Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak about the events which led to Bill C-20. Before I do so I would like to inform the House of a message that I received from my constituents during the recess. They were strongly in favour of this bill. In fact there were a number of my constituents who came to me and asked why it had taken our government so long to table this legislation.
I would like to look back to the circumstances of the 1995 referendum to explain why our government decided to table Bill C-20. I note that some of my colleagues noted that we do not take great joy in having to take such a step, but we do so because the separatist leaders continue to brandish the threat of another referendum on separation.
Let us look back for a moment to the 1994 general election in Quebec, which was won by the Parti Quebecois. At that time the PQ strategy was to jumpstart the process leading up to Quebec separation, even before Quebecers had a chance to vote on it in a referendum. Then Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau claimed that Quebec had a right to self-determination, which would allow it to separate from Canada unilaterally. Draft legislation along those lines was actually tabled in the national assembly.
In an attempt to whip up support for its option the Parizeau government struck numerous political commissions in every region of the province. Following several weeks of so-called consultations the commissions reported back to the national commission on the future of Quebec, which submitted a report to the PQ government on April 19, 1995. That was also the time of the notorious Le Hir reports, which would become one of the most incredible propaganda exercises ever undertaken in Quebec's history.
In the spring of 1995 Mr. Parizeau's Parti Quebecois changed tack regarding the referendum question, deciding to adopt a vague concept of association included in an eventual question. And so, the sovereignty partnership was born.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Parizeau had hitherto opposed any such concept, wanting instead to concentrate on sovereignty. In an interview in 1990 he stated:
As far as I'm concerned, the question that should be asked the next time around ought to be on Quebec sovereignty, not on “Do you authorize us to negotiate to see whether....” No, no. I think it has to be clear....We've now come to the point where we have to ask Quebecers how they feel about sovereignty.
Faced with certain defeat in the referendum, he chose instead, for political reasons, to adopt this concept of partnership.
On June 12, 1995, Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard, then leader of the Bloc Quebecois, and Mario Dumont, leader of the Action démocratique du Québec, signed a tripartite agreement on that basis. Under that agreement the Government of Quebec, following a vote in favour of its option, would undertake negotiations with the rest of Canada to establish a political and economic partnership. Those negotiations would be limited to one year at the most, at which time sovereignty would be proclaimed whether or not a partnership had been concluded. The agreement also stipulated that the Government of Quebec could terminate the negotiations at any time if it deemed they were not progressing quickly enough.
After having told a diplomat that the referendum process was like a lobster trap that Quebecers could not get out of, Mr. Parizeau was now hiding his true intentions. Despite this new partnership spin, all he really wanted was a yes vote that he could then use to make a unilateral declaration of independence.
This is not conjecture on my part. The proof is there.
On the very day of the referendum, Mr. Parizeau taped a televised message to the population in which he clearly stated his intention of going ahead with a unilateral declaration of independence. He confirmed that intention in his memoirs. It is there in black and white on page 286. He stated:
It will be noted that any speeches I have made pertaining to negotiations with Canada have been so worded to allow for such a declaration of sovereignty. And I have never made any undertaking, either in public or in private, not to make a unilateral declaration of sovereignty.
That is what the famous concept of partnership really boiled down to.
Anybody could have had their own interpretation of this concept, but Mr. Parizeau would have thrown the concept out the window at the first opportunity. Fortunately, he never got that chance because a majority of Quebecers refused to fall into that trap.
The confusion surrounding a unilateral declaration of independence says a lot about the agreement of June 12, 1995, which was one of the cornerstones of the yes side's referendum campaign in 1995. Mr. Dumont, who was one of the signatories to the agreement, stated recently that he has never been a sovereignist.
As for Mr. Parizeau, he went on to make yet another statement in his typical style. He wrote:
It's often been said that the question in 1995 wasn't clear. It's true, as I've said many times, that the question I would have preferred was the following: Do you want Quebec to become a sovereign (or independent) country as of...?
There we have Mr. Parizeau's deep-rooted conviction about the concept of partnership. It is noteworthy that the only time Mr. Parizeau ever toned down his hard line separatist rhetoric was at the very time he was in a position to put it into practice.
What was the question that was asked in the end? It was set out in Bill 1, an act respecting the future of Quebec, and it reads as follows:
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?
Right away we can see a key difference in comparison with the referendum process that was undertaken in 1980. Unlike that earlier process, the Government of Quebec provided for only one referendum in 1995. Let us bear in mind that under the latter formula sovereignty was not conditional upon a political and economic partnership with the rest of Canada. Whether or not any agreement were reached with the rest of the country, sovereignty would be inevitable. It would come about no matter what happened, and Quebecers would have no say on the final product. There would be no second vote.
In an attempt to clarify the question, the Quebec Liberal Party proposed a number of amendments to Bill 1. All of those amendments were rejected by the PQ government. At the same time, the Prime Minister of Canada stated that the question was ambiguous and that a majority of 50% plus one would be too small to effect sovereignty. We all know the outcome.
On October 30, 1995, 50.48% of Quebec voters answered no, while 49.42% voted yes. Of special note are poll results obtained in the last days of the campaign, indicating that one out of five yes voters truly believed that Quebec would still remain a Canadian province in the event of a yes victory. The separatist leaders' campaign of smoke and mirrors worked very effectively.
For all of those reasons our government is duty bound to act now to ensure that Quebecers will not have to bankroll yet another misinformation campaign to get them to support separation, an option which they have twice rejected.
The purpose of the bill tabled by the intergovernmental affairs minister is to ensure that the referendum process is clear and that Quebecers can make a choice secure in the knowledge that all the cards are well and truly laid on the table. They have the right to vote on a clear option and a crystal clear question. They are entitled to the assurance that they will never lose their Canadian citizenship and all of the other advantages they enjoy as Canadians, unless they have renounced Canada loud and clear.
This is the purpose of the clarity act. As its name suggests it seeks to ensure that the choice to be made is clear to everyone. Since the separatist leaders will not support that objective, our government has decided to enact legislation to ensure that our democratic tradition is not usurped by double talk and double dealing.