Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in this take note debate on the state of the world in Iraq.
Canadian policy on Iraq is motivated by our concern over three main issues: first, the humanitarian situation; second, Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction; and third, its failure to comply with the numerous resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations. All these factors constitute a threat to the stability of the region.
The series of events that have brought Iraqi non-compliance and Iraq's humanitarian crisis to the forefront of international concerns should also be seen in the historical context of the United Nations interventions and also its sanctions. Let us begin.
The invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990 was swiftly condemned by the security council which demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. On August 6 the Security Council adopted resolution 661 under chapter 7 of the U.S. charter, which deals with actions with respect to threats to peace and acts of aggression, imposing comprehensive, mandatory sanctions on Iraq and creating a sanctions committee to monitor the implementation of these. Unfortunately, since the humanitarian emergency in Iraq was not addressed by the Security Council until April of 1991, this ban also included food imports.
Unfortunately various attempts to negotiate an Iraqi withdrawal failed and the Security Council adopted resolution 678, authorizing the use of “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait and giving Iraq until January 15, 1991 to comply with UN demands. On January 16 the coalition partners, including Canada, launched a massive air and ground attack, effectively achieving the UN's objective of reversing Baghdad's aggression.
On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 687, establishing the terms of the ceasefire and conditions for lifting the sanctions. This extremely comprehensive resolution set out eight specific conditions for the lifting of the sanctions imposed previously, including: the monitoring and destruction of all chemical, biological and ballistic missile weapons; an acceptance of a permanent, ongoing monitoring program managed by the United Nations; the monitored elimination of nuclear weapons materials and capabilities to be conducted by the United Nations special commission; the return of Kuwaitis and others held in Iraq, the missing persons; a mechanism to compensate victims for damage done by Iraq; and a pledge not to commit or support any act of international terrorism.
Although the Iraqi government pledged to comply, its actions from the outset unfortunately demonstrated extreme reluctance to implement the stated terms, and thus began a protracted contest of wills between Saddam Hussein and the Security Council which still continues today.
A full accounting of Iraq's prohibited weapons remains outstanding. Iraq consistently denied access to UN monitors, interfered with inspections and provided false and misleading disclosures. Over the years the United Nations special commission nonetheless succeeded in locating and dismantling much of Iraq's weapons capability, but not without great difficulty and disruptions of its work.
The Security Council adopted a number of additional resolutions such as resolution 706 and 712, related to the creation and implementation of the oil for food program as a response to the alarming humanitarian crisis. This program was a serious attempt to address the needs of the Iraqi people but the humanitarian operation was again hindered by Iraq itself. For five years it refused to participate at all, and when it finally did, it never gave the program its full support and participation.
I believe it would be trite to say that Iraq is one of the most repressive governments in the world. This was a strong factor in rendering sanctions less effective. The comprehensive scope of the ceasefire resolution became a problem, for it mandated Iraqi compliance across a broad range of requirements, leaving little room for partial easing of sanctions pressure in response to progress.
Rather than complying fully and promptly with Security Council resolutions, Saddam Hussein delayed and then made concessions in an expectation that the council would reduce its requirements. When these concessions did not bring results, Iraq refused further compliance.
After considerable initial progress, the UN inspection and dismantlement effort was interrupted and its inspectors were withdrawn in 1998 as a result of Iraqi lack of cooperation. However biological weapons remained a threat. The end of the inspection program created a dilemma for the Security Council and further delayed a resolution of the crisis. An atmosphere of permanent distrust, obstructions and confrontations had followed the withdrawal of inspectors and made the search for solutions problematic.
Then in January of 1999, acting on a proposal from Canada, the Security Council established three expert panels to explore options for resolving weapons inspections, humanitarian needs and missing persons and property. Unfortunately, these never functioned.
In December of 1999 the council approved a new weapons inspection system under resolution 1284. The resolution also increased the authorized volume of Iraqi oil exports for humanitarian purchases. Unfortunately, Iraq has never allowed the new weapons inspection system inspectors to enter the country.
Four years have passed since the last UN inspections in Iraq. The United Nations weapons inspectors must be allowed back into Iraq immediately so that accurate information on Iraq's capacity to manufacture and deploy weapons of mass destruction can be obtained and any reconstituted Iraqi weapons programs dismantled. The United Nations, and specifically the Security Council, remain central to the international community's efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Iraq must not be allowed to defy the authority of the Security Council any longer.
It is the Security Council that is seized with the issue and Canada will continue to work to ensure that Iraq allows the UN's inspection team back into the country as soon as possible. It is imperative that inspectors be allowed full access to Iraq's installations and programs. The world needs to ascertain that Iraq, indeed, has nothing to hide. I would further submit that the credibility of the United Nations organization has never depended more on a collective resolve than it does today.
Defiance of Security Council resolutions by the Iraqi regime has gone on long enough and immediate and resolute action must be taken. The next step is for the council to obtain immediate and unconditional acceptance by Iraq of weapons inspectors and compliance with all provisions of council resolutions.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has already noted the Security Council will have to face its responsibility should the threat caused by Iraq's defiance not subside. In such a case the Prime Minister and our Minister of Foreign Affairs have already stated the Security Council would have to consider appropriate measures.
In article 24 of the UN Charter the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is defined as a collective responsibility, discharged through the authority of the Security Council. This is what gives the decision to use force its legitimacy, but only when a collective decision has been made. When we decided to use force against Iraqi aggression in 1991, the international community sought the sanction of the Security Council. This was the proper way to proceed then and it is the proper way to proceed now.
In conclusion, I would respectfully submit that the international community must be united in its resolve to have Iraq abide by the decision of the Security Council. Such unity of purpose must express itself in a resolution of the Security Council.