Mr. Speaker, as the member of parliament for Edmonton East I am pleased to participate in the debate at report stage of Bill C-9, an act to give effect to the Nisga'a final agreement. My objective is to place on the permanent Hansard record my concern that the implementation of this agreement amounts to indirectly effecting a permanent constitutional amendment, and I believe that is wrong. I also wish to use this opportunity to raise concerns about any course of action in the House that would bind future generations of legislators.
Since no decision or action in the House should ever be considered to be infallible and since our history has shown us time and again that courses of action must change as circumstances change, we should not set a template with the Nisga'a agreement that cannot later be reshaped.
It is generally accepted that the Nisga'a agreement may well serve as a model for future agreements with other aboriginal groups, particularly in British Columbia. Should we as legislators not be concerned that the implementation of this agreement may enshrine in stone a model that would be better subject to later reconsideration and refinement?
I therefore believe that the bill under discussion should have the following qualification: that this agreement is not intended to be and is not in fact, in substance or in form a constitutional amendment and that, accordingly, the agreement may be subject to later reconsideration, revision or amendment by parliament.
With the controversies and court clarifications surrounding the Marshall case, it becomes clear that even justices of the Supreme Court of Canada are fallible. Governments and government policies are similarly fallible. One of the important benefits of any democracy is that governments can be changed, which provides a check against errors being perpetrated. A new government may assess the policies of its predecessor and declare them to be wrong, redundant or badly thought out. The courage and self-confidence of a government in significantly altering or abandoning an entrenched course of action is very important to Canada's future welfare, in aboriginal matters or otherwise.
In short, no government should act in a way such as to permanently bind its successors, unless specifically intending to do so by way of constitutional amendment.
In aboriginal treaty matters, this becomes particularly important given that much of the evidence that formed the basis of current decision making and treaty interpretation is far from being indisputable. Historical renderings of oral traditions are full of nuance, significant differences in interpretation and not easily verified independently. These evidentiary weaknesses become quite evident in the Marshall case. Any discussion based on oral tradition must, by its very nature, be considered to be interpretative rather than grounded on objective fact.
Remembrance Day has recently passed. At this time and in years prior, people were reminded of past prejudices toward aboriginal veterans that give to current grievances. After the second world war, aboriginal veterans had to choose between renouncing their aboriginal status and receiving post-war benefits available to all veterans. Understandably, most were reluctant to give up their birthright. They believed then and believe now that it was unjust to discriminate in post-war veterans benefits based on race. I agree with them and have consistently advocated their position in my capacity as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition critic for veterans affairs.
On September 25, 1998 my colleague from North Vancouver introduced a motion that added clarity to my position with respect to aboriginal veterans. In the context of the current debate, it is very important to remind the House that differences of opinion concerning the Nisga'a agreement do not impede the recognition of general injustices that must be addressed.
We might question how this veteran inequality came about. Simply, it is due to a government trying to balance, many would say juggle, the special rights of some with equal rights of all and then deciding to favour the few, in this case at the cost of aboriginal war veterans rights. Seeing how the federal government absolutely fumbled the play toward handling war veterans rights, it boggles the mind to think how the government will ever decide on the rights of equality for all Canadians. Looking at the Nisga'a agreement, there is an entrenchment of refusal to permit all Canadians on Nisga'a lands to have the same voting rights. What sort of equality is this?
The Bloc Quebecois on my left are salivating over the implications of the ever more special status of government by and for the people of Nisga'a. It is salivating at the opportunity to see these rights enshrined and then interpreted for its own purposes.
With a government so devoid of solutions that it could not resolve the aboriginal war veterans' concerns in 55 years, what chance do we have that it will not interpret the Nisga'a agreement as constitutionally carved in stone, thus becoming precedent setting for separatist purposes.
Advocating a just cause on behalf of the aboriginal community should not blind a parliamentarian to the fact that all such claims are not equally just. A major consequence of the Nisga'a agreement will be the creation of a self-governing community based on race, notwithstanding the fact that non-aboriginals and non-Nisga'a aboriginals have lived and worked in this area of British Columbia for many years. The nature of the franchise of the non-Nisga'a to democratically influence the future of the area is far from certain.
It is also important to remember that the majority of the positions favouring aboriginal self-government do not involve economic self-sufficiency as a precondition to such self-government. The Nisga'a agreement is no different and, in this respect, quite comparable to the creation of Nunavut: self-government which is not preceded by economical self-sufficiency; and self-government funded by settlement payments, which does little to eliminate dependency.
With the 1992 rejection of the Charlottetown accord by the Canadian people, the notion of any distinct society was soundly rejected. We should remember that the distinct aboriginal society component of the Charlottetown accord was similarly rejected. While non-aboriginal Canadians appear prepared to acknowledge that degrees of redress are required to correct past injustices, few are prepared to advocate the creation of third world republics. Few are prepared to advocate the balkanization of Canada through the implementation of hundreds of similar agreements. Few are prepared to support the dedication of taxpayer revenues to fund such balkanization or the self-government falsehoods associated with continuing dependencies. Dependency on public funds, however caused, comes with an obligation to use one's best efforts to end such dependency. A perpetual victim attitude is far from being currently defensible as a means to justify such dependency.
Let me refer once again to my current involvement with the grievances of aboriginal veterans. They are not victims; they cannot be. They are defenders of Canada, all of whom volunteered to defend Canada. They have been subject to an injustice for over half a century. Their current state in life, for better or for worse, is not blamed on this injustice. Perhaps this is because, based on their military background, aboriginal veterans appreciate that individual strength and initiative is necessary to overcome any adversity. In the heat of battle, putting on the victim cloak and blaming others simply increases the likelihood of the battle being lost. The focus must be the larger collective good and one's individual contribution to that good.
In this debate, I hope that the focus will similarly be on the larger collective good, particularly in the longer term, and how our actions here may contribute to that collective good.