. The issue is how to get rid of them.
The objective of this whole exercise must be to allow UN inspectors to get into Iraq unfettered. The question is how to do that.
The United States wants to bomb if diplomacy fails. Let us look at some considerations.
If a VX or sarin gas plant were bombed, sarin and VX nerve gas would be released into the air and would spread around causing thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people to die. The situation could be catastrophic. The worst case scenario would be very bad. It would also polarize individuals within the country and would probably drive support to Saddam Hussein. Support within his own country would harden, just like it did after 1991.
Also, it would end the visits of UNSCOM in Iraq. We can be certain of that. UNSCOM has done an outstanding job of establishing the presence of nuclear weapons grade material and also the presence of chemical and biological weapons. This has enabled us to get rid of them. Those inspections would end in the event of bombing.
We have to consider that the action of bombing must outweigh the downside: polarizing support within Iraq; polarizing the people against the international community; potentially causing a huge catastrophe in the release of sarin and VX nerve gases and biological and chemical weapons; and also a hardening of positions in the United Nations and the end of weapons inspections in Iraq.
If we bomb, the bombing must take place on military targets alone. We must avoid any kind of collateral damage of the civilian population.
If diplomacy is to occur, there is something important we are missing here. Diplomacy should involve the Arab nations. In fact the secretary general of the Arab league has said very clearly he would support diplomatic initiatives and in fact that is the preferable way. The Arab league is against the bombing scenario. Let us make it put its money where its mouth is and ask the Arab league to put together a group of diplomats intent on going into Baghdad to try to organize a diplomatic solution.
Some give and take could occur. One of the complaints Saddam Hussein had was that the weapons inspectors were all people from the U.S. and U.K. One compromise that could easily be made would be to involve other weapons inspectors along with the U.S. and U.K. individuals, such as members from Arab nations. This would add an element of impartiality and would eliminate that argument.
We should also not end any sanctions and support a trade of oil for food so that the Iraqi people will have some kind of relief for the terrible situation they have endured for so long. Oil for food and medicine would also demonstrate clearly to the Iraqi people that the international community is very much sympathetic to them but is against the brutal regime that brutalizes them more than anything else. I need not remind the House that the greatest number of casualties suffered under the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein is among the Iraqi people.
The U.S. has asked us for support which will likely be peripheral support. We can provide that support if diplomatic initiatives have truly been exhausted.
There are some inconsistencies in our foreign policy. We are all desirous of supporting UN resolution 687. At the same time we ignore the UN resolutions in the Middle East. We ignore the illegal grouping of Israeli soldiers in South Lebanon who should have been removed a long time ago. We also ignore UN resolutions relating to the areas shared by the Palestinian and Israeli people. We ignore UN resolutions on the West Bank, the Gaza strip and Jerusalem.
If we are to be consistent and fair not only to ourselves but to the world, and in particular to the Arab community, we must support all UN resolutions fairly. We cannot say on one hand that we are supporting resolution 687 while on the other hand choosing to ignore another UN resolution dealing with the Middle East. If we want to be seen as a fair player we have to support all UN resolutions equally and fairly. In doing so we will be seen as being a far more equitable and fair player in the Middle East.
One of the problems with the Middle East is that although most of the nations there despise or at least fear Saddam Hussein, they mistrust, and rightfully so, the west because of the failure of western foreign policy to come to the aid of some egregious situations that are taking place right now in the Middle East.
Ultimately the final solution in dealing with Saddam Hussein has to come from within. The political solution is the solution that will end the regime of Saddam Hussein. It has to come from the remnants of opposition parties that still exist within Iraq.
The bombing, if it is to occur, must be understood by the Iraqi people to be in support of them and against the regime of Saddam Hussein. It is also important for the Arab community to get on side with whatever we do. We must ensure that diplomatic initiatives are exhausted and that the Arab community is intimately involved in those decisions. If it is not, any decisions that are made will be looked upon again as western influence in Middle East problems and the lack of sensitivity implicit in that.
It is also important for us to understand our role as Canadians. We have two roles. We must support our neighbours, the United States. We receive much from them and are grateful as co-operative partners in military affairs. However, as has been said many times before, a military solution must come after a diplomatic solution.
We can take a leadership role in trying to put forth through the United Nations a very clear and specific request to the Arab league to involve them as mediators in the quandary we are faced with right now to ensure that weapons inspectors can go into Iraq. This might be accomplished by explaining to them very clearly that the effects of a chemical, nuclear or biological attack by Iraq on Israel would involve casualties on Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian people and the Jordanians.
I realize that our time is coming to an end, but I implore our country, the foreign minister and the prime minister to push the Americans to aggressively achieve a diplomatic solution for us to take our leadership role to the UN and to the Arab league, to pursue a diplomatic issue and to try some different innovative ways to involve the Arab community in achieving a diplomatic solution before a military solution becomes our only option.