Mr. Speaker, I am hoping at some point, perhaps over a glass of wine or a cup of beer, we can further discuss royal recommendations, a matter of no small interest to me. I am anxious to pick your brains and learn more about this.
Turning to Motion No. 1, the manner in which the motion is put forward is in the highly technical language of amendments and would therefore make no sense to anybody from outside reading it. This is a matter of no small relevance given the unwillingness of the government to provide the necessary documentation in a timely fashion. This is a problem which incidentally could have been cured by simply using more photocopiers over the weekend.
With respect to clause 4 of the bill, the amended version would change the definition of terrorism. Specifically, it would strike out paragraph (A) of the relevant subclause. Thus, it would change from reading that terrorism is “an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause and, in whole or in part, with the intention of intimidating the public or a segment of the public” et cetera. What is being eliminated is the part that speaks of political, religious or ideological purposes, objectives or causes.
For the life of me I cannot see why we would say that an act of terror, a criminal act that is committed for an ideological or a religious purpose as opposed to an act of terror that is committed out of pure venality, pure greed or general hatefulness would be a more severe offence under the law. The other side of this is why something that is done purely for the sake of one of these more mundane reasons is somehow less hateful under the law. It seems to me that the terror activities of the biker gangs in Montreal, such as planting bombs, are no less bad or harmful than similar bombs that might be planted by someone who is motivated by some insane reading of Christianity, Islam or any other religion.
These actions are crimes. A crime is a crime regardless of its motivation. It is a fundamental principle of our law that we do not look at the ideological and religious motivations of any action. We have always understood in Canada and in the tradition from which Canada's laws have descended that these are private matters. These are within a sphere in which the government has no say and no interest.
It is relevant and very important that the government protect all its citizens from violent actions. Actions that are designed and work in a conspiratorial fashion, as terrorist activities tend to do, ought to be governed by laws that are universal in their application, that is, that apply to those who seek to undertake those actions out of motivations that have nothing to do with religion or ideology.
This is no small point. If we look at the history of terrorist activity and at the history of organized criminal activity both here and abroad, it is quite striking that terrorist organizations evolve over time into mere criminality. If we look at the history of the Mafia, we will find that its ancestry and roots go back to Sicily of course and to those who sought to fight against the tyranny of the Bourbon kings in Sicily.
It started out as a secret society fighting and engaging in activities of intimidation and what might be described as terror in order to further a political goal. Over time the ideology moved out of those activities and they became driven purely by greed, purely by the desire to further the individual well-being of members of the Mafia at the expense of the rest of society. The code of secrecy that had been so important when it was a political and ideological movement remained in place. That code of omertà is what drives forward that organization.
I cannot see what the difference is between the kinds of activities that those groups conduct and the activities that are conducted by terrorists who are driven by ideology insofar as they affect the good of the public or insofar as they harm the public. It seems very clear to me that there is in fact no public policy difference.
This is a very dangerous route to go down and one which I suggest is very nearly unprecedented. It seems to me in looking at this clause that quite frankly it is in violation of the reading I would have of our Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of the earlier bill of rights which of course is still in effect.
It is conceivable, as the government and the Minister of Justice are constantly reminding us, that the courts might find this to be not in violation of section 1 of the charter which allows for restrictions to be placed on freedoms, and I suppose including freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and freedom of thought, when these restrictions are found to be not in violation of the normal procedures of a free and democratic society.
I suggest that the test which the supreme court applies when it is looking at whether or not section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been violated is that it says, on the balance of the probabilities, is this particular violation of freedom of conscience, or religion, or assembly, or whatever it might happen to be, the least harmful available to the government which seems to me it is not on the balance of the probabilities. In other words, is there a better than 50% chance that some less intrusive mechanism could have been found to achieve the legitimate policy objective. It seems quite clear that when we consider this test, we realize that section 1 is not much of a guarantee of our fundamental rights and freedoms.
All that is needed is five out of nine justices on the supreme court deciding that there is a better than 50% chance that a less intrusive manner of dealing with the particular problem was not available and the result is that it remains constitutional. That strikes me as being a very weak test.
When we are dealing with something as fundamental as freedom of religion, freedom of thought and freedom of speech, I do not want to be in a country where crown prosecutors are going to go before the courts and say that they are seeking to prove that the suspect in a terrorist activity had the weapon on his or her person, or the dynamite in the trunk of his or her car and that the individual had a guilty mind, a willingness to go ahead and commit some harm, perhaps some deaths, some injuries as defined in the act and in addition, that the individual was a sincere adherent to a certain otherwise legitimate religion. I find that absolutely appalling. Quite frankly I am astonished that this is included at all.
I cannot see one ounce of extra protection from terrorism that is provided to the Canadian people. I cannot see one ounce of reassurance to those members of the sorts of groups that would find themselves being targeted illegitimately under this law. I cannot see any protection for these people from this clause. I cannot in fact ascertain what public policy purpose this clause should have. It is very bad and I would urge all members in the strongest possible terms to vote in favour of the amendment in order to strike out this particular clause of the law.