Madam Speaker, it is a great pleasure to speak to the motion brought forward by my brilliant colleague from Hochelaga—Maisonneuve.
The member has defended, with all the passion he is known for and all his ability, recognized by all I am sure, the need to acknowledge that Bill C-20 would have prevented Robert Bourassa from holding the referendum he wanted to hold right after the passage in Quebec of the act calling for a referendum in the fall of 1992.
This point has to be made. It is very enlightening. The members feel reassured when they hear the government's propaganda, when they hear the government saying again and again that there are no more problems in Quebec, that Quebecers do not want a referendum.
A few months before the 1995 referendum, however, Quebecers did not want a referendum. Yet they still went to vote, 94% of them, and we all know what the results almost were. Canada had to resort to those things that my colleague talked about to ensure that the referendum would not pass.
I would like to point out that all this is not a whim. I will not go as far back as 1760, but in passing I would like to remind members that, when Lord Durham arrived here in 1838, he made this now famous statement “I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state”. It would appear nothing has changed since then.
What Durham had understood and what we are still struggling with, is that French Canadians had to be put in a minority situation before the colonies could have responsible government. Once they were in a minority situation, responsible government could be granted. That is in fact what happened. Durham wanted to go further; he wanted assimilation. He said it was for “the good of the French Canadians who would for ever be carriers of water”.
Yes, Quebecers were reduced to a minority. For a long time, Quebecers expressed their nationalism in various ways, including wanting Canada to sever its ties with England, while the good English Canadians were very attached, and many still are, to mother England.
In the sixties, following the independence of the former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the liberation of Cuba and South America, a more radical nationalist movement emerged.
Daniel Johnson whose father, an Irishman by birth and, a contributor to Sinn Fein, did not speak French, ran for his party saying “My platform is equality or independence”. This was in 1965. His own father did not speak French; he was Irish. Because of this, perhaps he had a better understanding of the fact that the situation of French Canadians deserved, if they could not achieve equality, that there be a national movement for independence. This was Daniel Johnson in 1965. I urge members to read his book again. It is excellent.
The movement that became the Parti Quebecois grew progressively: in 1966, 8% of the votes went to the indépendantistes; in 1970, it was 23%; in 1997, 30% and in 1976, 41%. For the 1980 referendum, Mr. Lévesque, who had really wanted this country, a country associated with Canada, had to leave, not without having entered into negotiations with Mr. Mulroney, who had just been elected. Why? To regain the powers Quebec had lost with the unilateral patriation of the constitution by Trudeau.
René Lévesque had to leave. Pierre-Marc Johnson was premier for a short time. Who took up the torch to try at least to regain the powers lost because of Trudeau? It was a good federalist, Robert Bourassa. It was Robert Bourassa who led this negotiation. It was Robert Bourassa who was premier when the Meech Lake accord failed in June 1990.
What has happened since? We had the Charlottetown accord, which was far from being clear. The Charlottetown accord did not solve anything. In 1995 there was a referendum and the outcome could not have been closer. One might think that everything is solved. Come on.
There is something incomprehensible in the blindness shown by the House of Commons and by the political class in Canada. There is something absolutely incredible. As I said, this is incomprehensible.
When we go abroad, what seems the most incomprehensible is the fact that, on Canada's side, nothing serious was done afterwards. Nothing serious was done in this House. There was a minor motion that, somewhere, contained the word people, and another motion that gave an extra veto to British Columbia, which would make it even harder for Quebec to use its veto.
What my young and brilliant colleague wants to bring back in this House is at least a first hour of debate on that substantive issue, because Quebec will never leave on the ocean. We will always remain neighbours with Ontario and the maritimes.
Bill C-20 did not settle anything. Do not be lulled by it. It does not settle anything because the desire for sovereignty, where attempts were made elsewhere to crush it, has grown stronger. It seems to me that this parliament should recognize—and this is what my colleague's motion is asking for—that this desire must be allowed to be expressed unimpeded. But Bill C-20 is an impediment.
However, impediments never stopped this desire from being expressed. My point is that parliament ought to realize that this desire, this will be expressed.
The sovereignist movement in Quebec has been exemplary, exemplary in terms of democracy. We should be regularly thanked for that. We owe much of it to René Lévesque who, at the time of the FLQ crisis, it must be remembered, said that as long as the battle could be won democratically, violence was unacceptable.
René Lévesque remained steadfast. Finally, the movement disappeared. In fact, when all the police forces investigating the FLQ pulled out, we realized that it no longer existed. But that is another story.
What my colleague is pointing out, and I want to point out also, is that Bill C-20 is designed to prevent the people from expressing its desire to be both sovereign and associated with Canada. I cannot see how an illegitimate law will prevent that from happening.