Mr. Speaker, I rise today to participate in the debate on the private member's motion brought forward by the hon. member for Burnaby—Douglas. I know of my colleague's work in the foreign affairs portfolio. We have served together on the committee since 1997. The member is an experienced member of the House and has led many personal crusades, some being very controversial. I have learned to work with him on an issue by issue basis.
In the House hardworking members bring forward private members' bills and motions. I appreciate very much their hard work and the intent behind their bills and motions. The motion today calls on the government to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that Canada does not participate in the research, development, or production of components for use in the proposed American national missile defence system.
It is my understanding that America's missile defence system is still mostly only a part of the imagination or planning of U.S. military strategists. They think they can do something to protect North America from a nuclear weapons attack. They are not yet sure what is possible in this regard, but they have pledged to the world that they would continue in their tradition as defenders of the free world to develop a missile defence system.
My colleague seems to be seeking to shut down all Canadian consultations and research. He would shut down exports to the U.S. of technology, wire, aluminum, pencils or anything else that the Americans might use in their quest to protect North America from nuclear weapon attacks. I have read the motion carefully. We have just heard from the hon. member his intention with respect to the motion, but I am concerned that he is overreacting.
Let us look into the background of the whole issue. During the cold war, effective arms control agreements between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union acted as a deterrent to the Soviet threat to deploy missiles in western Europe. Though it never went beyond the theoretical stage, the American strategic defence initiative, SDI of the 1980s, has been acknowledged as a factor that forced the Soviets to the arms agreement table. Now, 20 years later, the United States is on the verge of deploying the national missile defence system, known as the NMD program.
From what little the U.S. has told the world, its current missile defence system proposal, the NMD, is not as grand in scope as the SDI. It is more easily deployable, tactically as opposed to strategically focused and extremely practical. George W. Bush has made it clear that he endorses the program and plans to proceed with its implementation. Everyone knows that he would like Canada to be part of that implementation.
Let us look at the issue strategically. The application of the NMD is intrinsically tied to North American aerospace defence, NORAD. It was an alliance forged between Canada and the U.S. in 1958 and has been the focal point of Canada's air defence policy ever since. With headquarters in Colorado Springs, NORAD is the most sophisticated air surveillance system on earth and monitors potential airborne threats to Canada and the U.S. It is in constant communication with U.S. air force and Canadian air force units designated as primary NORAD interception units.
Originally tracking stations in Canada along the distant early warning line, the DEW line, provided primary intelligence but were replaced by satellites in the 1980s.
Because NORAD remains charged with defending North America's continental air space the NMD program falls into NORAD's mandate and the alliance is expecting to be formally tasked with administering the program. For Canada not to participate in NMD would be problematic to the joint intelligence, security and military efforts that NORAD accomplishes.
How could Canada be privy to a portion of the NORAD operation and be excluded from NMD activities? The tension inherent in such a relationship could very well cause a serious reappraisal of the NORAD partnership or indeed an end to the defence alliance. This potential consequences would be devastating for Canada.
We cannot protect our airspace, gather the degree and volume of intelligence currently amassed by NORAD, or provide the air force training opportunities currently afforded by membership in NORAD. In the interest of our own defence we should allow the Americans the opportunity to ask us how, if and when they want us to participate. Moreover, we should allow them to develop their efforts to the point of a formal proposal before we condemn them.
I will indicate the reasons the Canadian Alliance believes that Canada should support and be an early partner in the NMD. The NMD is a land based system that is easily deployable and relatively simple in design and scope. It is primarily tactical in scope and is not viewed as an absolute defence against a massive missile attack against North America. It is designed to prevent accidents and aggression from rogue states. It is not a grand strategic plan that is aimed at eradicating all missile threats at all times. The NMD will not result in any escalation or renewal of the arms race.
Therefore arguments that it will nullify the anti-ballistic missile treaty are specious since the ABM treaty can be amended at any time. The NMD offers at no cost tremendous security, intelligence and military benefits to Canada. Like our membership in NORAD where club dues are basically waived, participation in the NMD will not have any financial impact upon Canada. Rather it will enhance, not reduce, Canadian security.
The program will proceed with or without Canadian involvement. We would be well advised to participate at the ground level in order to gain the maximum benefits possible. Canadian military leaders are overwhelmingly committed to the plan, including Lieutenant General George MacDonald, the deputy commander of NORAD who sees grave consequences for Canada if we choose not to participate in the program.
For these reasons we will endorse the plan in principle. We continue to encourage the government to participate fully in the NMD and cease its unfortunate habit of alienating our best friend, closest ally and largest trading partner, the United States. Canada could only benefit from this far reaching plan. Canada must see what the NMD system will be once fully developed. If it is as presented, we must support it and give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt while it works out options for missile defence.
In the post-cold war era there is a new, real and growing threat since the world is confronted with a more diverse, less predictable and more risk prone group of states armed with increasingly capable weapons of mass destruction used as tools of terror, blackmail and aggression.
There is always a risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of an existing ballistic missile. Therefore, we as an ally of the U.S. have a moral imperative to allow the use of all reasonable tools available to deal with this threat. Missile defence will be a necessary element of deterrence and an opportunity for a collective approach to enhancing security for all.