Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise to take part in this debate on Bill-32, an act to implement the free trade agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica.
Today's debate will be an opportunity to continue the debate first begun this spring and last winter concerning the kind of free trade agreement we want to have, bearing in mind that we are engaged in negotiations for a free trade area of the Americas scheduled to end in 2005. This agreement must be viewed in the light of this negotiation process.
Obviously, we cannot disagree in principle with a free trade agreement with Costa Rica. In this case, opening up markets gives all the countries, Canada, Quebec and Costa Rica, an opportunity to improve trade and increase wealth. Since Costa Rica is a developing country, a southern country, and has a right to the development of trade with a rich nation such as Canada, it can only benefit. We think that it is in the interest of all trade partners for the ground rules from a trade point of view to be known and respected.
The interesting thing about the case of Costa Rica is that this very small country managed to use the rules of the World Trade Organization to make the American giant see reason when it did not want to let Costa Rican textiles in. Costa Rica filed a complaint. A WTO panel ruled in its favour. The United States agreed to open its market to Costa Rican textiles, not because it was Costa Rica that was asking but because it was the WTO.
Trading nations throughout the world therefore have an interest in principle in seeing that the rules are as clear as possible. It is because we agree in principle that we are going to vote in favour of Bill C-32 at second reading.
That having been said, our final position is far from certain, because we have very serious reservations, particularly with respect to the issue of investment and the anticipated effects of this agreement on the refined sugar industry in Quebec and in Canada. The preceding speaker mentioned this, and I will be coming back to the topic of the very significant risks of this free trade agreement with Costa Rica for such sectors as the Lantic Sugar refinery in Montreal, which was mentioned by the member for Hochelaga--Maisonneuve last week.
If no changes are made to those two aspects of the agreement we will, as I said, be forced to reassess our position at third reading.
Of course, we will be told that it is going to be very difficult to backtrack on an agreement the Canadian government has already signed with Costa Rica. That is the government's fault, because if the process had been more transparent, if parliamentarians have been involved, if civil society had been consulted as the Minister for International Trade had made a commitment to do, we would not be in this situation. We are, therefore, refusing to be held prisoner by a done deal and we are not going to hand over a blank cheque to the Minister of International Trade, or to the Liberal government, because this precedent with Costa Rica, as in the other cases, will enable this government to continue negotiation process with regard to the free trade area of the Americas with the same lack of transparency, not involving parliamentarians and not consulting civil society.
It is time the government understood that democracy and transparency are now essential conditions for the successful signing of any free trade agreement, whether with Costa Rica or the with regard to the free trade area of the Americas. Enough is enough. The Liberal government is responsible for getting us into this situation, and now it is being forced to face up to its responsibilities and to get back to our Costa Rican partners on two aspects, namely investment protection and the predictable effects of the agreement on the refined sugar industry.
I thought that message had been understood at the Quebec City summit. With the experience of the failed multilateral agreement on investment at Seattle and the difficulties at the Quebec City summit, I thought that it had become clear for democratic governments, particularly the Government of Canada, which brags about being a model in this respect, that the era of negotiations behind closed doors was over.
Costa Rica is not a good example because we never heard about it and there were no consultations, even though, as I said earlier, the Minister for International Trade told us back in January that he would consult industry officials and civil society. But he did not do it.
I also remind the House that in the winter and spring the Bloc Quebecois moved two motions to democratize the negotiation process on the free trade area of the Americas, but both of these motions were rejected by the Liberal majority.
In one instance, we unanimously adopted a proposal to implement a continuous process to consult parliamentarians and civil society, but nothing was done by this government; nothing was done by the Minister for International Trade.
During the debate on the free trade agreement with Costa Rica, the government will have to finally open its eyes.
This bill should also be put in the context of not only the negotiations on the free trade area of the Americas, but also in the context of the negotiations at the World Trade Organization.
If we miss this opportunity to have a substantive debate on the transparency and democratization of the negotiation process, chances are that, following some agreement at the World Trade Organization, the Liberal government will once again put us before a fait accompli.
The same goes for the ongoing negotiations with four Central American countries, namely Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador, in that we have absolutely no idea of what is going on with these negotiations. It is the same thing with the free trade area of the Americas.
As far as we are concerned, it is imperative that, in this agreement, we take into account the two themes or issues that I mentioned earlier.
The first one is the investment issue. The Minister for International Trade is playing with words. In the background papers that were distributed to us, we are told that there is no new commitment on investments and services, which is true.
However, this may suggest to some opponents that there is nothing in this agreement that resembles chapter XI of NAFTA on the protection of investments, which is false. There are no new commitments on investments, because these commitments were made in 1998, when the investment protection incentive agreement was signed.
This agreement, which the Costa Rica—Canada free trade agreement refers to specifically, contains provisions similar to those found in chapter 11 of NAFTA. These provisions, according to a number of people, present considerable potential problems. This was evidenced recently by the proceedings UPS launched against Canada Post and the Government of Canada.
So, the free trade agreement with Costa Rica refers to this agreement for the promotion and protection of investments, and I will read article XII of March 18, 1998, which provides that:
Any dispute between one Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party, relating to a claim by the investor that a measure taken or not taken by the former Contracting Party is in breach of this Agreement, and that the investor has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach, shall...be settled amicably between them.
The following article provides:
If a dispute has not been settled amicably within a period of six months from the date on which it was initiated, it may be submitted by the investor to arbitration in accordance with paragraph (4).
Arbitration between a private party and a government is the prerogative of chapter 11, a chapter that was promised us. However, the Minister for International Trade had said that he did not want it in the final agreement of the free trade agreement of the Americas.
I note that the following appears on the federal government's website:
Canada is not advocating the replication of NAFTA investor-state rules in the FTAA and has not supported the proposals made so far by other FTAA countries to include such a type of dispute settlement mechanism.
As we can see, there is a blatant contradiction, since, once again, we see in the free trade agreement with Costa Rica provisions referring to another agreement—it is true—but they are the ones from chapter 11, which the government says it does not want to include in the final free trade area of the Americas agreement.
We might have expected that the federal government, the Minister for International Trade, would go back to the 1998 agreement to strike out the provisions and have disputes between countries, which are provided for in all the agreements, including that of the WTO, even those involving private business, settled by governments, by countries and not by private interests.
It is therefore essential to review this if the agreement is to be acceptable. Even though, as I mentioned, we support free trade in theory, we must ensure that it benefits the people of the Americas, in this case, the people of Costa Rica, Canada, and Quebec, rather than private corporations that would take precedence over the right of sovereign states to make decisions based on the interests of their citizens.
We have been told, and I think this is scandalous, that this agreement poses no threat, since there is very little, if any, Costa Rican investment in Canada. That is not the point. The point is whether we, as Canadians and Quebecers, believe that trade agreements must take into consideration the development of all populations, rather than defending the interests of our own capitalists. I believe, as a matter of principle, that this parliament must ensure that this situation is rectified.
In the case of sugar, which is the second aspect, and I believe that my colleague from Hochelaga--Maisonneuve outlined the difficulty, we gave Costa Rica better access to the Canadian market than what we would receive under this agreement, with respect to the Costa Rican sugar market. Obviously, we will be told that Costa Rica does not produce refined sugar, only a small amount of raw sugar. They export very little to Canada.
But that is not the point. Once again, we are setting a precedent, whereby in negotiations with the other four countries of Central America, including Guatemala, which is a very large producer--combined, these four countries export one and a half times the total industry production in Canada and Quebec--we will open up our markets to this raw sugar, and possibly refined sugar, since it will cost relatively little for Guatemalans to develop a sugar refining industry. We will be opening up our markets without them reciprocating.
Let us not kid ourselves. The market for refined sugar from Canada or Quebec will not be Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador or Costa Rica, but the United States. The problem is that the Americans have a protectionist attitude and policy when it comes to refined sugar. As long as they refuse to open their markets, any opening in Canada's market for refined sugar from other countries will be a concession without an equivalent advantage.
We think it very important that this part of the agreement be dropped, not because we are protectionists like the Americans, but because we really believe in free trade. And because we do, we want this part of the free trade agreement between Canada and Costa Rica to be dropped and the Canadian government to propose multilateral liberalization of the refined sugar market, including, of course, the American market, as part of free trade area of the Americas negotiations.
In this context, our industry will have an opportunity to develop, to be competitive, and to hang on to existing jobs, as well as create more. As the House is probably aware, our sugar industry, especially the Lantic Sugar refinery in Montreal, has worked hard to become an international player. In this industry, we operate according to the rules of free trade, because the raw sugar refined in Canada is bought at market prices and not subsidized in any way.
If we truly believe in free trade, if we truly believe that free trade should serve the public and not just the private sector, it seems to me that we have a golden opportunity during the coming weeks to do something about it, to use free trade with Costa Rica as proof in the free trade negotiations that Canada wants to play a leadership role. The opportunity is there.
I think that government members were somewhat deluded about the real impact of the issues surrounding this free trade agreement. We are not at all sure that we are going to support this bill at third reading. Work will be done in committee. My colleagues and I will have an opportunity to present a number of amendments to correct the situation, in the hope that parliamentarians will match actions to words and that the free trade agreement with Costa Rica will truly serve Canadians, Quebecers and Costa Ricans.