Mr. Speaker, I wish to speak to Motion No. 4 which would change a line in the definition of animal in the bill from an animal that is capable of feeling pain to an animal that is capable of experiencing pain.
The parliamentary secretary, with great respect to him, made a comment on Motion No. 4 and the record will show that there was a major contradiction in his statement. What he said, in effect, was that in order to be conscious of pain an animal has to have a central nervous system. I suggest that in order for an animal to be conscious of pain it has to have a brain.
The purpose of Motion No. 4 is simply to create a clarification in the bill whereby when the courts come to examine what we mean by cruelty to a creature the court will understand it to mean that the creature suffers. I suggest that in order for a creature to suffer it has to have a brain that is at least sufficiently of a high order that it is conscious of its surroundings.
In other words, the animal has to be conscious of suffering. I suggest that simply having a nervous system, such as a worm or an octopus, does not mean that an animal, while it may feel pain in the sense that it reacts to pain, is actually conscious of the pain in the sense of suffering. We have no way of knowing that.
In changing the word feel to experience I think we could all assume the courts would interpret the word experience in an appropriate sense rather than in a broad sense that is inappropriate. The sense, of course, that has been implied is that one has to have some sort of consciousness in order to experience one's own senses.
The choice of the word experience was simply to suggest to the courts that what we are talking about in the cruelty to animals bill are creatures that suffer, not creatures that are of such low order no one would assume they suffer. Even an amoeba will react to cold water or any other infliction of heat or dryness and so will a worm.
I want to make sure that when the courts look at this legislation they appreciate that the intent of parliament is to spare the suffering of creatures, not to extend the bill to every creature on earth. I am afraid that unless we limit it to the idea that an animal must be conscious of its surroundings we run the risk of the bill having too large a sweep.
This is primarily a technical change which I think would be of advantage to the bill. I hope that the justice department, which in fairness has not had time to review my motion in depth, will re-examine the whole distinction between experience and feel in the sense of being conscious of one's environment. Perhaps we can look forward to the justice minister's support for this motion when it comes time to vote.