I thank you, Mr. Speaker. As I was saying, whether we have a sunset clause or not, it does not change the fact that a three year period for an in-depth study of the consequences of this bill is way too long. Of course, reports on the investigations and on the preventive arrests will be prepared yearly by the attorney general, the solicitor general and their provincial counterparts.
However, this does not add any guarantee that would lead us to believe that the government will set the record straight if some slip-ups occur along the way. There could be three years worth of blunders before the government looks into the matter again. There again, nothing guarantees that this review will be made at all, because it is far from unusual to see deadlines not being respected and acts not being reviewed on time. Extraordinary legislation introduced in exceptional circumstances necessarily requires a more stringent control that the one the minister is suggesting.
As for wiretapping, on October 24, Allan Borovoy, adviser to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, said before the committee that CSIS already had all the necessary tools to conduct wiretaps.
Mr. Borovoy also mentioned, although this was not his final conclusion, that new powers would not be needed, and that, before infringing on civil liberties, we should demonstrate that this will result in a significant improvement of existing security. Given that, according to this advisor, this has not been demonstrated, one must wonder why the minister is allowing the defence minister to authorize electronic surveillance without prior judicial approval.
After alienating the right of parliament to decide the reinstatement of this legislation, by refusing a real sunset clause, the minister is also taking away from the courts the right to authorize the electronic surveillance of communications. The political and judicial branches have become one.
Now, a word on preventative arrests and increased powers. These provisions could very well jeopardize the delicate balance between security and freedom. Under this bill, an individual could be detained for 24 hours on the basis of mere suspicion, even if the words “reasonable grounds” are used in the same clause. But reasonable grounds and suspicions are clearly quite different.
As a matter of fact, legal literature recognizes that mere suspicion does not constitute sufficient grounds for action that has to be taken on the basis of reasonable grounds. Besides, the Barreau du Québec has stated that under constitutional law, these two concepts are contradictory. It even went as far as saying that the concept of suspicion would introduce a discretionary leeway which could lead to arbitrary arrests. Moreover, in her opening speech at the inaugural meeting of the committee, the Minister said:
I remind my hon. colleagues that there are instances where, in other free and democratic societies like the United Kingdom and, most likely, the United States, once they have passed their new legislation, detention will be allowed for a period of up to seven days.
We could also remind the minister that no later than this morning, in reference to this measure and others, such as communications intercept, the questioning of target groups and possible trials before a martial court, the headline on the front page of Le Devoir read “Is the United States to become a police state?”
At one time, Moscow was much safer than several North American cities but those were the days of communism, when security was based on a political tyranny which was promoting terror. Surveillance was everywhere and denouncement was a way to survive. Are we prepared to pay such a price? As Alain Gagnon would say, to ask the question is to answer it.
The attorney general could refer any person to a judge whether or not this person is directly or indirectly linked to a terrorist group or activity. In a way, this provision is like giving a fishing license to the authorities. The bar association was also critical of this provision, arguing that it interferes with the right to remain silent, when no charges have even been laid yet.
The least we can say is that Bill C-36 gives the police outrageous powers which would not be tolerated in more ordinary times. These provisions remain hard to justify, despite the present crisis. One may question the relevancy of such measures in light of two recent events which got our attention.
Here is the first case. In mid-October, the media reported the story of an individual named Abdellah Ouzghar. To give some background, Ouzghar had been convicted in absentia to five years in jail, last April, by the criminal court of Paris. The charges were, among others, being part of a crime syndicate for the purpose of planning a terrorist act. Furthermore, Interpol had already issued two international arrest warrants against Ouzghar, and the warrants mentioned his address in Hamilton.
Under the Extradition Act, the RCMP was to proceed with the temporary arrest of this individual so that France could then apply for his extradition. Yet, it took more than one year after the issue of the first arrest warrant and also six months after his conviction in France for the RCMP to finally arrest him on October 12 of last year.
Here is another example. In early November, the media reported another no less commonplace incident involving an individual named Liban Hussein. The RCMP has candidly admitted that it did not take any step to arrest this Ottawa resident, whose name was on the list of people and organizations actively involved in the financing of Osama bin Laden's terrorist activities. Finally, it was only after the individual gave himself up that the RCMP arrested him.
In both cases, we doubt very much that this flagrant carelessness on the part of the authorities, especially the RCMP, can be justified by legal constraints. In fact, the authorities have all the tools they need to act effectively, but they do not know how to use them. Is it carelessness or incompetence? Whatever. It is absolutely pointless to give more powers to people who do not know how to use the ones they already have.
As for the procedure for establishing the list of terrorist entities or the list used to deny or revoke charitable status, I commented on it at second reading of Bill C-16 as well as at second reading of Bill C-36 and, nothing having changed since, my comments will be the same. Therefore I refer members to my two previous speeches.
In conclusion, Bill C-36 is just one more step toward an abusive centralization of powers that used to be reserved to entities that were independent from the government. Moreover, what is more serious is that this power grab eliminates any notion of impartiality.
I can only conclude that, with Bill C-36, not only is the government seriously infringing our rights and freedoms, but it is taking advantage of a crisis situation to compromise the principle of the separation of powers.
The headline on the cover of the latest issue of the Journal du Barreau read “Anti-terrorist Bill C-36: Legitimate Goal, Bad Vehicle”. This title summarizes the position of the Bloc Quebecois very well, and this is why we will be voting against this bill.