moved that:
That, in the opinion of this House, the government should have a standing committee of the House of Commons hold public hearings on every proposed procurement of goods or services by the Canadian Armed Forces valued at more than $100 million, in order to ensure that the procurement process is transparent and fair to all concerned.
Madam Speaker, I will begin with the following question: Why did I move such a motion?
On numerous occasions, examples of insufficient spending on the part of National Defence have been raised in the daily newspapers and in the House, and there have also been examples of heavier spending, in fact, very substantial spending.
Looking at these examples, one could not help but conclude that what applies to minor spending ought to apply equally to major spending, which is the reason for this motion.
In the past, National Defence's goods and services procurement procedures have experienced numerous failures. I want to go into a few examples of these.
First of all, the purchase of the utility tactical transport helicopters known as the Griffons. Cabinet approved this on April 7, 1992, and Treasury Board assented on September 8, 1992. The very next day, a $754.5 million contract for the purchase of some 100 Griffon helicopters, a flight simulator, and other equipment, plus related documentation and services, was awarded.
The first aircraft was delivered in March 1995, and the last in January 1998. The estimated total cost of the project was $1.2 billion, according to the auditor general's April 1998 report.
It can therefore be seen that the project went $445 million over budget, more than 59% over budget. It has cost $1.2 billion rather than $754.5 million.
The Griffon replaced three other models of helicopter, which were retired: the CH-118 Iroquois, the CH-135 Twin Huey and the CH-136 Kiowa.
The auditor general made many criticisms with respect to the selection of this helicopter. I refer to the April 1998 auditor general report, which states that “it appears there was a review of how a single aircraft could replace two types but departmental officials could not produce a copy of it”.
Other documents as well were lost only God knows how.
A study done in August 1992, after the department had decided on the Griffon, showed that its load capacity was less than that required to transport a gun or engineer equipment. Its load capacity for evacuating wounded and for logistical support was also lower than required.
In its response, the department stated that the lack of capacity could be made up by the support provided by allied aircraft. In other words, the equipment we are unable to load in our helicopters could be loaded with the help of our good neighbours. That is the good neighbour strategy. So much for Canada's sovereignty in the area of national defence.
The department concluded that to buy only one type of utility tactical transport helicopters would cost less than to modernize and maintain a fleet made up of several types of aircraft. However, the auditor general demonstrated that the operating cost of the new helicopter would be 20% to 40% higher than that of the aircraft to be replaced.
The department bought the aircraft from the only supplier it consulted. Only one supplier was consulted. This is a commercial aircraft and not a military one. Other types of helicopter were turned down. Life cycle costs for other aircraft, which might have been lower, were not considered.
This aircraft has a limited reconnaissance capability, and the auditor general concluded that the tactical studies did not adequately justify replacing two divergent aircraft types with one, and that they were concluded too late in the process to affect decision making. In addition, the studies called into question the suitability of the aircraft that was selected.
The acquisition of search and rescue helicopters is another example. They are the Cormorant helicopters, the ones in the notorious helicopter contract.
On April 23, 1998, the Minister of National Defence announced the purchase of 15 Cormorant search and rescue helicopters from a British-Italian consortium, E.H. Industries. The total value of this contract was $777 million, with $580 million for the aircraft and $197 million for project management, training, parts, integrated logistic support, and a small contingency fund.
Delivery to the Canadian forces should commence in the summer of 2000 and be concluded by the spring of 2002. The financial resources for this program are provided for in the February 1997 federal budget, and they are within the existing financial framework.
Four helicopter manufacturers were competing for this contract. There was E.H. Industries, which manufactures model AW-520 or the Cormorant; Boeing, an American manufacturer offering the Chinook; Eurocopter, which manufactures the Cougar; and Sikorsky, an American company manufacturing the Maplehawk.
Initially the cost of acquiring helicopters was some $593 million. This was reduced to $580 million, because a saving was made by having the helicopters picked up at the manufacturer in Italy, rather than having them delivered to Canada.
E.H. Industries expected providing the Canadian forces with helicopters would mean jobs totalling 5,000 person years for Canadians over the life of the eight year contract.
E.H. Industries also undertook to provide major industrial and regional benefits before the conclusion of the contract. So, it made a commitment to spend a total of $629 million on industrial and regional benefits.
Here again, of the $593 in industrial and regional benefits already distributed—that is what we were told in May 1998—$318 million will go to Quebec companies. The E.H. Industries consortium in Canada includes Bombardier, located in Montreal, Canadian Helicopter Corporation, in St. John's, Newfoundland, and Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg.
There are other examples of major purchases. I mention here the purchase of 35 helicopters intended this time for maritime patrol. The purchase of these new helicopters has become necessary because it is time to get rid of the thirty or so Sea King helicopters from the 1960s. Every hour of flying time requires an average of 21 hours of maintenance, according to the army. In addition, the army also says that they have to be stripped down almost entirely after every 500 hours' flying time.
The Sea Kings are based on warships. They fight submarines, acting as the eyes and ears of the frigates.
Minister Eggleton, like his predecessor, asked his staff for a study on the possibility of renting helicopters instead of buying them. The acquisition cost of 35 helicopters is estimated at $2 to $3 billion. As for the search and rescue helicopter contract, Eurocopter is in contention for this new contract.
In 1997, this company lost out in the bidding process for 15 maritime search and rescue helicopters. Bitter, it even threatened to sue the government and its competitors. It would have been useful to have a committee of the House compare the bids at the time so that parliamentarians could see them and make absolutely sure that we made the right choice.
Members will recall that, originally, the Department of National Defence had called for 50 aircraft, that is 15 search and rescue helicopters and 35 maritime patrol helicopters. However, in 1993, the Liberals cancelled the EH-101 contract, saying that the contract, which was awarded by the Conservatives, was too expensive. We demanded a lot of explanation at the time but never got the information we wanted.
The cancellation of this contract cost taxpayers a whopping $478.3 million, or almost half a billion dollars.
Today, with regard to the search and rescue capability, the Liberal government would have us believe that it saved money, even taking into account the cost of cancelling the EH-101 contract. Let us wait and see how much this contract for 35 new aircraft will cost taxpayers. Again, in this case, we think that the opportunity to discuss this issue before a standing committee of the House would help shed some light on the real terms of the contract.
I will now deal with the auditor general's report on DND, dated April 1998 . It shows that DND bought military equipment that does not meet the needs of our troops. In other words, the department is badly mismanaging its budget.
Out of six major capital equipment projects worth a total of $3.3 billion, half the projects scrutinized by the auditor general do not meet the pre-established needs of the military. Therefore, 60% of the $3.3 billion worth of capital equipment purchased does not even meet the real needs of the army.
Another example is the Leopard thermal weapon sight. On September 19, 1996, Treasury Board officially approved a project to install a thermal weapon sight on Leopard tanks.
The total estimated cost of the project is $145 million. The results of tactical analyses on how to upgrade the Leopard do not justify the decision to improve only the night vision system. Indeed, the army established that the upgrading of the whole vehicle, including the gun and the armour, was the minimum that would have been acceptable.
According to DND, a detailed analysis of existing options was not carried out for financial reasons. DND decided that purchasing the thermal weapon sight was the only affordable option. However the auditor general found no study showing this option optimized the financial resources of the army.
As part of a 1992 study by the Canadian forces, contracting out was considered. However, they came to the conclusion that no Canadian firm could supply this service and it was therefore preferable to buy the equipment. However the department did not bother calculating the cost of contracting out this service.
Then there was the project to replace the Lynx, the Coyote project.
In 1992, the government announced it was purchasing 299 light armoured reconnaissance vehicles and related support equipment. A contract was signed in March 1993. The total cost approved by Treasury Board was $883,686,000 for the budget year. The vehicles were delivered in March 1996 and January 1998.
The Coyote provides the army with a reconnaissance capability. The tactical concept adopted for the Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicle was based on various studies, including the simulation study used for the Leopard C1. This study showed that, without the support of a powerful force, a vehicle with armour like the Coyote's could not withstand enemy fire during a battle of average intensity. There again, the vehicle acquired was not suited to the needs of the army.
The study also showed that this type of vehicle could certainly not be used by a multipurpose force. Units using this kind of vehicle should be considered light units with limited means and should perform only limited tasks.
At the time of the audit by the auditor general, Canadian forces were still conducting trials to determine how the Coyotes could best be used. The assistant deputy minister, materiel, and the vice chief of defence staff ordered that Coyotes be bought on the basis of prime necessity. However, no other vehicles had been tested.
These are enough examples to justify the motion.
However, I will deal with the conclusions reached by the auditor general in April 98. He concluded that the Department of Defence relied on simplistic judgments for complex purchases, that it relied very little on equipment use plans in its studies and that the choice of materiel it ends up buying is not based on the results of the studies carried out.
This probably explains why, for 12 maritime coastal defence vessels, the department bought two units of a mechanical minesweeping device that is only effective against specific types of mines. This probably also explains why it did not buy all the necessary equipment that would allow its ships to conduct effective night patrols in poor visibility. In other words, we are well protected, but only during the daytime and when the weather is fine.
For taxpayers in Quebec and Canada, this waste of public money is unacceptable. It is also a major cause for concern, since DND plans to spend close to $6.5 billion over the next five years.
Once again, the federal government is mismanaging our tax dollars, and taxpayers in Quebec and Canada would be well advised to see to this.
We must change the defence department's way of doing things. On February 11, 1999, the auditor general appeared before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to provide an update on that department's procurement policy.
On that occasion, the auditor general levelled criticism at the defence department's way of doing things. The department now has a plan of action to reform its procurement process, but that plan is incomplete and it does not go far enough.
For example, the purpose of the pilot project component is to test certain procurement concepts. However, several of these projects will not be completed before September 2000. Moreover, the pilot projects selected are relatively unimportant.
Conversely, in Great Britain, the smart procurement initiative was much for audacious. It led to a broad reform of the procurement proposals process, which could lead to a closer partnership between government and the private sector.
Contrary to what is done here, the British have literally opted for their major procurement items, namely their aircraft carriers, attack submarines and Apache helicopters. Canada could follow the lead of the British in that regard. Meanwhile, the House could make a first step by voting in favour of this motion.
In conclusion, I wish to say that taxpayers in Quebec and Canada can expect, in the months and years to come, to pay colossal amounts of money for these projects.
Therefore, they have a right to expect that their money is being spent wisely on good quality products. For that to happen, we believe that we should avoid past mistakes and change the way the department does things, first by adopting a rule whereby any procurement project valued at more than $100 million will be examined during public hearings by a standing committee of the House.
The purpose is to make the process more transparent and fairer for taxpayers in Quebec and Canada, so that they can get more of their money's worth. Finally, we do not believe that our motion is an end in itself. However, we do think that it is a step in the right direction.