Mr. Speaker, I have no idea as to whether the accusation by the member against an official who previously worked there and no longer does is valid. That in itself does not constitute privilege. If indeed the privacy commissioner, the information commissioner, or both have ruled in this matter, that does not constitute privilege in itself.
I draw the attention of the Speaker to citation 31 of Beauchesne's, which states in part: “The failure of the government”, if there is such a failure, which I do not admit, “to comply with the law”, which again I do not admit, “is not a matter for the Speaker, but should be decided by the courts”.
If he alleges that someone did not obey the Access to Information Act, or even another statute, that does not constitute privilege. There has to be an argument regarding privilege, not as to whether someone obeyed the law per se.
Finally, citation 27 states that a question of privilege ought rarely to come up in parliament and that it should be dealt with by a motion. Citation 28 states that it is clear that many acts which might offend against the law or the moral sense of the community do not necessarily offend the privileges of the House.
We really are stretching it. If we are going to start saying that every time someone thinks, rightly or wrongly, that an act of parliament, in this case the allegation that something that was judged by an officer of this House, so there was a remedy, constitutes privilege, that is really overstating it.