moved:
Motion No. 6
That Bill C-36, in Clause 29, be amended by adding after line 18 on page 62 the following:
“In no case shall a person be bound to secrecy for a period exceeding fifteen years, unless otherwise indicated by the deputy head.”
Mr. Speaker, the amendment would alter the definition of persons permanently bound to secrecy in the act. In Bill C-36 which is currently returning to the House from committee the definition of persons permanently bound to secrecy is long but includes a whole series of people. The definition is automatic. The binding to secrecy is automatic for anyone in those categories.
The purpose of the amendment is to allow the discretion to be reversed. A person would be bound to secrecy permanently if designated by the deputy head of the relevant department but not otherwise. The point of this is to deal with the almost obsessive secrecy that permeates this piece of legislation.
The dangers writ large in the attitude the government has taken toward secrecy in Bill C-36 were summarized by the remarks in the House of the member for Ancaster--Dundas--Flamborough--Aldershot. He said:
Section 87 enables the government to withhold information pertaining to security issues forever...That is the excuse that has been used by dictatorships throughout history and around the world.
That is the danger writ large. The danger writ small, if one likes, in relation to the clause was summarized most eloquently by Edward Greenspon in an article published in the November 17 edition of the Globe and Mail . I will read quite an extensive quote from the article to illustrate exactly what the concern is. He wrote:
Commentators have been rightly critical of the provisions giving the minister an unfettered blanket exception from the Access to Information Act. Ms. McLellan has indicated a willingness to amend her bill to include a Federal Court review, but that represents too drawn out a process to serve as an effective instrument of oversight.
Then there are the little noted sections of her bill that replace the old Official Secrets Act with the new Security of Information Act. The changeover unduly constrains the release of information by whistle blowers, and permits the Orwellian designation of certain government officials as “persons permanently bound by secrecy.” That means they must take their secrets to the grave.
He continues:
Ms. McLellan should take note of a comment made by University of Toronto security expert Wesley Wark at a recent symposium on her bill. “In the war on terrorism, the public will need to be told more rather than less about the actions and capabilities of Canadian security and intelligence institutions.”
There are of course good reasons some people should be bound to secrecy for an extensive period of time, say for 15 years as I propose in the amendment. There are certain cases in which a permanent lifelong ban on release of information may be appropriate. However those instances ought to be the exception and be granted on a case by case basis rather than being automatic.
Automatic secrecy provides a convenient veil behind which any number of restrictions can be hidden. When facts are hidden behind a veil there is a temptation to extend secrecy to things that have nothing to do with terrorism or national security. This would essentially gut the entire openness in government movement that has slowly built up strength over the past 20 years. It would be a real shame to see that destroyed. This is what the amendment hopes to prevent.
The amendment I have proposed would change the way deputy heads of security agencies such as CSIS, the RCMP or the Communications Security Establishment may designate employees by limiting secrecy to 15 years except when the deputy head specifically makes a change to the contrary. This would curb the absolute muzzling powers that are placed on the whistle blowing capacities of employees to expose gross excess, corruption or other misuses of power.
The 15 year limit was chosen for two reasons. First, it is consistent with the time limit on ministerial secrecy certificates. I have reservations about ministerial secrecy certificates. However the government saw fit to use 15 years so in the spirit of consistency and logic I am proposing 15 years.
Second, 15 years is the length of time after which most security information would be obsolete anyway. There are possible exceptions but most security information would be rendered obsolete.
There are exceptions. Let us imagine going back in time to the forties where one might have wanted to make exemptions of longer than 15 years for nuclear secrets. Those kinds of exemptions can be built in on a case by case basis by the people who know best. Let us give them the authority to go that way but let us not give them a blanket exemption.
The time allocation that has been put in place may make it difficult to address other aspects of the bill later. I have an amendment coming up with regard to a sunset clause. I will address the issue now because I might not have a chance to do so later.
I was an early advocate of a sunset clause. The government resisted initially. I think this was based largely on the fact that the Prime Minister had offered an ad lib comment off the cuff in Shanghai and did not want anyone to show him up. Whatever the reason, the government has been reticent about putting sunset clauses in place. That is a grave error. The partial sunset clause it put in place is inadequate.
There are aspects of the bill that are good. The sunset clause on preventive arrest that would permit ongoing investigations to be grandfathered or exempted from the sunset clause is a good idea. Where the government has put in the sunset clause it is a welcome change. However the sunset clause should be extended not to the UN conventions we are entrenching but to other aspects of the bill that would greatly reduce the traditional civil liberties of Canadians.
We need to confront an interesting question. We were talking about a three year review of the bill that would take place between now and the next election. Why are we are now talking about a five year sunset clause? I fail to see why three years made sense when the bill was introduced but now five years is appropriate, unless the review was something that could be swept under the rug as prior reviews have been.
There is a long history of reviews that have been dealt with so expeditiously that members of the committees meant to be reviewing were unaware of them. The review of the Referendum Act that supposedly took place in 1995 was so brief that members of the committee were unaware of it.
I was on the committee and I asked the chief electoral officer about the review. He said it came up as an item of business with no advance notice or discussion. It was meaningless.
As long as that was the case the government was willing to have a three year review. Now that we are talking about something genuine, a real limitation on the government and a real review which would involve any embarrassing oversteps brought to the public's view, the government wants it to be after the next election.
Members of the House ought not vote in favour of suspending civil liberties until such time as it is electorally convenient for the Prime Minister to reintroduce those civil liberties. It is a shame. It is a strong reason to vote against the bill as a whole but certainly to vote in favour of any amendment that would extend the sunset clause.