Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege to rise in the House to speak on this legislation. I have been privileged to sit on the justice committee throughout the deliberations and to examine the legislation as it has made its way through the committee stage.
I do support the bill. It is an excellent piece of legislation. I also support my friend's motion which I consider to be a point of philosophical divergence.
There are three points at which a DNA sample could be taken, point of arrest, point of charge, point of conviction. The purpose of this legislation is to give the police access to DNA profiles for the purposes of identifying individuals so they can be linked or not linked as the case may be to crime scenes. It is not conclusive proof but taken with other evidence adds to the weight of evidence against an accused. It also works the other way to eliminate suspects.
We were told at committee stage that a properly gathered sample creates a 1 in 94 billion probability sample. Notwithstanding this high level probability, it is not in and of itself conclusive as to the issue of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The crown would still have to adduce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offence charged. Defence counsel will still attack reliability, credibility, means of gathering the sample, the integrity of the sample, the errors in collection, et cetera. Nevertheless, it is of significant use to police investigation. Canadians have only to witness the Morin inquiry to understand the powerful input of DNA evidence.
If this is such a great tool, then why can the Parliament of Canada not make it readily available to the police? What could be the possible justification for withholding a tool that is readily accessible, surrounded by safeguards for abuse and would be of great assistance in solving outstanding crimes? The issues revolve around the point at which the sample is taken and the means by which the sample is taken. There are three points at which a sample of blood, hair or saliva could be taken, at arrest, charge or conviction.
It was not seriously argued before us that samples should be taken a point of arrest. This would simply create a fishing expedition on the part of the police and imperil the liberty of the citizen. The argument came down to a choice between point of charge and point of conviction. If truth were known many if not all members of the committee would have been content with a charge regime. To lay the charge the police must have reasonable and probable grounds that a crime has been committed. At that time, as a matter of routine, fingerprints and mugshots are taken; similarly, so could DNA samples. The police want to be able to take DNA samples at that point and enter the results in a DNA bank for cross-reference purposes and for identification.
The technology has become so advanced that the taking of a sample is minimally intrusive. Logically if the taking of DNA samples is less intrusive than fingerprinting why should the justice system be deprived of that tool? If it is constitutionally okay to take a fingerprint and a mugshot, why is it not constitutionally okay to take DNA?
Here is where legal theory becomes so arcane and obscure as to lose even the most diligent of students. The core of the argument is that the state is absolutely prohibited from intruding on the sanctity of the person without consent. The person has an absolute right to the integrity of his or her personhood. Therefore the taking of a cell by any means, however intrusive or non-intrusive, is a breach of that person's privacy. The state is absolutely forbidden from doing it.
In addition, the depth and range of material revealed by DNA samples provides to the state a marker of that individual which is not only a complete profile but could be used for other purposes. In other words, the legal wall between the person and the state has been breached and the state knows far more about that individual than it has any right to know.
The argument is of dubious merit for two reasons. The first is the fear of using the profile for purposes other than identification. I believe the committee was not concerned about that issue as the procedures and safeguards were such a series of Chinese walls that it would be virtually impossible to breach those walls.
The second is the issue of invading the privacy of a person. The charter gives protection to the undue invasion of privacy. However, it can be statutorily sanctioned as it is with fingerprinting. If one can invade privacy by statute on fingerprinting, one can also surely do it by DNA sample simultaneously. We are after all legislators and our business is that of creating law. If statute sanctions fingerprinting as not unduly invasive, why cannot DNA sampling by statute, such as this this bill, also be considered to be not unduly invasive? Nice question with no neat answer. The advice of justice lawyers was that if we move the sample from point of conviction down to point of charge the bill would not withstand a charter challenge.
I have been in and around law for about 28 years and consider the views of justice lawyers to be excellent. When you retain lawyers you do not stand up and contradict them easily.
When the matter came to a clause by clause stage the minister and his lawyers from the justice department were quite adamant that the charge regime would not survive a charter challenge. To their credit, their arguments were strong. If we go to a charge regime the bill would not survive a charter challenge.
One week after the bill was taken back to the House justice lawyers were quoted, however, in the front pages of The Globe and Mail as saying every time they go to the supreme court they do not have a clue what will happen. Flip a coin. The supreme court is adrift in a sea of confusion.
The additions of Justices Binnie and Bastarach do not help in predicting the outcome. When this was brought to the attention of the justice minister she stated in committee that she was obtaining three more outside opinions from retired justices. To no one's great surprise, the opinions support the government's position.
This resembles the theatre of the absurd. The Parliament of Canada stands on the sidelines while justice lawyers and their surrogates argue out a position based on established precedent; hardly the point. The motion says in effect we have read your opinions, we have heard your arguments and we are not persuaded.
We believe there are adequate safeguards to protect privacy and sanctity of the person and that search and seizure is warranted in this instance. The tabling of the opinions could amount to the subtle use of a notwithstanding clause.
The bill has a huge hole in it. If Paul Bernardo were sitting in a police station this morning charged with a sexual offence he would not be DNA banked until he was convicted and if not convicted he would never be banked. The police could say to themselves with legitimacy they do not have the resources to do this. He is a blond, blue eyed boy with a job and a home in beautiful downtown Guildwood, which happens to be my riding. They could also state they have a lot more pressing problems than to get a justice warrant. The police in Fredericton who are conducting other investigations would never know about it. Nor would the police in Edmonton. So this is quite a large gap in the legislation.
Members may have detected a bit of skepticism on my part with respect to the efficacy of the bill but I am ultimately persuaded that the good qualities in the bill might be lost to charter challenge. However, I do support this motion and I do wish that the government had exercised a more subtle approach in excising out a charge regime be it on one conviction or on two convictions so that the bill could have a charter challenge at the point where we could try to advance the law in this area.
This brings me to my final point, the doctrine of supremacy of parliament. I was greatly intrigued by the comments of Mr. Justice Cory in the Brin decision. He said that courts use the charter to dialogue with the legislature. Dialogue as experienced by this legislator is more like a monologue. We speak, you listen.
Courts develop legal theory, charter theory about trees and branches and living documents to arrive at conclusions which look suspiciously like ex post facto reasoning, you legislators sit down.
I have been in and around the justice system in Ontario for quite a number of years and consider it to be one of the finest in the world. Ultimately, however, it is a very crude means of resolving disputes. Lawsuits have winners and losers, unevenly resourced litigants and narrow views of relevance materiality.
Legislation such as this is a product of years of analysis, drafting, study and witnesses. The committee spent months looking at this legislation and it went through an extensive consultation process prior to being introduced.
The members of the committee represent in excess of one million people who come from a variety of backgrounds, both philosophical and political. I would argue with little fear of contradiction that if we as a committee had our choice absent charter arguments that we would be presenting a regime based on charge.
In my view judicial attitudes are not consistent with Canadian values on this issue and judges need to know that after extensive debate and analysis parliamentarians are only presenting this bill due to limited and narrow thinking by judicial activists.