Mr. Speaker, just before oral question period, I was saying that Bill C-20, an act to amend the Competition Act and related amendments to other Acts, introduces a new criminal offence relating to fraudulent telemarketing.
The Minister of Industry described in great detail why this new offence and the clauses in the bill which relate to it had become necessary. I added that we would be pleased to support the bill, if this were all it contained.
I pointed out, however, that the bill before us, although stressing—as do those defending it—the clauses relating to fraudulent or abusive telemarketing, in reality conceals numerous other clauses with which we cannot agree. Not all the other clauses, but a sufficiently large number to prompt us to ask pressing questions and to disagree with the principle of the bill.
It is important to point out that the bill decriminalizes a number of former offences. Although the bill introduces a new regime which could be termed civil, it in fact creates new provisions, some aspects of which are questionable to say the least.
After an investigation has been conducted under several provisions of the act, after the case has gone before the competition tribunal, it may be determined that the business has engaged in reviewable conduct.
For the purpose of hearing such a case, the competition tribunal would be made up differently: you would not have a judge, a counsel and other interested parties, so to speak, but just a judge.
When the conduct of a business has been determined to be reviewable, this business may be ordered what to do or not to do, depending on the offence and the evidence. It would face what constitutes, as far as I and the individuals and lawyers I consulted know, a new penalty called an administrative monetary penalty, which is similar to the penalties imposed previously under criminal law, but which seems to be a new, civil version of what the government no longer wants to do.
There is no doubt that the evidence rule has been changed. What paragraph 74(1) provides is that evidence should be considered as convincing prima facie, which, on the face of it, is surprising. The least we can do is to question this.
But there is a more serious concern in that the current director of the competition bureau is the only one authorized to investigate the businesses and ask the tribunal or another court of his choice to make a determination of reviewable conduct.
This is to say that this is a complex bill, but behind this complexity is the concentration of power in the hands of the competition bureau and its director, who actually becomes a commissioner under this bill.
These provisions are also intriguing to say the least. In Quebec, the consumer protection act contains provisions similar to those found in the Competition Act with respect to misleading advertising, to conspiracy, and Quebec, which took action in civil matters, is doing quite well in that area. What will businesses do? Will they not, in Quebec at least, be subject to two systems? Are they compatible or not? These are certainly important questions that need to be answered.
The bill is touted as providing the courts with new means of dealing with crime through orders on consent and orders including prescriptive terms upon what I described earlier as prima facie convincing evidence.
As I have said, these means cannot be requested except by the commissioner, who has total discretionary power. One could assume he will choose to go before the Competition Tribunal.
Moreover, it was stated during the inquiries and committee sittings that the Competition Tribunal has limited means at its disposal. It is, therefore, not surprising that only the commissioner can act in this connection.
The cost of this decriminalization is that powers are centralized in the hands of a commissioner who is, and I must again emphasize this point, a federal public servant answerable only to the minister.
When the commissioner applies for an order from the competition tribunal, he gives the person whose conduct is to be reviewed 48 hours' notice. This in fact allows plenty of time for an out-of-court settlement to be reached. During these 48 hours, the commissioner and the party may reach an agreement on the terms of the order, including the possibility of their being taxable. The order will be filed for immediate registration.
We are moving from a system of criminal offences to one that is not only decriminalized but can end up completely sidestepping the criminal system with out-of-court settlements.
Some may argue that this is more efficient. What must be asked is whether this system includes everything necessary to ensure that the spirit of the Competition Act is respected by all businesses, not only small and medium-sized ones, but large ones as well.
I will close by saying that one addition was made on deceptive telemarketing after introduction of the first bill, C-67. Deceptive telemarketing—and this may be essential, but was not included in the first bill—may, under sections 45 and 47, be subject to electronic surveillance. This was not in Bill C-67.
The Canada-U.S. report on deceptive telemarketing, dated November 1997, recommended that the matter be studied in greater depth before a decision was reached on the use of electronic surveillance to gather evidence on major offences related to deceptive telemarketing.
A number of questions need to be asked in connection with the application of this bill.
For instance, according to the Parliamentary Research Branch, deceptive telemarketing costs consumers $60 million. That is serious.
It is far from the losses that the same research branch estimates at $40 billion in the United States.
The reason we must target deceptive telemarketing is that this misleading advertising by telephone is generally aimed at defenceless people, including the elderly, who stand to lose a lot of money. We have seen tragic cases of people who lost just about all their savings.
The advisory committee was not in a position to make concrete recommendations, but it agreed that the bill should go ahead with this provision.
This bill includes worthwhile, innovative provisions, but its review of the Competition Act does not fully satisfy consumers—in the broad sense used by the industry minister this morning, which includes businesses as consumers. Indeed, based on the consultations I have held, the administrative monetary penalties may very well be challenged. Some practising lawyers and others in the education sector told me that, on the face of it, they were practically convinced that this provision would be challenged before the courts.
Since we have just started second reading, we will have to insist in committee on finding out what kind of studies were conducted. In addition, the potential for duplication and overlap with Quebec consumer protection legislation is extremely troubling and warrants considerable attention.
Finally, there may be some concern over decriminalization aimed at centralizing powers in the hands of one official. I have no quarrel with that person's ability. However, he will have absolute discretionary power opposable only by the minister, to whom he is accountable.
In this period of worldwide economic upheaval, the negotiations on the multilateral agreement on investment are worrying many people. While the underlying intentions are laudable, there are other intentions that are of huge concern, and it is not clear that even Canada will approve, given the exceptions sought, in the field of culture, for example.
When negotiations of such importance are being conducted, it is vital the government reassure the people that competition will be maintained. Too many small businesses and thus consumers could be deprived of opportunities and, worse, heavily penalized. We must take a hard look at mergers and doubtful and fraudulent business practices, and consumers must be assured that the minister and the commissioner will not be tempted to enter into agreements that will result in two justices: one for ordinary individuals and one for businesses, including major corporations, that would always put them above suspicion.
For reasons of overlap and because of questions about the spirit of the Competition Act and its application, the Bloc Quebecois cannot support the bill in principle at second reading.