Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate my friend, the member of the Bloc Quebecois, as well as the other members who have taken part in this debate until now.
Many members and many government members have already openly acknowledged the extreme importance of this legislation. Many members have pointed out that this may be the most important bill we will see in the life of this parliament. I very much believe that myself. Very fundamentally this legislation touches the lives of many Canadians. We have an obligation to get the bill right, to strike the proper balance in the first instance.
As a member of the justice committee and as a member of the House it is fair to say that significant effort has been made on the part of all members who have engaged in the process. I pay tribute to other members of the committee, in particular the member for Scarborough East whom I think gave a very compelling speech. He pointed out quite correctly that many members on both sides of the House have been struggling in a fundamental way with this particular legislation and how we find this balance. He went on to say that there will be immense intrusion into civil rights and acknowledged quite rightly that the process thus far has been messy.
Those were brave words. I hope the hon. member will not be made to pay a price for those words. I think raising the alarm, being intellectually honest the way the member has both at committee and in the House is how the process should work. We should encourage and embrace that kind of honesty, particularly on the government side.
The amendments that have been put forward are in that vein. They are an attempt to legitimately bring the bill around, bring it back to a point where Canadians will feel comfort, I would suggest particularly those in the immigrant community who are most at risk, those of the Islamic faith who are extremely bothered by the potential for abuse, by the potential to upset the balance that exists in the country they have chosen to come to live, to breathe and to participate in democracy. They are extremely worried by what the government has put before us in the form of this bill.
These amendments touch on so many acts. They touch in a very complicated and comprehensive way on as many as 10 pieces of legislation, but most notably the criminal code, the Access to Information Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Privacy Act. The amendments we are putting forward today are meant in a fundamental way to bring greater openness and greater transparency, words that used to mean something to the government of the day. Those words were littered throughout the pages of the now infamous fairytale red book promises that were placed before Canadians pre-election. We do not see that type of language any more. We do not see that type of commitment to being open as to what the legislation will actually do.
The amendment proposed by the hon. member for Lanark--Carleton speaks of essentially deleting the political, religious and ideological purpose that is contained in this particular bill. As mentioned by the right hon. member for Calgary Centre, the bill puts upon the crown, and by virtue of that the police, the requirement that they prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been a specific motivation that is tied into this definition.
I submit strongly that is going to be extremely difficult if not impossible for the crown to prove. Short of a confession or short of reliable evidence of what a person was thinking when they carried out an act of terrorism, this aspect will be virtually useless in the prosecution of offences.
We had approached it differently. We had approached it in a way that it would be a conditional part of the crown's case and one in fact which would be broadened to encompass, for example, acts that were committed purely out of hatred which is often the case. There is sometimes great difficulty ascribing any motivation whatsoever that fits with reasoning and rational thought patterns when trying to prove a criminal offence of the magnitude that we witnessed on September 11.
The motivation behind the amendments presented by the right hon. member for Calgary Centre are very much in keeping with the need to establish openness, to put before the Canadian people the reasoning behind being listed, for example.
It is necessary for people to grasp just how damning and damaging it can be for individuals to find themselves placed on a list of suspected terrorists. That definition is broad enough to be listed if one has been deemed to facilitate or participate or in some way aid or abet a terrorist activity. These are very broad definitions that are open to immense interpretation.
What is wrong with having published, having placed before parliament and before the country, the reasons that would attach to this process of listing? What could possibly be offensive or inappropriate in individuals knowing the reasons and the criteria that will be applied to their actions being made open to them, what necessitates a person being placed on the list. Of course from that we want to know how a person gets off the list if he or she has been wrongly placed on the list. This is all very nebulous and open to interpretation.
This is an attempt to bring some precision to the law. The law is very often a blunt instrument. This is the bluntest of the blunt. This is simply saying a person can be placed on this list at the direction of the solicitor general with no reasons given. Oftentimes there is the potential that a person could be placed on the list and not even know it until perhaps that person put his or her card in a bank machine only to find out the account was frozen. Or perhaps the person is advised when he or she shows up for work. That was the case a few months ago with an individual who was mistakenly placed on a terrorist list by virtue of the fact that his name resembled that of another suspect.
There are pragmatic, practical implications that have not appeared on the government's radar screen. The motion with respect to this establishment of criteria gives some detail, some meaning to this listing process. It will give some further legitimacy to the solicitor general's decision that otherwise can be made in isolation, that otherwise can be made based on information, the veracity of which the individual has no opportunity to challenge. It may originate from a country with less than democratic principles that attach.
That luxury may not exist for an individual who comes from a country like the Sudan or Sri Lanka where there are administrations which may decide to pass on information to Canada upon which the solicitor general might act in making a decision to list and there is no ability whatsoever to examine or challenge that information. Publishing and placing before parliament the criteria would address this anomaly and injustice.
The second motion deals with reversing the onus, as the right hon. member for Calgary Centre suggested. It puts the onus back on the government. What can be wrong with suggesting that not only should the government be able to justify its actions in listing, but within 60 days certainly with the fleet of lawyers and the ample resources available to the government, it should somehow be able to justify that listing and if not, pay a price for it? Actually lighting a fire under the government requiring it to do its job and justify its actions is healthy for democracy.
Motion No. 4 found in this first grouping is a motion proposed by the right hon. member for Calgary Centre. The motion brings about the potential, not the requirement but the potential, in assessing a situation and determining that an individual's right to counsel may be somehow neglected or overlooked or in some way compromised, this shall allow a judge to determine that an individual should have counsel appointed. This is not new. Duty counsel has been part of our justice system for many years.
The concerns raised by my colleague from the Alliance, a former attorney general, are legitimate, that this could be downloaded to the provinces. I strongly suggest that given the potential for injustice if an individual does not have counsel, and the potential harm to reputation and employment entirely impacting on his or her life, the right of the judge to have the ability to appoint counsel should supersede those concerns of fiscal responsibility and who will pick up the cost.
I would suggest that a judge acting in his discretion would certainly be aware of the status of legal aid in the provinces in ensuring that an individual does have that right to counsel and enforces it.