Madam Speaker, you caught me a bit off guard. I felt that this was a debate of interest to a great many people in this parliament, especially since Bill C-78 is an important bill.
This is definitely a highly technical bill. It addresses the various pension plans administered by the federal government, as well as creating some institutions of future importance. It is a bill on which, as we have just seen, the government is very anxious to pass a gag order, or in other words to take away the right of the members of this House to speak, because it has seen how things are heating up.
It seemed just now that we were dealing with what, in criminal circles, would be called a return to the scene of the crime. When a criminal is interrupted while committing a theft, he takes off, but he always returns. And that is what this government is doing.
This bill has major consequences for the future of relations between the federal government and the employee contributors to the various pension funds.
Bill C-78 creates the public sector pension investment board. The mandate of this board will be to do exactly what we have been doing for more than 30 years in Quebec with the Caisse de dépôt et placement, which is to say managing various pension funds. There are three major funds, including the one for government employees.
The bill amends the Public Service Superannuation Act, the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act.
The board will manage the billions of dollars in these funds annually. As I mentioned, the board's mandate resembles that of the Caisse de dépôt et de placement. Over 30 years ago we had the bright idea to set up this caisse, which now manages several tens of billions of dollars of Quebeckers' retirement savings.
On the strength of its more than 30-year track record, I can say that we did well to introduce this caisse, just as the government is doing well to establish a public sector pension investment board.
Where it falls apart and where we disagree violently with the government has to do with the fact that there is a danger that the main players will not be represented on the board's board of directors.
Right now, these various funds have 275,000 members. A total of 160,000 retirees and 52,000 survivors receive payments from one of the three plans. None of these will, if we look at the probabilities, be represented on the board of directors of the Public Sector Pension Investment Board.
It involves the management of the contributions they made as employees and making the most prudent decisions possible so these funds will grow, remain viable and provide a good pension income on their retirement. However, employees contributing currently will not be represented on the board of the pension investment board.
Neither will those who are retired, who contributed in the past. Some decisions, including those involving unforeseen surpluses generated by the various pension funds, require those who have previously contributed and who are now receiving their pension to have a say and be involved in decisions. But no, the 160,000 retired individuals who have paid in and who are responsible for past surpluses have no right in this regard. They will not be represented on the board of the pension board.
Why, we ask, will they not be represented? For the following reason. The members of the board of the Public Sector Pension Investment Board will be appointed under the following process. The President of the Treasury Board, in his usual dictatorial wisdom, establishes an advisory committee of eight persons under Bill C-78. It is him who appoints the eight members of the nominating committee. These eight people will submit to the President of the Treasury Board a list of potential candidates for appointment as directors of the pension investment board.
This nominating committee will ultimately, with the approval of the President of the Treasury Board and the governor in council, determine who will sit on the board of directors and decide how the pension plans that I mentioned earlier will be managed.
The President of the Treasury Board will appoint the chair of the nominating committee. He is the only one making that appointment. He will also directly appoint two members to represent him on the nominating committee, one of whom must be a public service employee.
He will appoint a member among people who are in receipt of a pension. He will also appoint two members after consulting with the Minister of National Defence, and two members after consulting with the Solicitor General of Canada.
These are the eight people who will make up the nominating committee. Only two of them will represent pensioners and employees making contributions.
When you are making a 50% contribution to a pension plan and the government—your employer—is contributing the other 50%, you expect equal representation from the beginning of the process.
So, two out of the eight members of the nominating committee will provide the President of Treasury Board with a list of candidates for seats on the board of a body which will administer billions of dollars of present and future employer and employee contributions.
Are we to believe that the majority of those suggested will be representatives of pensioners and workers? Logically, using simple mathematics, if these members are two out of the eight contributing to a discussion within the advisory board on a list of candidates to be submitted for positions on the Public Sector Pension Investment Board as directors, then their propositions will be in a minority from the start.
Then, once the list has been determined by the nominating committee, it is submitted to the President of Treasury Board, who will have every prerogative. He is the one who will determine which people on the nominating committee list will be submitted to the governor in council, or in other words the Cabinet, to constitute the 12 directors of the Public Sector Pension Investment Board, who will have a 3-year mandate.
When the President of Treasury Board receives this list from the nominating committee, if he does not feel like having any members representing pensioners or workers contributing to the plans, he will just do what is commonly called “cherry-picking”. He will just choose from the list the people whom he wants to submit to the Cabinet for approval.
The chances of any worker or pensioner representatives being on the executive of the Public Sector Pension Investment Board are about as unlikely as the chances of skating safely on the Rideau Canal this time of year.
There is no logic in this, particularly since the committee struck by the President of Treasury Board a year or two ago, which tabled its report in December 1996, proposed, based on how things are done elsewhere, that there be equal representation of workers and pensioners and of government on the executive of the Public Sector Pension Investment Board.
When the committee made this recommendation on representation, the government seemed fairly open to it, but last December its attitude changed and it decided this was no longer the way things would be. It decided to do as it does in its day-to-day management, which is to make quasi unilateral decisions, fill in the gap with unions and pensioners, act as it has usually done in its relations with unionized employees, and that is to proceed with special legislation and riot sticks. When it is not the riot stick, it is cayenne pepper. So, that is what it does.
It is a dictatorship. It is an abuse of power and the denial of the rights of contributors to be part of the decisions that concern their money.
I would remind members that 50% of the contributions in each of the three funds come from workers. The other 50% comes from the government. Could you not, when you have contributed 50% from your pay cheque, have some say when it comes time to make a decision? No.
The President of the Treasury Board, on the example of the Minister of Finance, who dips into the employment insurance fund surpluses, decided to continue the tradition of this Liberal government of royally ignoring employees and pensioners and make unilateral decisions. That is unacceptable.
According to actuarial forecasts, there will be a surplus in the three main funds that could exceed $30 billion. In Bill C-78, the government appropriates the right to use what it calls unforeseen surpluses, including that of $30 billion, as it sees fit.
No question of discussions with the unions or those who contribute to the fund, no. Unilaterally, he decided he would follow the government's practice of taking money from others, without warning, without speaking to anyone. Bill C-78 enshrines the practice by providing that the government will use the actuarial surplus as it sees fit.
For example, the government could use part of that surplus to reduce contributions or eliminate them temporarily. But on this side of the House, when we look at what happened to the employment insurance fund, we are convinced that the government will use that $30 billion in a manner that totally ignores the fact that it should benefit public service employees, and particularly pensioners and surviving spouses.
In his usual wisdom—which is selective when the time comes to present his case—the President of the Treasury Board says “Yes, but in the past, when there was a deficit in the various pension plans, it is the government that put up the money to eliminate such a deficit”. Indeed. But let him show the actual figures indicating what amount the federal government had to provide in recent years to eliminate such deficits in the pension plans. Is it $4 billion, $5 billion or $6 billion? Could the President of the Treasury Board commit to table the figures on the federal government's contribution, which is estimated to be around $5 billion?
If the federal government did indeed provide $5 billion to absorb the deficits in the three pension plans, could it be that, out of the anticipated surplus of $30 billion, there is $25 billion that do not belong to it, or that only half of that amount belong to it since the government and the workers both equally contribute to these plans?
Could it be that the President of the Treasury Board is very selective in his arguments? He is using closure precisely because he does not want to hear the whole truth.
We are prepared to consider that if, in recent years, the federal government contributed $5 billion to absorb any pension deficits related to an economic downturn, that leaves a surplus of $25 billion for which we could agree on a management structure. Decisions should be made in a collegial fashion. But the government does not know about that concept. There is an amount of $25 billion that does not belong to the government. The government may be entitled to half of it, but the other half belongs to contributors.
The consultation and management process for contributions and surpluses that is found in the legislation is a breach of democracy and it goes against what is done elsewhere.
Let us take a look at what is done elsewhere. It is not just government pensioners, federal public servants contributing to pension plans who find themselves with greater actuarial surpluses than anticipated four or five years ago. This has happened everywhere because of low interest rates, higher rates of return and, perhaps, managers' talent. The result is almost generalized surpluses that were not forecast by actuaries in almost all pension funds throughout the country.
What have others done with the unexpected surpluses? They have agreed to a collegial system with plan members, pensioners and managers. The federal government will not consider such an approach.
I will give the example of the Government of Quebec, with which I am very familiar. The Government of Quebec has two pension fund management committees, one representing unionized workers and one representing managers. There are two pension plans, one for unionized workers and one for managers. Each of these plans has a management committee.
The unions and the government are represented on each management committee in equal numbers. There is real collegiality. It is a democracy, not a dictatorship.
Last December, the way the President of the Treasury Board was talking, it sounded as though the government had seen the light, had remembered what democracy was and how to behave in a civilized manner, and would introduce a structure in which contributors and management would have equal representation. But no.
In Quebec, there is a collegial approach to deciding how surpluses are handled. Decisions are taken as well. This committee, composed of equal numbers of unionized workers and representatives of the Government of Quebec, also decides what will be done with surpluses and what management directions should be taken. In co-operation with the Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec, it decides on the best growth vehicles for contributions and for part of the surplus of workers and managers.
It would have been so easy to get it right for once. All the elements were there. But instead this government's cynicism has prevailed. This government is thick. I have said so often, but not often enough, in my opinion. The government is close-minded. We try to get it to understand some common sense, we try to tell it that it might be a good idea at some point to look calmly at the possibility of collaboration with the public servants and public service pensioners, rather than confrontation. But with the government, it is always confrontation.
It is trampling on the most fundamental right, a minimal right I would call it, to have representation. It makes no sense. Contributors to a fund would like to take part in the decisions on how that fund is managed, particularly since later on, depending on what decisions are made, and on whether or not there is contributor participation, they are the ones who will benefit, or not benefit, from the administrators' decisions. Here we are faced with a structure in which contributors are completely pushed aside. This is not normal.
As members know, here is how things work elsewhere when there is a surplus: a joint decision is made on what to do with the unexpected surplus. Judging by a sampling of some thirty funds over the past three or four decades, often it has been agreed to improve the plan and its benefits, and also to improve survivor's benefits. Often, survivor benefits are less than the worker's pension was during his or her lifetime.
The plan has been improved, and now even includes certain provisions for part time workers, but it has always moved in the direction of improving people's lot. This government's only motivation is the general improvement of the state of the surpluses, with the Minister of Finance shamelessly dipping into surpluses in the employment insurance fund.
The President of the Treasury Board has just got into the habit, unless the two are one and the same, unless the Minister of Finance is ordering the President of the Treasury Board, as the future leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, who is preparing his race for the leadership and who wants an extraordinary performance to be able to announce this race where he succeeded while others failed spectacularly. But he is doing this on the backs of others. Everyone is going to remember that.