Mr. Speaker, I will address the groupings as outlined by the Speaker, Motions Nos. 1 through 4.
In respect of the amendment brought by my colleague from the Canadian Alliance, this amendment eliminates prosecutions based on political, religious or ideological motives. I indicated earlier that I was very concerned about retaining that definition of terrorist activity or that phrase in the definition.
I do not think it is a productive exercise by the courts. In fact, it is very destructive. There is the requirement then for prosecutors to bring witnesses to talk about religious, political or ideological groups. Certainly terrorist activity has nothing to do with religious, political or ideological motives in terms of a criminal context. There may be some underlying religious motivation. There may be political motivation. There may be ideological motivation. However, when it comes to the prosecution of a criminal offence, it is the actions that we are concerned about and the criminal intent. Whether that intent involves religious, political or ideological motivation is irrelevant.
I would urge members of the House to delete that. It is very destructive in a multicultural society for us to be examining the precepts of another religion in a court and then drawing conclusions in the same hearing about terrorist activities. It cannot help the multicultural fabric of Canada.
In respect of the second amendment, I support it. Essentially, it makes the process for determining the list of terrorist activities more open and less arbitrary. I do not think it is a great imposition upon the government to set out the criteria so that everyone can see the basis upon which these determinations are being made.
We are making intrusions upon civil liberties. These intrusions are justified in the security sense, political sense and, indeed, constitutional sense. There is no harm in setting out those criteria to reassure Canadians that decisions are being made for bona fide security and criminal reasons, not for other reasons of which we will know nothing.
Third, I have concerns about the motion brought in respect of Motion No. 3. If the solicitor general has not made a decision on a terrorist entity within 60 days, then the terrorist entity would no longer be on the list. Because I am not inside government or the bureaucracy, I do not know the resources available and the intricacies of making these determinations. Setting that kind of an arbitrary date may do immense harm to a police or security investigation. I have concerns about that limitation. Therefore, I cannot support that particular amendment.
In respect of Motion No. 4, the aim and the goal are laudable. By allowing the judge to appoint legal counsel in a particular case, we are usurping the function of the provincial legal aid societies. These legal aid societies are on very tight budgets. The government has not helped in that respect. The cutbacks in legal aid by the federal government are nothing short of atrocious. It is the provincial government that carries the responsibility.
Members could simply stand up and say “let us authorize the judge to appoint these lawyers in every case”. The point of fact is this cost comes out of provincial coffers and not federal coffers. That is my concern. We need to speak with provincial governments in a co-operative fashion so that we do not impact adversely on their legal aid programs.
While the recommendation is a good one, it is premature without having spoken to legal aid societies and provincial governments. Speaking as a former provincial official, I would have grave concerns about another downloading of costs upon the province. It is not that I do not believe that individuals are entitled to legal aid. I am simply concerned that this will allow the federal government to continue to off-load its responsibilities in respect of the financial support for legal aid.