Debates of April 12th, 1999

Kosovo

[André Harvey, Progressive Conservative, Chicoutimi, QC]

Mr. Speaker, allow me to salute my colleague who, when it comes to international issues, always has a great deal of common sense and knows how to take into account all the human aspects. Our colleague is quite aware that the decision to involve our young soldiers, our sons and daughters, cannot be taken lightly.

I would like to know what he thinks of the present NATO strategy, which relies exclusively on air to ground strikes.

I would like to ask if he can explain this choice of strategy which, if I may say so, has precipitated the exile of Kosovars. It has also resulted in the destruction of all their physical property and the death of thousands of Kosovars.

We are still not in a position to put a price on the material and human damages caused by this necessary intervention which has not been accompanied by a strategy to counter the invasion by Serb troops.

[Daniel Turp, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that NATO'>s strategy was to favour air strikes, so that the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would quickly, very quickly agree to sit down at the negotiation table.

It was NATO's hope that the destruction of his military capability would prompt Slobodan Milosevic to seek a peaceful settlement and go back to the negotiation table. However, NATO obviously underestimated his ability not only to protect his military arsenal, but also to resist pressure, including international pressure, and thus refuse to go back to the negotiation table.

I think we underestimated that. Even if NATO's foreign ministers maintain that their strategy might work, it has not worked so far.

Ethnic cleansing is continuing and my great fear, which is shared by others, is that ethnic cleansing will lead to genocide. It may be that, technically speaking, we cannot talk about a genocide at this point, but even the closing of the border a few days ago should be cause for concern, because it is the prelude to a possible genocide. Under these circumstances, we must anticipate, or at least consider, ground military action.

We must not let this century end the way it began, with another genocide. Armenians were the victims of genocide at the beginning of the century. Jews were the victims of genocide half way through this century and now, at the end of the century, in addition to Cambodians and Rwandans, we may have the Kosovars.

It is true that military personnel from Quebec and Canada, your sons and daughters, will put their lives on the line if ground troops are sent in, but sometimes the lives of others must be put on the line to ensure the survival of a people. We must not let a people, the Kosovars, who contribute to the world's cultural heritage, disappear by being dispersed all over the planet, as the Serb leader is hoping to do.

[The Deputy Speaker]

The hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General for a brief question.

[Gérard Asselin, Bloc, Charlevoix, QC]

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order.

You were in the chair, and this member already had the opportunity to ask a question of my colleague. I would ask that you give me the chance to do so too.

[The Deputy Speaker]

I gave the floor to the hon. member for Brossard—La Prairie even though I saw the hon. member for Charlevoix rise. I gave a lot of time for the answers to the hon. member for Beauharnois—Salaberry. It was well over a minute, something like three or four minutes. I did that because other members wanted to ask questions.

We have another question now, and that is why I have decided to give the parliamentary secretary the opportunity to ask a question. It will be a 30-second question, and the answer will be just as short.

[Jacques Saada, Liberal, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I was about to say I can feel all the sincerity in my colleague's remarks, but I have a hard time understanding his premise.

He is taking the stand that NATO's air strikes have been unproductive. Maybe he is in the know and I am not, but nothing indicates that they have been unproductive.

He contends that the presence of ground forces will make it easier to put an end to ethnic cleansing and to genocide. This kind of operation is not a matter of hours. I have a hard time understanding the logic of it all.

We should make a clear distinction between what we wish and what the facts really are. Since I have only 30 seconds, I will ask my question later on if I am given another chance.

[Daniel Turp, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I do not mean to downplay the success of NATO's military operation and the fact that it has indeed managed to destroy a good part of the arsenal of the Yugoslav army.

Having said that, the outflow of Kosovars was not slowed down during the air strikes. As I said earlier, we still have today 80,000 displaced persons within Kosovo who could fall victim of Serbian authorities. That would justify the dispatch of ground troops.

[George Proud, Liberal, Hillsborough, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra.

It is a pleasure for me to take part in this debate this evening. I want to speak on our role in Kosovo, where we are and where I believe we should be heading.

Today, as NATO has just celebrated its 50th anniversary, it is clear that it has become history's most successful alliance. Recently NATO's role in Yugoslavia is the most visible confirmation of the enduring value of a transatlantic alliance for strong security in Europe.

Kosovo is a region that demands our attention. It has historically been subjected to many different types of conflict. I would like to look at the historical context in which Kosovo is placed today while shedding some light on the brutal nature of Mr. Milosevic's regime.

Conflict has plagued Kosovo for hundreds of years. The humanitarian crisis in Kosovo is the most recent manifestation of a long history of conflict for Kosovars. Time does not allow me to chronicle the history.

If we look to the period in the mid-20th century following the breakup of Yugoslavia by the axis powers in April 1941, most of Kosovo was incorporated into an Italian controlled greater Albania. At this time the Kosovars collaborated with the fascist state. Kosovo saw little stability in this period. It was not until another oppressive regime took power in 1944 that Kosovars began to see some sort of consistency in their lives, the communists.

Under the communists, Kosovars were still oppressed. In July 1945 the communist-dominated assembly voted for the voluntary union of Kosovo with the republic of Serbia within a Yugoslav federation. Yugoslavia's Albanians were treated as a national minority with no right to a republic of their own. Clearly the voices of Kosovars were not heard.

Oppression of individual liberties is the hallmark of the communist regime. The state security police, through extensive surveillance and harassment, oppressed Albanians. This harassment was so severe that between 1945 and 1966 over 200,000 moved to Turkey.

The treatment of Kosovar Albanians has consistently been terrible, but it pales in comparison to the depths of depravity that Mr. Milosevic has reached. The difference between Mr. Milosevic's reign of terror and what we saw at the period after the war is that Mr. Milosevic wants to murder, rape and squeeze every bit of humanity out of these people.

I have chosen to look at this time period because it took place in the 20th century context. It was only 55 years ago that Kosovo was under the control of a fascist regime. It was only 50 years ago that NATO was formed to provide for the collective security of the North Atlantic. It was only 24 hours ago when women and children were raped and murdered. It was only 24 hours ago when the fathers of these children were lined up against a wall and shot in the back.

What we are dealing with in this debate is not history. It is the present. As we speak, atrocities are taking place that cannot be left unnoticed. As we sit here this evening, people are being shot like sitting ducks for the entire world to see.

Canada as a member of NATO must act promptly, decisively and without hesitation to restore peace. NATO was designed to do this and to do anything else would be a waste of our time and money. NATO acted quickly in Bosnia. NATO actions in Bosnia illustrate how it was called upon to ensure peace in a military role.

In 1992 a terrible conflict exploded in Bosnia-Hercegovina. During the next three years, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and over two million were forced from their homes. The missions assumed by NATO in the former Yugoslavia played a critical role in bringing peace to Bosnia, while at the same time affirming that NATO was doing its job quickly and effectively.

NATO first became involved in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 by deploying ships and aircraft to monitor UN sanctions on the Adriatic and the no fly zone over Bosnia. In 1993 this monitoring shifted to enforcement. Following the UN security council's adoption of resolution 836 in June, NATO offered close air support to the United Nations protection force, UNPROFOR, that was on the ground in Bosnia. Shortly thereafter, NATO began to develop air strike options to help lift the siege of Sarajevo and undertook its first combat action in February 1994 when allied aircraft shot down four aircraft violating the UN no fly zone.

NATO continued to take a more active role in promoting stability when it bombed a Bosnian Serb arms depot in May 1995. The Bosnian Serbs responded by taking UN peacekeepers as hostages. Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica and Zepa, safe areas, in July. It became clear that diplomacy, humanitarian peacekeeping and humanitarian air strikes had reached their limits, much like the failed Rambouillet agreement.

Under the authority of UN resolution 836, NATO responded by initiating a three week campaign of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets. This operation, named Deliberate Force, delivered over 1,000 munitions, including 700 smart bombs and cruise missiles. The operation was a success. It reached its objective of reducing the threat to Sarajevo and deterring future attacks on the safe areas.

I cannot stress how important NATO's role was in Bosnia-Hercegovina. NATO had an objective in Bosnia and it reached it. We have an objective in Kosovo and we must reach it too. This common objective was the prevention of loss of life and the escalation of violence.

Many people do not realize how repressive this man is. In January of this year observers from the Kosovar Verification Mission discovered the bodies of 45 Albanians in the village of Racak. According to the observers the victims, including one child and three women, were killed by Serb security forces. The international community was quick to unanimously condemn this act of mass murder. But what good does universal condemnation do when people continue to die? Our number one priority is to stop the brutal killing and the destruction of human lives and property in Kosovo. We need action, not words. Acting is what we are doing.

Following this massacre, Serb forces entered the village of Racak. This led to fighting between Serb forces and the separatists in the whole area around the villages. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that over 5,000 people were driven out of this village by the fighting. Just today we read in the newspaper reports from Albania of how ethnic Albanian women and girls were publicly stripped and then raped by Serb militia as they tried to leave Kosovo.

Yesterday masked gunmen shot and killed one of Yugoslavia's most prominent journalists outside his home. This happened after a pro Milosevic newspaper accused him of supporting the NATO bombing campaign. This is absolute madness. NATO has taken an active role in the past and should continue to pursue peace and stability.

As members of this transatlantic alliance, we as Canadians cannot sit idly by and watch Milosevic's reign of terror beat people to the ground. We have fought for what we believe in and we should continue to press forward in our fight to relieve the people of Kosovo of their pain. How can we not support NATO air strikes? Can we sit and watch as women are raped in front of their children, as fathers are shot in front of their children? No, I think not.

It is for people like Milosevic that we have security organizations like NATO. As I illustrated earlier, NATO acted in Bosnia-Hercegovina to neutralize the Bosnian Serbs. We have spent years ensuring that someone like Milosevic cannot bully people, cannot do as the fascists did in the second world war.

Billions of dollars and years of planning and policy discussion, all for the collective security of NATO member countries. All of this designed to use the tool of last resort to ensure that peace is maintained. We should use it when all of our other options are no longer viable.

It was made clear a long time ago that Mr. Milosevic did not see the United Nations and NATO as serious, capable organizations. The failure of the Rambouillet meetings illustrated that Mr. Milosevic does not want peace and does not want to stop the killing. When one tyrant can cause so much death and destruction, it is apparent that we as Canadians must act. It makes me proud that we have done so. It makes me proud that we will continue to support our NATO initiative in whatever way we must.

Our actions must diminish the capabilities of the Yugoslav army and the special forces who have committed atrocities against civilians in Kosovo. Our air campaign will allow us to meet this objective. It may take some time, but our NATO allies knew from the start that degrading Yugoslavia's military capabilities would take time. I think we must remain committed to our present policy of full support of NATO in this air campaign.

[Peter MacKay, Progressive Conservative, Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the hon. member for Hillsborough for his very articulate remarks. He makes a very compelling case for the actions taken thus far in this horrific crisis emerging in Kosovo. My question that I would direct to the hon. member is along these lines.

I know the hon. member was present for the remarks made by the Prime Minister. He will recall the Prime Minister's quite accurate statement that there is a need for unity not only in the House but in this country as we support the NATO action or the actions of our troops.

To that end, I ask the question, is there not an opportunity, and should there not be an opportunity in the House for the parliamentary expression of the will of this support and this unconditional feeling that we want to put forward to encourage our troops and send them a message that we in parliament support that action? Can the hon. member think of a more compelling case for an opportunity to have a vote in which that expression could take place on the floor of the House of Commons? I can think of none.

[George Proud, Liberal, Hillsborough, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his remarks and his question.

I believe that parliament should always play a role in these things. I also believe that government is elected to govern and there are certain things that government has to do whether we like it or not.

Even in one of the most powerful legislatures in the world, that of the United States, the Government of the United States has the power to commit troops to areas of conflict and then the U.S. congress debates it, probably before it happens but most times after it happens.

This is an ongoing debate among all parliamentarians. I would like to see the debate take place, but there are some things that government has to do. One does not want to lay one's cards out on the table. If one is going to send troops into certain areas, one does not want to tell the people before one does that. There are certain things one must let government do and hopefully it will do it in the best interests of all Canadians.

[Jay Hill, Reform, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, my congratulations as well to the hon. member for Hillsborough for an excellent presentation. With all due respect, he did not adequately address in his answer the question of my colleague from the Progressive Conservative Party about the vote.

Perhaps the hon. member for Hillsborough is a bit confused. What the opposition is asking for is not whether we commit or vote on committing ground troops at this time. We recognize that decision will be made at some time in the future. What we were endeavouring to do today during Oral Question Period, and what we will continue to try to do during this debate this evening until the wee hours of the morning I am sure, is to get a commitment from the government that if the government does move to commit ground troops in the future, it will only be after a full and open debate in the House culminating in a vote.

I do not understand what is so difficult about getting a commitment, not only from the Prime Minister, but from all government members of parliament on that very issue of democracy in this parliament.

[George Proud, Liberal, Hillsborough, PE]

Mr. Speaker, as I said in the previous answer to my colleague, I think that debate must take place if we are to send ground troops. There is nothing in my estimation that is more important than having a debate on this issue.

The other thing about it is I am not convinced that these air strikes will not do the job. We are 21 days into it now and it could go on for a couple more weeks.

I am sure the damage being done will bring Mr. Milosevic's army and his people to heel at the end of the day. I am convinced that the air strikes will do the job. I am sure the troops that we will be committing there after the fact will be peacekeepers. I am sure we will have a debate in the House because governments have to govern and there are things they have to do. I see no reason to say that we should have a vote on it at this time.

[Louise Hardy, NDP, Yukon, YT]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague mentioned that we knew how ruthless Milosevic was. Under those conditions, knowing how ruthless he was, why were we not prepared for the tragedy that has followed? Why were we so unprepared to look after the refugees? Why are we still unprepared to look after the humanitarian destruction that has followed?

I think this debate should be what gives us time to stop and look at where we went wrong because we went wrong somewhere if we have achieved the exact opposite of what we wanted, which was safety for the Albanian people.

[George Proud, Liberal, Hillsborough, PE]

Mr. Speaker, we are doing everything we can. Maybe we can do more for humanitarian aid. We are putting up millions of dollars. We are sending people in to look after the refugees. We have offered to bring the refugees to Canada. This has probably changed at the present time. We are probably going to send them to the surrounding countries.

I believe Canada does not have to take a back seat to any country in what we have done to give humanitarian aid to these people in the terrible, stressful time they are having.

[Ted McWhinney, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, this debate is a reprise of two earlier debates on October 7, 1998 and February 17, 1999.

I had posed some questions to opposition parties during the first debate. In a very real sense we can see law emerging from this process of discussion and give and take. We do not actually need a vote. Sometimes we get more consensus the other way.

It is elementary that the United Nations charter outlawed the recourse to armed force and military action except in the two extraordinary situations sanctioned by the charter; that is individual or collective self-defence or action under Chapter VII of the charter, the peacemaking sections. I temporarily overlooked Articles 53 and 107, the enemy states sections which authorize actions without any limits. They are still there against Germany and Japan but they are anachronisms.

It is also true that regional security organizations, being legal creatures of the charter and subject to the charter, cannot partake of any legal powers higher than or in conflict with the powers of the security council. That is explicit in Chapter VIII of the charter. In other words, a regional security organization cannot hoist itself by its own bootstraps into a legal power to use armed force that it does not have under the charter.

These were rules which, after the one exception of the Korean War in 1950, the world community was able to live under during the cold war because, in spite of some perhaps contemporary views, the cold war system of public order maintained a strong regulation of the political-territorial status quo of Yalta and the other wartime agreements.

What we have seen though at the end of the cold war is the breakdown of this post-war system of order and the breakdown in consequence of some of those artificial multinational states that were created by the Versaille treaty and maintained by Yalta and other instruments thereafter. The new century, contrary to the general view of a century of progress and enlightenment, may well turn out to be the century of inter-ethnic conflict. We are rediscovering in a very horrifying way the pre-1914 conflicts in which the Balkans, of course, were the cockpits of Europe as Bismarck said.

To go back to this general issue, what are we to do in a present situation where a crisis faces the world community, but where, in the view of many governments, action under Chapter VII of the charter is inhibited by the fear—which may or may not be unfounded until it is tested—of the exercise of a veto by a permanent member of the security council? Russia or China are the ones that have been fingered.

We should not forget that in the Korean War of 1950, President Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, developed in a very imaginative way the recourse to the UN general assembly, the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It was adopted by 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions. It basically stated that although the security council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, if it is blocked by wilful obstruction in the use of the veto then the general assembly has plenary powers to act.

I think that is a useful precedent. I wonder if it could not be used in the present situation if we are unable to take further action compatibly with the charter.

We must remember that there is no veto in the general assembly. An ordinary two-thirds majority applies and the general assembly can be called into being with a 24 hour notice in an emergency situation.

In the debates in the House, those two debates I referred to, I raised this new concept of humanitarian intervention. Admittedly it has some difficult antecedents. One was what might be called the colonialist power of intervention asserted in the 19th century by Britain, France, Germany and other countries, sometimes cloaked as reprisals. That is generally considered anachronistic. Some of us would also remember that during the cold war it was asserted by the bloc leaders on both sides. Everyone will remember the situation of the intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Prague in 1968, the so-called hegemonial intervention, that you can intervene to enforce solidarity within your own bloc.

However, there are other antecedents to this which should not be confused with those past interventions. One of the more interesting developments is the attempt to flesh out, to give new parameters defining modalities for this concept of humanitarian intervention which is likely to be the weapon we need to cope with this inter-ethnic conflict that is going to be with us.

I do regret that it has not been felt possible to involve the United Nations more firmly in the process to date. However, there is nothing to prevent the United Nations from being accommodated to the crisis problem solving as it develops.

The Minister for International Cooperation has already recognized the primacy of the United Nations in the general policy aspects of humanitarian care and control of refugees. One had hints which come close to some suggestions on the opposition side that it might be possible to accommodate, within a framework of an international military force now limited to NATO, non-NATO members. There is nothing to prevent the United Nations from authorizing an international force in which NATO might be the prime element but which could include Russian troops or other troops. It could even be put under U.S. command. If this sounds rather strange, it was in fact the solution found in the Korean War of 1950 with an American commander-in-chief but under the political control of the United Nations. When he exceeded his powers, and he was a very strong personality, he was fired by his president after consultation with the secretary general of the United Nations.

The possibility is there and it is possible in a phase 2 of the operations to control the crisis in Yugoslavia. That would be the best and most productive way to proceed.

I would also suggest the use of the world court. I listened carefully to the member for Beauharnois—Salaberry. He touched on this but I would like to suggest that the court is available and it can give decisions on very short notice, the reasons sometimes come later. Fleshing out the limitations to this concept of humanitarian intervention, it cannot solely be limited to one country's own conception of what is right and wrong. We get into the Latin legal phrase, quod licet Jovi, licet bovi. What is allowed to Jupiter on high must be allowed also to the humble ox. There are other countries around the world whose jurists have been in touch with me over the last few weeks saying, “Why can't we do this?” It suggests that we should put this as far as possible in the next phase into United Nations' hands.

I would also like to get a ruling on the limitations as to aerial bombardment. It is often forgotten that the rules of aerial bombardment are not what they were in World War II where members will notice it was not a count in the Nuremberg indictments. The additional protocols in 1977 in a very real sense limit the capacity to conduct aerial bombardment. I think it would help to have a world court ruling on this.

Why do I speak of law? It is simply because I am reminded of another American president, President Kennedy, who had advice from his security advisers, among others, to bomb those missile bases in Cuba. President Kennedy's answer was essentially that a great state is not armed solely with the law, it has its armed power, but the essence of wise decision making is to choose those modalities that solve the problem that are compatible with international law.

President Kennedy's peaceful solution to the Cuban missile crisis is a textbook case in all our university courses on United Nations law and it is a model to follow. I welcome the suggestions that I discern in the opposition and I discern in some of the government answers that there will be an increasing attempt to phase in the operations with the United Nations. That is the more traditional Canadian way, that we operate through the international authority, through the United Nations. In the particular circumstances, it may not have been possible to be so at the beginning, but it is possible to be so at the end.

[Jim Abbott, Reform, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I was very interested in the speaker's premise. I would just like to develop it a little bit further.

In terms of intervention for humanitarian reasons, here we have NATO, which has historically been a defensive organization, suddenly turning offensive. Under what basis, what authority, does he see this happening? Why are we not intervening, for example, in East Timor? What would happen if an altercation occurred between China and Taiwan? What would happen in the Basque? What authority is there?

Surely, as a professor on this topic, he undoubtedly has some thoughts on this. What authority does he really see NATO involved in the way in which it is involved in this very aggressive intervention?

[Ted McWhinney, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, NATO was involved because to those making the immediate decisions it was the only organization seen to be ready and able to act. However, I have my own doubts about it because the alliance is strictly a defensive one. It is even more limited than the normal regional security organization.

It should not be assumed, however, that there may not be a sufficient legal base in itself. When President Truman launched the Uniting for Peace resolution it was a revolutionary act, but it is entered into UN history because it is obviously good and sensible.

Let us face it, in terms of Canadian policies in international organizations, the general assembly is a much more democratic and open body than the security council. We have been arguing for a reform of the security council. We get nowhere because the veto of the permanent members applies to amendments of the charter designed so the security council should yield to the general assembly.

[Gérard Asselin, Bloc, Charlevoix, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the question is not to know whether or not we are going to vote. The opposition had indeed asked the government to hold a debate to better inform the public, because those who do not watch any of the reports on the news networks do not know what is going on.

We know that Canada is supporting the UN to defend the Kosovars in that war-torn land. But while we are debating this issue here tonight to better inform the public, how many children will die? How many women will be raped and killed while we have this debate tonight? How many seniors will die?

The question I would like to put to my hon. colleague is the following: what part will Canada continue to play if NATO decides to dispatch ground troops? If this decision is made, we know that 200,000 soldiers will have to be sent to Kosovo tomorrow morning. Is Canada prepared to take part in ground operations and meet all the requirements? We are part of things right now, we are caught up in the system. How far will we have to go?

[Ted McWhinney, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, our role is necessarily limited by the size of our army and by our public defence system. There are only four planes, I think.

Of course, we have no control over the rules of the game. Nonetheless, since we are members of NATO, we were asked to co-operate, and we did so for these reasons. Even though our contribution is more of a symbol than a display military might, I think that our membership in the alliance created an obligation for us. But we must ask whether NATO is adapted to today's reality. That is the key question, in my view. The renewal of NATO seems to be a pressing issue more than ever.

[Svend Robinson, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I welcome the member's support for the suggestion of our leader and our party with respect to the possibility of an OSCE or a UN peacekeeping force as opposed to a NATO force.

I wonder if the member would also like to comment on the application of article 52 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties which explicitly forbids coercion and force to compel any state to sign a treaty or agreement. In light of that and in light of the element in the Rambouillet accord which put NATO at the heart of peacekeeping, does the hon. member not feel that there is a conflict?

[Ted McWhinney, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, on the first question which the hon. member raised, certainly part of the consensus that emerged during our two debates in October last year and in February was looking toward international organizations. If it could not be a force sanctioned by the security council, then it could be the OSCE, which has the advantage of having the former Soviet Union as a member. Therefore, we would have its co-operation.

Nevertheless, like NATO it is also an organization that in many respects is out of date. It is there to preserve the Helsinki accords, which themselves were to preserve the Yalta division of Europe. I am not sure that the OSCE is the answer. I would say that we should go back to the general assembly.

I respect article 52 of the Vienna convention and the member's interpretation of it.

[Svend Robinson, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I value the opportunity to participate in this very important and significant debate. I deeply regret the decision of the government to equivocate with respect to the role of parliament and the role of each elected member of this House in making a decision with respect to the issue of the possible use of ground troops. I do not understand why it is that our government and our Prime Minister have taken the position which ultimately amounts to contempt for the role of elected representatives.

I listened with interest to the Conservative questioners. My colleague from Winnipeg Transcona and I were here in 1990 and 1991 and we certainly recall our efforts to get a vote from the then Conservative government. It stonewalled and refused to act until long after the military action had taken place in Iraq, which began on January 15. I think history has to be remembered in that instance.

I rose in this House 19 days ago on behalf of my colleagues to speak in another debate. It was a take note debate with respect to the pending decision to support the use of NATO aerial attacks in Kosovo. We were then faced with compelling and moving evidence of an impending humanitarian disaster, one which in many respects had already started to take place: the burning of villages, the destruction of people's homes, mass expulsions, murder, torture and rape.

I remember vividly the assurances given by ministers, privately, in committee and elsewhere, that this firm course of action with air strikes would bring an early return to the negotiating table and hopefully an end to the ethnic cleansing which all of us in this House deplore.

At that time, in the absence of what we felt was any other viable alternative to stop the humanitarian tragedy, we supported the decision to proceed.

Today, 19 days later, where are we? We know that our troops, based at Aviano and elsewhere, have performed an outstanding job under very difficult circumstances. We know the fear of their families and indeed their own fear at a time like this and we extend our support to them, as well as to the aid workers on the ground.

We are deeply impressed by the incredible generosity of Canadians who have opened their homes and their hearts to refugees. It has not happened yet, but certainly I know my hon. colleague from Winnipeg North Centre and others have been playing a leading role in encouraging our government to continue this generosity.

Here we are 19 days later with NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels. What have they come up with in terms of new approaches and a new strategy? They have decided to continue the air attacks. Continue, keep going, make them even stronger.

Quite clearly this situation is a human and a military catastrophe, both for the Kosovars and Albanians who have been driven out of their homes, villages and communities; not just outside Kosovo, but up into the mountains. They are hiding within Kosovo itself. Their villages continue to be burned and they continue to be raped. As well, too many innocent civilians have been killed by the bombing. I have to ask: Why bomb a Yugoslavian car plant which also involved the killing of innocent civilians?

Our defence critic raised questions about the use of depleted uranium in U.S. antitank weapons. These are serious questions for which we are awaiting answers from the Minister of National Defence.

My colleagues and I have all had harrowing personal stories told to us by those who are affected by this tragedy. It was brought home to me when a Serbian constituent phoned. He said “How do I explain to my daughter that her government, the Government of Canada, is bombing her grandmother's home?”

Within a couple of hours I had an anguished call from a Kosovar Albanian living in Canada who said that he was unable to contact his parents. Silence. He has no idea. There is fear and uncertainty in not knowing what is happening to them.

We have to ask the question: What do we do now? How do we answer these anguished questions of our constituents and, indeed, of Canadians?

Today our leader, the hon. member for Halifax, called once again on our government to put diplomacy and negotiations and not bombing at the heart of our strategy. She reiterated the call which my hon. colleague from Halifax West and I made at the meeting of the national defence and veterans affairs committee on March 31. It was a call for Canada to show leadership within NATO and within the United Nations for an immediate return to the negotiating table; not with a whole list of conditions, but with two basic conditions: first, an end to the atrocities on the ground, the brutality, the ethnic cleansing and the crimes against humanity; and second, an end to the bombing. With those two conditions accomplished there would be a return to the table.

When we get to the table there are a couple of key points that must be considered. First, we have to recognize that Rambouillet is, for all intents and purposes, dead. In fact, given the inclusion in the Rambouillet accord of the provision for NATO peacekeeping troops, I think many of us in retrospect would say that this was an impossible condition for Milosevic to take back to the Serbian government.

There were alternatives. Indeed, there are alternatives. One alternative, of course, is not to have a NATO peacekeeping force but a force under United Nations jurisdiction, under OSCE jurisdiction. Instead we heard again today from our Minister of National Defence the statement that he made as recently as last Friday, that this has to be a NATO-led force. That is fatal to any significant negotiated agreement in this area.

We appeal to the minister to recognize that and to recognize the absolutely critical role that Russia must play as well in these negotiations. It has been effectively sidelined, silenced and shut out. It proposed a G-8 meeting. We understand that may happen and we welcome that. However, both in negotiations and in peacekeeping on the ground Russia must be involved.

What form will Kosovo take after negotiations? It is very difficult to say. There again, Rambouillet is likely a dead letter. To talk about autonomy within the context of what has taken place recently is very difficult to imagine. It may be that there will be some sort of international protectorate, but we will have to examine that with care.

The fundamental point that we as New Democrats are underlining is that the United Nations and the OSCE must play the leading role in negotiations. We called for a special emergency meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Once again, we are appealing for that.

I am splitting my time, Mr. Speaker. I have a couple of minutes left, so I will try to be brief.

We are calling for a special meeting of the UN general assembly. At the same time we want to acknowledge the very important contribution made by groups such as Project Ploughshares, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, the Regina Peace Council, the Canadian Peace Alliance, Voices of Women, End the Arms Race and many others in urging an alternative approach, an approach that involves peaceful negotiations.

NATO is clearly not the answer. There is a double standard in NATO's approach. It is silent, for example, on the appalling situation of the Kurds in Turkey. Then there is the approach taken by the United States within NATO. It has contempt for its obligations to the United Nations. It has not paid its dues. It ignores the call for an international criminal court. It ignores the international court of justice. I could go on and on. It supports ruthless dictators. This is not the body to enforce a new humanitarian law.

We call, along with Project Ploughshares and others, for a new mechanism to legitimize within the framework of the United Nations peaceful humanitarian intervention.

I want to again note our thanks to those groups—

[The Speaker]

Perhaps in the questions and comments you could mention them. I will now entertain questions and comments.

[Sue Barnes, Liberal, London West, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to the hon. member. I recall in March 1998 when the UN passed a resolution. Early in the fall we passed another resolution. Both of those resolutions attempted to peacefully convince the sides to come together. That has not happened. At the security council we had blockage and intransigence.

However, there have been some helpful signs, some from unexpected quarters. In this area history has shown that not everyone comes into this situation with totally clean hands.

During part of the last two weeks I have talked to many people in my riding, including Serbian Canadians, who have real concerns and maybe a different point of view. I support what we are doing within NATO, but I would welcome some intervention by the UN.

Russia has given some indication of wanting to involve itself in negotiations. What is the member's feelings on the involvement of Russia as a potential broker of a new rapprochement between these parties?

[Svend Robinson, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues have said it is the key. There is no question that Russia must be involved at the heart of these negotiations. That is one of the reasons we have called for that consistently.

Russia's position with respect to NATO peacekeeping troops is that it is a non-starter, so we have to re-examine that as well.

Of course we have to bring the United Nations much further into the loop. However, there is a lot of wisdom in civil society that has been ignored. Our government could show some leadership in convening, both within Canada and internationally, some sort of an international forum to seek alternatives to simple air strikes and bombing. There is that wisdom and we should be calling on it, both in Canada and internationally.