Debates of March 19th, 1998

Business Of The House

[Ken Epp, Reform, Elk Island, AB]

Mr. Speaker, it is my honour and my delight and my privilege to ask the famous Thursday question and to inquire about the legislative agenda that is planned by the government for the coming days.

[Don Boudria, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member across for this excellent question. At the same time, I want to thank hon. members on both sides of the House for their co-operation in dealing with legislation so far this week.

The real and serious work of this Chamber does not seem to sometimes excite much the people in the media, but I want to take this opportunity to point out that since my business statement last week, members of all parties have moved forward six important pieces of legislation. I hope for similar co-operation in the future.

This afternoon we will continue Bill C-25, the defence reorganization bill.

On Monday the first item will be Bill C-28, a bill to augment the Canada health and social transfer. We are looking forward to support on this. This will be followed by Bill C-12, the RCMP superannuation bill; Bill S-3 respecting pension benefit standards, and Bill C-25 if not completed today.

On Tuesday and if necessary on Wednesday we shall debate the budget implementation bill that was introduced this morning. We would then return to any leftover bills from Monday, followed by Bill S-4, the marine bill.

That is the weekly business statement. For the convenience of all hon. members, I would like to indicate the plans of the House for a little bit further. I hope to be able to announce a schedule in the future that will include among other things Bill C-27, the coastal fisheries bill, Bill C-26, the grain bill, the Judges Act amendments introduced this morning, as well as Bill C-3 and Bill S-5 if the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights reports them in time.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-25, an act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

National Defence Act

[Bob Kilger, Liberal, Stormont—Dundas, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have held discussions with representatives of all parties on Bill C-25. Regrettably, the Minister of National Defence has not had the opportunity to speak on it and I understand that he is deemed to have spoken, Bill C-25 being in his name.

I would seek the consent of the House to allow the minister to participate at the next Liberal turn in the normal rotation and for the normal period of 20 minutes, subject to 10 minutes of questions and comments.

[The Deputy Speaker]

Does the chief government whip have the unanimous consent of the House for his proposal?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Deputy Speaker]

When the House broke for question period, the hon. member for Lakeland had 15 minutes remaining in the time for his speech.

[Leon Benoit, Reform, Lakeland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, while I know you would be delighted to see me take my 15 minutes, I will probably take about 5 minutes to close.

[Some hon. members]

More, more.

[Leon Benoit, Reform, Lakeland, AB]

All of the members are hollering for more, but I have to keep it to what I really have to say. I am pleased that the minister will be speaking and be open to questions. I look forward to that.

All I have said about this legislation is not as important as a key component that has been missing from this government and from Liberal governments over the past 30 years. That component is a real show of support for and commitment to the Canadian military.

Before question period I was commenting on the three ways a government should show support for the military, the first being words, the second being money and the third being important and substantial change to the defence act and the way the defence department operates.

I commented on the words. To my knowledge, we have not seen a Liberal prime minister over the last 30 years stand up before the Canadian people and say very clearly that the Canadian military is absolutely essential to the security of Canadians in our country. I have not heard that the men and women in the military are good people who do their jobs as well as they can in the system they are forced to work within. I have not seen them show that kind of support for the people in the military. We hear that from the minister of defence but clearly that is his job.

It is absolutely essential for the Prime Minister of this country, the top person within the government of this country, to come out and show strong support for the military. Until that happens we are not going to have the proper level of morale, nor will we have a military that is functioning as well as it must function in order to offer the security that is so important for us. That commitment has not been there.

Money is the second key commitment that must be made by government. I go back to 1992 when Reform was putting together our zero in three plan, the plan to balance the budget in three years. We campaigned on this in 1993 for the election. In that plan we proposed reducing military funding from a level of about twelve and a half billion dollars a year down to about eleven billion dollars. We thought that was absolutely necessary based on the financial condition of the country.

This government has gone beyond $11 billion down to $9 billion a year that is being spent on the military. Our military cannot operate properly at that level of funding. The government has to show commitment by giving the men and women in the forces the proper equipment and the proper training. The men and women in the military right now do not even have proper personal equipment including uniforms and combat equipment. That is completely unacceptable.

On top of that, they need the best in terms of more significant, larger equipment like helicopters. There has been a promise to replace the search and rescue helicopters. What about the shipborne helicopters? We all know that the Sea Kings are unfit to fly. They operate under much more severe conditions for the military than they do during civilian usage. The military does not put as many hours on helicopters as the hours put on civilian choppers, but because of the vigorous and difficult conditions they operate under, they are not safe. This government will offer a replacement at the very earliest by the year 2005. That is the very earliest and that is not good enough. They just have not shown the commitment in terms of equipment and training. That has to happen before we will have proper morale in the forces.

Third, and this relates more directly to the piece of legislation that we are debating today, they have not shown a will, a desire or a direction when it comes to making the basis systemic changes that are needed to make this military operate properly.

This legislation, quite frankly, does not cut it. It is a series of half measures. Some of them are good and move in the right direction. However, when they are looked at and analysed, they really do not go anywhere near far enough.

We oppose this legislation. We will be making amendments and if the government will support our amendments, or put forth its own, offering the same kind of changes, then under those conditions we will support this legislation. It really depends on the government and what it will allow in terms of its own amendments and amendments from us and other opposition parties.

I will close by saying once again that I am looking forward to the minister and his presentation at four o'clock. I am looking forward to the questions that the opposition parties ask of the minister at that time.

[Pierrette Venne, Bloc, Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I must say first that Bill C-25 is not only sizeable, but also ambitious. It is ambitious because it seeks to change our military justice system. For those who followed the work of the commission of inquiry into the deployment of Canadian forces to Somalia, we know very well that the present system has serious problems that deserve some special attention.

The Bloc Quebecois is among those who believe that the role of members of Parliament in defence issues must be reinforced. This does not mean that we must play a huge role overseeing the conduct and business of the military, but that we must oversee them in such a way as to break down the walls of national defence and the Canadian armed forces, in the best interests of people in Quebec and Canada.

To be more effective in our role, we should have access to reports produced by non-political, independent organizations, such as those prepared by the auditor general. This is why, as the Létourneau commission recommended, we believe that an inspector general, working independently from the Canadian forces and accountable to Parliament, would ensure a fair, neutral and balanced analysis of the activities of the military, which the present bill will never be able to do.

As the Létourneau commission stated in its report “There is evidence that Canadians and members of the CF want a review process that is straightforward and independent. We also believe that a civilian inspector general, properly supported and directly responsible to Parliament, must form an essential part of the mechanism Canadians use to oversee and control the Canadian Forces”.

Even if soldiers give up some of their rights when they join the army, they still expect to be treated fairly. During the Létourneau commission, some soldiers complained that their commanding officers were often insensitive to their concerns and that those who dared to complain faced informal retaliation or even put their careers in jeopardy. The members of the armed forces who feel the need to complain are faced with a dilemma: to suffer in silence or to fight the system and deal with the consequences.

The creation of an office of the inspector general would unquestionably meet the need for a fairer complaint processing mechanism. Instead of implementing the recommendation of the Létourneau commission and in order to really confuse the public and give the impression that he was agreeing to some kind of inspection, the Minister of National Defence chose to set up a review committee made up of eight distinguished Canadians.

These people will review the implementation of announced changes within the department and the armed forces. However, they will not have anything to say about the conduct of the armed forces.

According to the minister, these eight distinguished people will serve as a window for Canadians, a window that will be closed in two years since the mandate of the review committee does not extend beyond that period.

What will we be left with in the end? Simply a few annual reports here and there to meet accountability requirements. In short, we will not know anything more about the important things that will continue to go on in this galaxy.

Like the Létourneau commission, we agree with the idea of appointing an inspector general of defence, who would be responsible for conducting investigations not only on the way the military justice system works, but also on any other aspect of national defence that he or she would deem appropriate.

Any member of the Canadian Forces and any employee of the Department of National Defence could contact the inspector general directly for any reason without having to obtain prior authorization from anybody else within the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence.

We know that, right now, civil employees of the department are worried about the proposal to privatize services within the Canadian Forces and the possible consequences of such a decision in terms of job security.

At the Longue-Pointe garrison, in Montreal's east end, it seems that the privatization process could result in the loss of 250 civilian and 150 military jobs. The same goes for the Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu garrison, where 300 jobs could disappear.

The inspector general would be the most appropriate authority to review any privatization of services by the Department of National Defence. An inspector general could address the individual or general problems of all DND and Canadian Forces personnel without these people having to fear some form of punishment.

To be able to express oneself freely without fear of retaliation is fundamental to anyone who wants to expose a delicate situation. Therefore, a member of the military should not be required to indicate to his or her superior that he or she is filing a complaint, especially if the complaint is against the superior.

Inspections, checks, investigations or reports following a complaint by a member of the military should not give any indication whatsoever of the complainant's identity.

The threat of reprisal is not an imaginary concern. The hearings conducted by the Létourneau commission revealed that some members of the military had been threatened and badgered for their part in the commission's work.

Corporal Purnelle and Major Armstrong were among them. The latter, in fact, required physical protection while in Somalia after he had made serious allegations of misconduct to his commanding officers.

By refusing to follow through with a proposal to create a position of inspector general, the defence minister is clearly showing that the armed forces do not intend to clean up their act and instead are determined to keep on operating in isolation.

To justify his rejection of an independent review body, the minister said in the fall that the position of inspector general would cloud his authority before Parliament. It would make the responsibilities and accountability of the chief of the Defence staff and the deputy minister ambiguous.

The minister even said that the high command did not want an inspector general constantly looking over their shoulder. However, the civil authorities have the duty to look over the shoulder of the military.

Why are the defence minister and the Canadian armed forces afraid of an institution which has a proven track record in the United States, and with which the American armed forces get along well?

It is the whole concept of accountability that is at stake. And by refusing to allow an independent control, the minister is reinforcing the idea that the government and the military are accountable to no one.

With regard to the minister's promise to create an ombudsman position, something the military personnel are still waiting for, we must be clear. This position is not the same thing at all as an office of the inspector general. While the function of the ombudsman, or ombudswoman, if you will, is generally limited to receiving grievances and making recommendations in this regard, the inspector general would have wide ranging inspection, control, inquiry and assistance functions. The functions of the inspector would include those of the ombudsman.

Thus, as was recommended by the Létourneau commission, these two functions should be brought together and carried out by a single entity, that is the office of the inspector general.

Finally, if the national defence minister had really wanted to ensure greater openness in the military justice system, he would have supported the establishment of the position of inspector general. This would have indicated a clear willingness to make changes. So we can forget about openness.

As I mentioned a little earlier, the minister also stated, in his response to the recommendations of the Létourneau commission, that the implementation of the changes to the National Defence Act would increase the fairness and effectiveness of the military justice system.

We, in the Bloc Quebecois, believe that all military personnel must be treated fairly. They must, like any other Canadian citizen, be able to benefit from the constitutional guarantees provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As the Létourneau commission said, the military justice system should follow the civil justice system, except when there are clear reasons to depart from it.

Therefore, the question we must now ask ourselves is this: will the changes brought about by the bill ensure, as the defence minister is claiming, fairness in the military justice system?

In Canada, this system is administered according to two main types of procedures, namely the summary trial and the court martial. Summary trials are aimed at dealing with minor military offences. This type of trial is at the heart of the military justice system, since more than 90% of all offences committed by members of the armed forces are only heard summarily.

Usually, summary trials are presided by commanding officers. The purpose of such trials is to deal quickly with disciplinary offences within the unit and to send the offender back to his or her unit as soon as possible. We understand that the goal to keep order and discipline within the armed forces somehow justifies the summary nature of this type of trial.

However, during the hearings of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice, chaired by former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Brian Dickson, several members of the armed forces criticized the summary trial system of justice and even questioned its legitimacy, since it violates some of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The right to counsel and the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal are both being violated. In that respect, this bill provides for minor changes to the summary trial process and appears to reinforce its constitutional validity.

In particular, the bill now prevents commanding officers from presiding at summary trials in which they are involved. Also, the accused person can have access to a lawyer before electing to be tried by court martial or by summary trial.

This does not mean that the accused has the right to counsel, only that he or she can consult with a lawyer. It is true that the commanding officer has the discretionary power to allow the accused to have access to a lawyer, but that is not a right granted to the accused, just a discretionary right enjoyed by the commanding officer.

The purpose of these few changes is quite simple. They are meant to change summary procedure just enough to let the commanding officers go on imposing their own discipline during summary trials. Even though this procedure still infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused to be heard by an impartial and independent court and to be represented by counsel, amendments in this bill will reduce the seriousness of these violations so that they can be reasonably justified under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

This section states that rights and freedoms are subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

In this case, the purpose of the bill is to make minimal changes to the summary procedure so that it can withstand any challenge under the charter, even if commanding officers are in no way impartial and independent in the legal sense defined by the supreme court in the Généreux case.

While the objective of maintaining order and discipline within the armed forces is important enough in itself to justify denying a constitutional right under certain circumstances, in wartime for example, we do believe that under normal circumstances, when the freedom of the accused is at stake, violating the right to be heard by an impartial and independent tribunal and the right to counsel, which are guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, is not justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The constitutional guarantees provided by the Charter apply to all citizens, whether they are civilians or members of the military. In the absence of criminal sanctions, violating rights guaranteed under the Charter is not as serious an issue. It is, however, a different matter when the accused may lose his freedom.

In this respect, section 7 of the Charter states that, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”.

This provision therefore guarantees the right to counsel of a person facing the risk of being deprived of his or her freedom. In addition, section 11(d) of the Charter entitles any person charged with an offence to a fair hearing. This right entails the right to counsel.

It is true that both the bill and the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces provide that the accused may choose between summary and court martial proceedings when faced with a jail term.

The accused who chooses to be court martialled is entitled to counsel. Under the QR&Os, however, this right must be exercised within 24 hours. If the accused chooses a summary trial, can we honestly say that he knowingly relinquished his constitutional right to counsel and to be heard by an impartial and independent tribunal?

The choice between a summary trial and a court martial can have serious consequences. That is why we think the accused should be free to opt for a summary trial and have the right to counsel when faced with a jail term.

As for the right of the accused to be heard by an impartial and independent tribunal, section 11(d) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. So, in the case of disciplinary infractions punishable by detention, the accused should be heard by a totally impartial tribunal capable of making a decision on the sole basis of the evidence presented.

But can we seriously believe that, when a commanding officer presides over a summary trial, there is not a reasonable risk that the accused will be subject to prejudice? The commanding officer will be required to judge a member of his unit and will probably have extensive knowledge of the accused's professional record. Furthermore, since the commanding officer is responsible to his superiors for the maintenance of discipline within his unit, he has a direct professional interest in the outcome of the summary trial.

The person making the decisions should not be influenced by the parties, or by outside forces, except in so far as he is convinced by the arguments and pleadings on the questions of law at issue.

Finally, we believe that breaches of discipline that may result in the suspension of liberty should be treated differently than other disciplinary offences. In our view, only a more formal and independent tribunal offering the accused the right to call on the services of a lawyer, should have the power to hand down a 30-day detention. This having been done, the military justice system should provide the accused with procedural guarantees consistent with the charter. The only way for a summary trial to ensure the accused these guarantees would be to restrict summary trials to offences not likely to result in criminal charges.

The advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms obliged the Canadian forces to make adjustments to their military justice system in order to comply with charter rights and freedoms. When I say obliged, I am not exaggerating.

On reading a study by Martin Friedland on the handling of military misconduct, I was astonished to learn that the armed forces tried, in the past, to obtain a general exemption from the application of the charter, but that the Department of Justice was opposed. I admit that this says a great deal about how the military establishment viewed the charter. The armed forces therefore had no choice, and had to comply with the charter in order to ensure the survival of their military justice system.

In the Généreux case in 1992, the supreme court ruled that the court martial court in which this case was tried did not constitute an independent tribunal within the meaning of section 11(d) of the charter. Before the court could even bring down its decision, changes had already been made to the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, particularly to remedy the major shortcomings relating to the judiciary independence of the Judge Advocate.

These changes called for military judges to be appointed for a set period of up to four years, but no less than two. They also required the judges to hold no other duties for the duration of their mandate. These changes also called for the Chief Military Judge, and no longer the Judge Advocate General, to have the express power to appoint a judge advocate to the court martial.

Without running down the whole list of changes that have occurred since and the ones proposed by the bill, particularly those concerning the authority to call a court martial, we must admit that these amendments as a whole have considerably improved the military justice system.

We believe, however, that the bill could have gone further in order to ensure greater independence for the military judges. These must be officers who have been barristers or advocates of at least 10 years' standing at the bar of a province. According to the bill, they are appointed during good behaviour for a term of five years, and this is an improvement over the current situation.

Since military judges are appointed for only five years, unlike civilian judges who are appointed until they reach retirement age, there is no guarantee whatsoever that they would not be compromising their careers as military judges by bringing down judgments in favour of the accused rather than the prosecution. I believe that military judges, like civilian judges, ought to benefit from security of tenure, sheltering them from any possible type of interference.

In addition, the irremovability of military judges is threatened because they may be removed before the end of their term under the discretionary power of the governor in council.

On the matter of independence, the approach in the U.K. is different from ours. There, a civilian and totally independent judge advocate general appoints the court martial judge advocates. The judge advocate general holds office up to the age of 70. Like civilian judges, he may be relieved of his duties only for failure to carry them out or for improper conduct.

The various judge advocates are civilian lawyers who cannot be removed. We believe Canada should draw on the British practice and use civilian judges who are totally independent and without military ambitions.

The Létourneau commission made a recommendation in this regard that the chief military judge and all other judges appointed to decide on matters of military misconduct by civilians be appointed under the federal Judges Act.

In a real effort to ensure institutional separation between the prosecution and defence functions of the military justice system, the bill creates the new positions of director of military prosecutions and director of the defence counsel service.

Furthermore, the bill establishes more precisely the role of the judge advocate general. The various roles played by the office of the judge advocate general have raised a lot of questions as to its impartiality. The fact of providing legal advice at the investigation and charge laying states and of being part of the prosecution, the defence and the judgment on military offences have drawn attention to the conflicting nature of the various functions performed by this office.

The bill, to its credit, removes the office of the judge advocate general from the prosecution function, which it gives exclusively to the new director of military prosecutions. Under this bill, this person will decide the charges laid against individuals to be judged by court martials and conduct the prosecution.

Unfortunately, the institutional separation is only superficial, since the director of military prosecutions will be acting under the supervision of the judge advocate general, who may issue guidelines or provide instructions on prosecutions. So, there is a risk of interference from the judge advocate general that undermines the integrity and independence of the director of prosecutions.

Oddly enough, the same thing goes for the new position of director of defence counsel services set up under this bill. By establishing defence counsel services, the bill separates the prosecutors from the defence counsel, since the defence counsel services no longer report to the office of the judge advocate general.

However, since the director of defence counsel services works under the general direction of the judge advocate general, once again, the bill fails to create the arm's length relationship that could reassure the members of the armed forces.

To achieve the proper arm's length relationship, should the defence counsel services not work under the direction of some other authority?

Finally, I know that I have just skimmed over the bill and that several other changes included in this piece of legislation deserve consideration, but unfortunately I will not have the time to address them today.

However, for all the reasons I mentioned earlier, I will vote against Bill C-25. How sad to realize that what Georges Clémenceau used to say at the beginning of the century still rings true today. He said “Military justice is to justice what military music is to music”.

Message From The Senate

[The Deputy Speaker]

I have the honour to inform the House that a message has been received from the Senate informing this House that the Senate has passed Bill S-9, an act respecting depository bills and depository notes and to amend the Financial Administration Act, to which the concurrence of this House is desired.

Points Of Order

[Eleni Bakopanos, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I would like to have unanimous consent to table a document that the Minister of Justice mentioned in answer to a question from a Conservative member.

[The Deputy Speaker]

Does the House give its unanimous consent to the tabling of this document?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-25, an act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

National Defence Act

[Nelson Riis, NDP, Kamloops, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I must say it is a privilege to speak to Bill C-25, an act to amend the National Defence Act, involving primarily military justice. The title of the bill does not state it all. I want to mention some of the highlights of this bill before I get into the discussion of its content.

Bill C-25 includes proposed amendments to the National Defence Act that attempt to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the military justice system's principal actors, including the Minister of National Defence and the judge advocate general. It also attempts to establish clear standards of institutional separation between the investigative, prosecutorial, defence and judicial functions. It establishes two independent oversight bodies external to the department and the Canadian forces, one a Canadian forces grievance board and the other a military police complaints commission.

The bill also abolishes the death penalty as a punishment and substitutes it with life in prison.

The bill requires the Canadian forces grievance board, the military police complaints commission and the judge advocate general to file annual reports that the minister must table in this House. These reports are in addition to the annual reports of the ombudsman, the chief of defence staff and the Canadian forces provost martial. It also requires the minister of defence to have the National Defence Act reviewed and the results of that review reported to Parliament within five years.

Mr. Speaker, I know that you stay awake late at night worrying about all of these different tablings and so on. I am sure that you will appreciate this process is appropriate within our parliamentary system.

It really is a joy for me to join the debate on Bill C-25, a bill which I have indicated changes and modernizes the National Defence Act and in particular the code of service discipline.

As most members of this House know, the main focus of Bill C-25 and a key focus of the National Defence Act is the military justice system, a distinct system of penal law applicable to members of the Canadian forces and other persons subject to Canadian military jurisdiction.

We all recognize that the military justice system in recent years has been under increasing scrutiny and pressure for change. A number of factors have contributed to the introduction of this bill.

One factor is undoubtedly the extended and unprecedented period of time since Canada was last involved in a major war and the perception that chances of such involvement are now very remote. This situation tends to lead people both inside and outside the military to be less tolerant of any perceived systematic unfairness in the system and its retention of punishments perceived as excessive or rather out of date.

I would like to take this opportunity to say that while we have been fortunate enough not to be involved in a major war for many, many years now and in fact for some decades, we do not forget the fact that many of those serving in our armed forces are serving in very troubled hot spots around the world. As we debate this change to Bill C-25, they are carrying on their best efforts as peacekeepers and peacemakers on behalf of Canada.

Another factor has been the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This constitutional change has brought the military justice system as well as the Canadian legal system generally under increased scrutiny as regards procedural safeguards for accused persons and principles of fairness and equality of treatment generally.

Particular attention has been drawn to aspects of the military justice system that reflect the disparity of treatment between soldiers and civilians or among military personnel. These include the lack of certain traditional criminal law safeguards at summary trials, the fact that only junior ranks, privates and corporals, and non-commissioned officers, master corporals and sergeants, can be summarily sentenced to detention or reduction in rank.

Also, commanding officers had considerable discretion in deciding to proceed or dismiss charges, including very serious criminal charges, the fact that persons exercising judicial fact functions, or what would be judicial functions in the civilian system, are often members of the chain of command who have no legal training and have other apparently conflicting responsibilities for administering the code of service discipline.

Let us be very clear. All of us in this House today know what is behind Bill C-25. In the last two years, such issues and concerns have been brought to the forefront by various high profile cases such as those relating to the misconduct by a handful of selected forces members in Somalia and Bosnia and the cases of Lieutenant Commander Marsaw and Corporal Purnelle.

The 1997 report on both the Somalia Inquiry and the Dickson report recommended a series of changes to the military justice system. There have also been a number of other internal and external studies dealing with possible reforms of the military system when it comes to justice.

New Democrats appreciate the efforts of the Minister of National Defence to bring the military justice system more in line with the civilian justice system. We are very concerned about the issue of accountability when it comes to the military justice system. Unfortunately, the efforts of the Minister of National Defence in this regard just do not go far enough. We regret that greatly. We were hoping for significant changes in the area of accountability, but unfortunately this has not happened with this particular piece of legislation.

We know that something went terribly wrong in Somalia. We sent Canadian troops to Somalia to help keep the peace. Some ended up killing the same people they were sent there to help. It is a horrible thing that happened. It would not be right to sweep this under the rug and pretend it never happened. Nor would it be right to simply deny it. It would not be right to deny why this happened. It is certainly not right that certain individuals involved in this terrible incident are not now held accountable.

All of this has happened. This is a fact. What is more shocking than the incident itself is the cover-up that happened and occurred after, a cover-up that included some of Canada's senior defence personnel.

Canadians first learned about the Somalia incident through some enterprising news reports. Some talented inquiring reporters broke the story. We learned more when Canadian soldiers with a conscience blew the whistle as well. However, during this time soldiers in the upper levels of the military were busy little beavers tampering with some documents, destroying some, distorting others and stonewalling at every opportunity.

Canadians, in spite of their efforts, could not get the full story no matter how hard they tried. In 1994 the Liberal government set up the Somalia Commission of Inquiry. In the beginning the Liberals appeared very keen to get to the truth. They were going to get to the bottom of things. I remember time after time various ministers and others speaking in this House saying it was important to get to the bottom of the Somalia issue.

When the commission started working, they too were stonewalled by military brass in their attempts to avoid having the truth come out. To say the least, this frustrated the commissioners. We all remember night after night on the news various commissioners in their own adroit way explaining the frustration that they experienced in terms of getting to the facts.

Nevertheless, the commission continued and the Liberal government got scared. They were now well into their term of office and preparing for an election call. I guess they did not want the defence department's dirty laundry being aired on the eve of an election. We all know what happened next.

Doug Young, the former minister of defence, shut the Somalia inquiry down. One of the commissioners called the shutdown the most brazen cover-up in denials of responsibility in the history of this country. He also said that the Liberal government's actions were a brazen cover-up and a denial of responsibility.

Because the government snuffed out the inquiry, Canadians will never know the truth about what happened in Somalia and Canadians will never know who was really responsible for all the cover-up.

I just grabbed a handful of newspaper clippings of that time from my file. I thought it would be appropriate to read some of the headlines into the record.

One of the panelists said of the commission that the Department of National Defence got away with it. Others went on to say some very questionable things. I do not think our rules would allow me to use some of the language in these presentations. I will set those aside.

One headline says “An inquiry insider slams the federal government's response”. A second says “Prime Minister acting in a most irresponsible fashion”. Another headline says “Canada's military remains not accountable”. Another says “The government kowtows to military brass”. Others say “The Somalia inquiry proves a major embarrassment to the armed forces and to the government of the day” and “Outside supervision of military ruled out”. The sub-headline says “Military remains responsible for their own: Inquiry exposes areas of incompetence”. It is depressing to read these headlines. One says “The defence stonewalled: Defence unable to obtain documents”.

It says—again this is the minister—“The minister has betrayed the Canadian armed forces, particularly their future”. Another one is “Panic in the armed forces”. Another one says “The Somalia inquiry a mess”. Still another says “Cutting off the inquiry will backfire in terms of political fall-out”. I am not sure if that happened but this was a prediction.

Another one says “Government calls the whole thing off before embarrassment” and another says “The deadline lets the brass off the hook: A previous Prime Minister shielded from reality”. It says “Minister of defence not told the truth: Grits shielded from military scrutiny”.

I could go on. This is just a handful. I am very reluctant to even mention these in my presentation because they are so distasteful. I guess we have to nevertheless do these things.

I must say that in spite of all the stonewalling and in spite of all the denials and cover-ups, despite being shut down mid-way through its work, the Somalia commission still issued recommendations.

Wouldn't you know it? The Liberal government has again responded with some arrogance, I am afraid to say. The Minister of National Defence called the inquiry's work an insult. The arrogance of this minister is unbelievable, how he would call the inquiry work an insult and not the fact that it was stonewalled and shut down prematurely.

I think we should tell the minister that this piece of legislation before the House today is an insult. This bill completely ignores—

[Dale Johnston, Reform, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that with such a good speech as this being given that the minister should be on hand to take note.

[The Deputy Speaker]

I am sure the minister would be taking note of the speech some place. I know the hon. member knows it is improper to refer to the presence or absence of members.

[Dale Johnston, Reform, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Perhaps then, it would be in order to ask whether the Speaker sees a quorum in the House.

[The Deputy Speaker]

I do not see a quorum. Perhaps we could ring the bells.

And the bells having rung:

[The Deputy Speaker]

Order, please. I see a quorum. The hon. member for Kamloops has the floor.

[Nelson Riis, NDP, Kamloops, BC]

I can hardly take that, Mr. Speaker. I have never experienced this before in my life. I do not want to overdo it and change their minds very quickly. Thank you, that is more like it.

I am going to end my remarks in my presentation by simply saying that we believe the minister is not going far enough in subjecting our armed forces to an outside and independent review process.

This concerns New Democrats a great deal because we feel that the insular culture of the military was in fact in large part responsible for the cover-up that occurred in the Somalia affair.

The measures introduced by the minister in Bill C-25 may be a bit of a help, and I acknowledge that they may be a bit of help, but they really do not address the problem of a military beholden to itself.

The Somalia commission's principle recommendation, the establishment of a formal inspector general system to watch over the military's performance, has been rejected by this minister and his Liberal government. Instead, the minister will allow the military to continue to investigate itself in these matters.

I know that the minister is a very thoughtful individual but I find it hard to believe that he was attached to this because would anybody really believe that the military will continue to investigate itself in a clear fashion. It is a bit like asking the coyote to keep an eye on the chickens in the henhouse and make sure everything is peaceful there.

We point out what appears to be a glaring error in the draft of this legislation and perhaps we will have a chance to change it later.

The minister has also rejected a key recommendation of the Somalia inquiry aimed at protecting both those individuals who report wrongdoing in connection with the Somalia mission and those who may do so in the future. This might be called whistle blowing. Also rejected is the recommendation that military police be more independent of the defence department and report to the solicitor general instead.

The minister also has not accepted the commission's proposal that Parliament set the ground rules for future peacekeeping operations.

I believe this minister has perpetuated the notion that the old boy network in the military is alive and well and that when problems arise, they will be settled clearly within the family. Given the terrible shape of our military these days, I am afraid that is not in any way assuring Canadians.

Bill C-25 reminds us of the government's failure to get to the bottom of the Somalia affair and the government's failure to bring forth the key recommendations of the Somalia commission in this bill indicates to us in the New Democratic Party that there is more secrecy to come and there will still continue to be a great lack of accountability in Canada's military.

Bill C-25, the department of defence response to the need for change in the military justice system, fails to deal with the contentious issue of accountability and responsibility within the senior echelons of the Canadian Armed Forces. That is why we are not terribly enthusiastic about this legislation at this time.

To reiterate, I think it is fair to say that the two areas of serious concern are, first, the fact that there is no protection for whistle blowers, in other words those men and women in the Canadian Armed Forces who see a serious wrongdoing, see something that simply should not take place, who do not feel free to inform others, including the public, of this problem. Until that happens there will always be this sort of cloudy pall hanging over the armed forces with people wondering if everything is going on above board. There is also the matter of accountability. The two are related but there is still the lack of accountability in terms of what is happening, particularly at the leadership level in our forces.

That is what we do not like about the bill but, like everything else, there are good points and there are some bad points. I have emphasized in my role as a critic today some of the more negative and downsides of Bill C-25. But there are positive aspects. I could list a few, but it just is not part of my personality in the House to list positive things. However, I will focus on one positive and that is the removal of the death penalty.

The minister is here in his place and I want to applaud him for his efforts.

Many countries around the world have eliminated the death penalty for their armed forces. The death penalty has been abolished in many western nations with which Canada has very strong ties. Among our NATO allies are countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain. I could list a number of countries which have done away with the death penalty as a punishment for all civil and military offences. Countries outside the NATO sphere have also abolished the death penalty for civil and service offences. Our Commonwealth friends such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have also abolished the death penalty.

The odd state in the U.S. retains the death penalty. It is interesting that those states which have kept the death penalty are those states which have the highest amount of violent crime. There seems to be an inverse relationship to the death penalty when it comes to safety.

Mr. Speaker, I know that you as a learned individual know full well all of the reasons why we have abolished the death penalty in Canada. Now that the Minister of National Defence, through this legislation, has eliminated the death penalty for Canada's armed forces, we join those nations which are the most progressive in the world. I believe it is fair to say that the countries which are the most favourable in the world in which to live, almost inevitably, are those countries which have taken steps to abolish the death penalty. It is a clear signal of the values they place on human life.

I am loath to say that we will not support the bill at this stage. However, we hope that by sending out a clear message to our friend, the minister of defence, there will be a chance to amend it in committee. We will be working hard in committee to improve the legislation.

[John Herron, Progressive Conservative, Fundy Royal, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to speak to this bill today. The government has decided to address the issue of justice in the Canadian forces and we believe it is about time.

Addressing the issue of justice in the military is both important and urgent. My party understands that if we are to do something, we might as well do it right. Unfortunately, while there are some interesting points in the bill, it does not address the real problems faced by the Canadian forces today.

There are several questions which we must ask ourselves. What events brought us to the point to have this bill read in Canada's House of Commons? Did the government act in an appropriate way and does the bill address the need for change? If passed, will the bill work in a practical way when it is applied?

While all these questions are connected, it would serve us well to take the time to ensure that they are answered to the satisfaction of Canadians.

The first question is perhaps the most important. The key for this bill is what events brought us to this point.

I believe all members of the House are aware of the events which transpired as a result of other events in Somalia. However, they are worth repeating and repeating.

The Somalia inquiry was shut down for political and personal reasons last year. That brings us here today. Inquiry commissions are created because there is a public concern which needs to be addressed. As elected officials of this House it is incumbent on all of us to take such matters very seriously. It seems to me that if there is a good enough reason to begin an inquiry, then there is a good reason to complete it.

I would like to quickly outline what was the cost, in real terms, of prematurely shutting down the Somalia commission.

Robert Fowler, then deputy minister of national defence, now Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, said that on March 19, 1993 he told defence minister Kim Campbell's acting chief of staff, Richard Claire, that Somalia teenager Shidane Arone had died three days earlier as a result of foul play at the hands of Canadians.

Richard Claire, then acting chief of staff to minister of defence Kim Campbell, said he did discuss the death with Fowler and Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, then vice-chief of defence staff on March 19, but nobody mentioned foul play. He said at that time the death was still a mystery to him.

The Right Hon. Kim Campbell, then minister of defence, said that she was aware that there was an investigation going on from March 17. She knew this because she received a briefing note on that day. In that briefing note the death of the Somali was listed as perplexing and that Canadian forces had acted appropriately.

The Right Hon. Kim Campbell also knew from the same briefing book that Corporal Marchi had tried to kill himself because “he had roughed him up”, meaning Shidane Arone, “the truth was that he beat him to death”. It was not until March 30, 11 days later, that Kim Campbell learned that there was an investigation into the death.

Because the Somali inquiry was cut short, this has never been resolved. The result is that Canada's fine military has been dragged through the mud and still there is no resolution. The result is that Canadians have less faith in their public servants as Robert Fowler remains Canada's ambassador to the United Nations and Larry Murray has just been appointed assistant deputy minister in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and still there is no resolution.

The result is that Canadians do not know the true story and still there is no resolution. That is why we are here today. We are not here because the government all of a sudden cares about justice in the military but because the government made a mistake and it knows it made a mistake and now it wants to hide that mistake as best as possible.

That brings me to the second point that I outlined earlier. Did the government act in an appropriate way and does the bill address the need for change? I would like to refer to the words of one of Canada's most respected sons, Chief Justice Brian Dickson. In a speech given in November, 1997 Chief Justice Dickson said: “Something is drastically wrong when the public feels that its military is incompetent and led by an inept if not corrupt hierarchy”.

I do not bring up Chief Justice Dickson for no reason. In fact, Chief Justice Dickson is an important player in the making of the bill because much of what is in the bill stems from the recommendations made to the minister of defence in March, 1997 by a special advisory group chaired by Chief Justice Dickson. It is worth repeating the words of Chief Justice Dickson: “Something is drastically wrong when the public feels that its military is incompetent and led by an inept if not corrupt hierarchy”.

My party agrees with Chief Justice Dickson. There is something drastically wrong. Does the bill address the need for change? I just told the House I disagree with the way the bill arrived here. However, there is much in the bill that my party agrees with. The problem, however, is that when one tries to cover up something rather than address the real issues, as this government so often does, the result is very often inadequate.

Similarly, because the government is introducing the bill for the wrong reasons, it does not go far enough in addressing the real problems. Indeed the government missed an excellent opportunity to instil new confidence in the military. The government could have taken measures that would have truly made a difference, measures the Canadian public could point to and say “my government listened and I now have faith in the way the military operates”. The government did not listen. Instead it shut down an inquiry and stifled debate and now the Canadian public will feel cheated, and justifiably so.

The government feels proud when it says that it is fulfilling 80% of the recommendations of the Somalia inquiry. I want to make two points about this not so great accomplishment. First, the Somalia inquiry was cut short and so we do not know what the full recommendations would have been. Second, while the government thinks 80% is something to brag about, my party's answer to that is quality is far more important than mere quantity.

The Somalia inquiry commissioners recommended that the judge advocate general be a civilian. The government ignored this recommendation. The Somalia inquiry commissioners recommended that the office of the inspector general be created. The government ignored that recommendation as well.

My party proposed in our election platform last year and we maintain today that creating the office of an inspector general would be the best way to make the military both accountable and increase transparency to give the public more confidence in its armed forces.

We proposed in our platform let the future begin: “Establishing an inspector general for the armed forces to act as an ombudsman to address concerns which cannot be dealt with in a routine chain of command”.

In the government's response to the Somalia inquiry, a document that for one reason or another my party has not yet figured out, called “A Commitment to Change” the government turns down the proposed inspector general. In “A Commitment to Change” the government states that the commissioners themselves are confused and that introducing an inspector general of the kind that they envisioned would demand the very sort of counter-expert body the commissioners consider inappropriate in chapter 44 of the Somalia report.

My party has looked very closely at chapter 44 of the Somalia report and found one thing has nothing to do with the other. Chapter 44 is entitled “The Need for a Vigilant Parliament”. The chapter does not speak about the office of the inspector general but rather how to better inform Canadian parliamentarians.

In chapter 16 of “A Commitment to Change” the government misleads Canadians into believing the Somalia commissioners asked for an inspector general and then said in chapter 44 an inspector general was not needed. That is not the case, and the minister and the government know this very well.

If that was not clear enough, my colleague for Compton—Stanstead put forward a motion on November 29, 1997 at the defence and veterans affairs committee because he knew it was very important to clarify this precise issue.

I would like to read the motion that my colleague presented at that time: “That the committee invite the three Somalia commissioners to appear before this committee to speak on chapter 44 of the Somalia report, `The Need for a Vigilant Parliament”'.

I am sad to say this motion for the need for a vigilant Parliament was turned down. This is shameful behaviour on the part of this government. It ends an inquiry and misleads Canadians in its response to the inquiry. When the defence committee wants to have things clarified, as is its right, the motion is turned down.

This government does not want a vigilant Parliament because if Parliament were too vigilant this government might not get away with all its schemes. Is this why 80% of the recommendations of the Somalia inquiry do not include the recommendation for a detailed annual report to Parliament? Instead of listening to the recommendations made by the Somalia commissioners this government chose to follow the advice given by the Dickson special advisory group. What my party cannot accept is the way this government picks and chooses what recommendations to follow.

The government might want an example and this might surprise it. Recommendation 35 of the Dickson report, which has not made its way into this bill, calls for “an independent office of complaint review and system oversight such as a military ombudsman be established within the Canadian forces and that it report directly to the Minister of National Defence”.

The Somalia commissioners call it an inspector general. The Dickson report calls it an ombudsman. My party calls it an inspector general to act as an ombudsman. And still this government does not act. In the words of the Minister of Defence, the military does not need someone looking over its shoulder.

Why is this minister convinced that the Department of National Defence does not need an independent inspector general when experts who have studied for months and made recommendations to his department tell him he does need an inspector general?

Before I move on to my final points I want to tell this House about another recommendation made by the Somalia commissioners that did not make it into the government's 80%: “That the National Defence Act be amended to provide clearly that any individual in the Canadian forces or any civilian can lay a complaint with the military police without fear of reprisal and without having first to raise the complaint with the chain of command”.

This recommendation does not appear in the bill before us today because in “A Commitment to Change” it is written plainly this recommendation is not accepted.

If passed, will this bill work in a practical way? My party will ensure during the committee stage of this bill that we invite witnesses who can enlighten the committee. I hope the government does not interfere with this process.

It is my understanding that my colleague from Compton—Stanstead will put forward motions to invite the Somalia commissioners. They are experts and they have something to add to this bill. He will also want to hear from those who worked closely on the Dickson special advisory group. But that is not all. It will be important to hear from the Americans, the British, the French and other like-minded nations on the operation and success of their military justice systems. It will also be important to hear from the stakeholders, namely members of the Canadian forces.

This bill addresses the issue of military summary trials, that is, trials run by military officers with no legal training.

When being briefed by the Department of National Defence on this bill, my party asked what sort of training company commanders were given. The answer that there was no formal training astounded us. Although Chief Justice Dickson recommends a certification process that allows officers to hold summary trials, the issue is not addressed in this bill.

Through my colleague, my party will argue that this bill should go further to create real change. We want the public to know the military serves them and not itself. I hope the government takes my party's suggestions seriously.

[Art Eggleton, Liberal, Minister of National Defence]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate on Bill C-25, an act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts.

The legislation is a comprehensive package of amendments that will strengthen the statutory framework governing the operations of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian forces. It deals primarily with the military justice system. The amendments proposed in the bill are the most extensive amendments to the National Defence Act since it was first put in place in 1950.

The men and women of our armed forces have maintained our defence forces at a high state of readiness in the face of many challenges. They have contributed with enthusiasm and professionalism to our wide range of international and domestic commitments. In the Saguenay, in Red River in Manitoba, in central, eastern and Atlantic Canada they have played a crucial role in protecting the health and the safety of Canadians.

During the recent ice storm, one of the worst natural disasters in our history, almost 16,000 members of the Forces provided relief to literally millions of Canadians who were without power.

They helped restore power, set up evacuation centres, assisted police and other emergency response teams and comforted people in need. Their very presence helped Canadians cope with the disaster and face it with added confidence and resolve. The Canadian forces demonstrated once again that it is truly a vital national institution. We and all Canadians have good reason to praise the dedication and the professionalism of these men and women.

We must also remember that the Canadian forces are an armed force trained for combat and requiring a distinct system of military justice. This requirement derives from the uniqueness of the Canadian forces' mandate, purposes and roles as well as special responsibilities and obligations to its members.

Military personnel may be required to risk injury or death in the performance of their duties. This puts a premium on the discipline and cohesion of military units. This operational reality has specific implications for military justice.

First, the Canadian forces require a justice system that can try offences against the ordinary law of Canada and offences that are unique to the military, such as mutiny or being absent without leave.

Second, the military chain of command which is accountable not only for the maintenance of discipline but for carrying out the missions assigned by the government, must play a key role in the administration of justice.

Third, the system must be able to try and punish violations quickly so that individuals can be returned to service as soon as possible.

Finally, the system needs to be portable so it can function wherever the forces are deployed in times of peace or conflict, either here in Canada or abroad.

Discipline is the lifeblood of any military organization. Whether in peace or war it spells the difference between military success and failure. It promotes effectiveness and efficiency. Its foundations are respect for leadership, appropriate training and a military justice system where equity and fairness are unquestionably clear to all.

In recent years however, the capacity of the military justice system to promote discipline, efficiency, high morale and justice has been called into question by a number of incidents. The government looked closely at these events and has acted decisively.

In March 1995 the Somalia commission was established and the commission brought us a great number of recommendations. Over 80% of those recommendations, including many on military justice, are being implemented. It has been asked what about the inspector general recommendation. It is here in other forms. There are other people responsible for the military justice system who will carry out those same functions. Indeed there will be independent monitoring, looking over the shoulders of the military to ensure that in fact they are implemented.

In December 1996 the government commissioned a special advisory group under the right hon. Brian Dickson, former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. We asked him and his colleagues to assess the military justice system and the police investigation services.

The group reported on time and under budget. The minister of the day supported the recommendations in his report to the Prime Minister on the leadership and management of the forces of March 25, 1997. The Prime Minister endorsed early action on the recommendations and work began immediately to pursue their implementation.

The special advisory group was also asked to examine the quasi-judicial role of the minister in the military justice system. I am pleased to accept the recommendations it has made. They are also being implemented.

When the government saw that the military justice system was one of the key areas where change was needed, we took action. We sought advice from within the military, from the public at large and from distinguished Canadians with specialized knowledge. The amendments under Bill C-25 are a product of that process.

Bill C-25 addresses a broad range of provisions in the National Defence Act. It will modernize the provisions with respect to boards of inquiry. It will clarify the legislative authority and performance of public service duties by Canadian forces members such as those during the recent ice storm.

Bill C-25 is primarily about the modernization of the military justice system. The four principal thrusts of this initiative will first, establish in the National Defence Act for the first time, the roles and responsibilities of the key figures in the military justice system and set clear standards of institutional separation, a very important element, for the investigative, prosecutorial, defence and judicial functions.

Second, it will enhance transparency and provide greater structure to the exercise of individual discretion in the investigation and charging processes.

Third, it will modernize the powers and the procedures of service tribunals, including eliminating the death penalty under military law.

Fourth, it will strengthen, not weaken but strengthen, oversight and review of the administration of military justice.

Each component is a major building block in the revitalization of the Canadian military justice system.

Allow me to present a brief overview of each, so that the totality of the improvements are apparent.

The roles, responsibilities and duties of the key figures in the military are not precisely set out in the National Defence Act as it is presently constituted. This has led to a degree of uncertainty and misunderstanding about their respective functions and relationships in the overall process of delivering justice.

The amendments contained in Bill C-25 will establish in clear terms the duties and relationship between the prosecution, defence and judicial functions. The bill clearly defines the role of the judge advocate general as a legal adviser to the Governor General, the Minister of National Defence, the forces and the Department of National Defence in matters of military law.

The bill will establish the office of the director of military prosecutions who under the general supervision of the JAG will be responsible for deciding which charges are tried by courts martial and for the conduct of all prosecutions at a courts martial.

It will provide for the appointment of a director of defence counsel services who will provide legal services to accused persons in proceedings under the code of service discipline.

It will provide explicitly for independent military judges to be appointed by the governor in council for fixed terms.

Under the system as it now stands, the Minister of National Defence is also a key figure and plays an active role in the routine administration of individual cases under the code of service discipline. Bill C-25 will remove the minister from such day to day administration. This will reduce potential conflict of interest between the minister's duties in individual cases and the minister's responsibility for the overall management of the department and the Canadian forces. It will enable the minister to focus on other duties and responsibilities.

These amendments will also complement the recent initiative to establish the national investigative service of the military police. This organization will be independent of the operational chain of command and will have jurisdiction to investigate serious and sensitive service offences. They are people who are being well trained to carry out that function.

Bill C-25 will also improve the structure of the investigation and charging process and enhance transparency within that process. The current system has been criticized for its lack of transparency and for the broad discretion it gives to a commanding officer to make final decisions concerning not only minor offences but also serious and sensitive offences that may implicate interests well beyond his or her individual unit.

The amendments to the act will remove from commanding officers the power to dismiss charges. They will provide a clear statutory basis for tailoring the jurisdiction of summary trials to those minor offences necessary for the maintenance of internal unit discipline. They will also require that a charge that is beyond the jurisdiction of commanding officers is referred to the director of military prosecutions.

Changes to the act and to the regulatory administrative provisions dealing with investigations and charging of service offences will increase openness and refocus the exercise of individual discretion. At the same time they will ensure the valuable and essential participation of the chain of command in the process.

The amendments under Bill C-25 will also modernize powers and procedures associated with the two types of service tribunals that try military offences, summary trials and courts martial.

Reform of the summary trial process is already well under way. Amendments to the Queen's regulations and orders enacted on November 30, 1997 restrict the jurisdiction of summary trials to more minor offences that affect internal unit discipline. They also grant accused persons the right to elect trial by courts martial in all but the most minor cases.

In addition, commanding officers are being provided with more comprehensive training in their military justice duties and responsibilities.

Bill C-25 will complement those ongoing reforms of the summary trial process by reducing the powers of punishment at summary trial in keeping with its disciplinary focus.

The maximum period of detention that may be awarded at a summary trial will be reduced from 90 to 30 days. The power to reduce in rank will be limited to one rank below the rank held before the summary trial.

In respect of courts martial, they will deal with more serious offences and will be conducted in accordance with rules similar to those at a civilian criminal court.

Currently general and disciplinary courts martial are composed of a judge advocate who officiates at a panel of officers headed by a president. Even though the president and the officers and the panel are not required by the act to possess any legal training, they nonetheless make judicial decisions and determine sentences. Moreover, as it now stands, only commissioned officers can sit as members of general and disciplinary courts martial panels.

Bill C-25 will recognize the judicial nature of the courts martial. As such, it will eliminate the position of president of the courts martial panels. It will authorize the presiding military judge to make all decisions of a legal nature, contrary to what I was hearing earlier from a colleague opposite.

It will enable a military judge presiding at courts martial rather than the members of the court martial to determine the sentence. These people are well qualified to do that.

Moreover, Bill C-25 will permit a non-commissioned member of the rank of warrant officer or above to serve as a member of a general and disciplinary court martial when the accused is a non-commissioned member.

This participation, which is for the first time, will enable the Canadian forces to tap into the considerable wealth of experience and leadership offered by their senior non-commissioned members, men and women who also have a significant role to play in the disciplinary process.

We are moving to enhance accountability and transparency within the military justice system. Oversight and review mechanisms must be in place to ensure that day to day decisions are monitored effectively and are capable of being assessed.

Bill C-25 will establish two oversight bodies, both of which will be independent of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian forces.

The first is the military police complaints commission. Its mandate will be to receive and investigate complaints by any member concerning the conduct of military police in the performance of their duties.

It will also investigate complaints by military police about improper interference in their investigations by members of the Canadian forces and senior departmental officials. That is something that is not done in other police complaints commissions.

Second, the Canadian forces grievance board will make findings and recommendations on certain categories of grievances prior to their being referred to the chief of defence staff for final decision.

If any finding or recommendation of the grievance board is not acted upon, the chief of defence staff will be required to provide reasons in writing for not doing so.

In addition to these oversight bodies, Bill C-25 will impose new review and reporting requirements. The Minister of National Defence will be required to report to parliament on the operation of the act within five years of the amendments coming into force.

Moreover, the Canadian forces grievances board, the military police complaints commission and the judge advocate general will be required to report annually to parliament. This will provide a great deal of opportunity for oversight of many reports coming into the public forum for examination.

These measures will greatly enhance accountability, transparency and increased competence in the military justice system.

The proposed amendments contained in Bill C-25 are the most extensive in the history of the act. They will provide a more modern and effective statutory framework for the operations of the department and the Forces.

They will more closely align military justice processes with judicial processes applicable to other Canadians.

In conjunction with other elements of our comprehensive program of institutional change, these amendments will increase the effectiveness and the efficiency of our armed forces and enable the men and women of the Canadian forces, who do so much for us and do it so well, to do it all even better.