Mr. Speaker, today is an allotted day pursuant to Standing Order 81. Before we move to orders of the day I wish to seek a clarification and to raise an issue with the Chair. Standing Order 81(2) states:
On any day or days appointed for the consideration of any business under the provisions of this Standing Order, that order of business shall have precedence over all other government business in such sitting or sittings.
This would mean that an order called for by the opposition, at least in theory, would be the one that would be discussed by the House. However I heard a few moments ago, as you indicated to the House, that one of the two items, potentially an opposition motion, under this allotted day has now been withdrawn. Pursuant to that I am faced with the issue of rising now before the House on what has been brought to our attention by Mr. Speaker.
What we have now is only one motion left. The proposed motion by the opposition House leader is identical to a recommendation contained in the second report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, concurrence of which was moved this morning in the House.
I wish to remind the Chair that the debate on this and the amendment thereto has not been concluded. It is still before the House and was before we adjourned. Marleau and Montpetit state at page 476, dealing with the rule of anticipation:
--a motion could not anticipate a matter which was standing on the Order Paper for further discussion,...
It is submitted that the proposed motion by the opposition House leader does precisely that with regard to the motion for concurrence proposed by the chair of the standing committee. Marleau and Montpetit go on to cite a case--I know someone else will cite it so I thought I would raise it first--when the Speaker had been lenient in applying the rule of anticipation to an opposition motion on an allotted day.
I want to argue, Mr. Speaker, that even if that leniency had been utilized on another occasion that the circumstances were different and do not apply today.
This particular case involved a ruling by Speaker James Jerome on November 14, 1975. An examination of that ruling will show that the opposition day motion was similar in subject matter, only in subject matter not textually the same, to a bill that had received second reading and had been referred to a committee. The two issues were not before the House and certainly not before the House on the same day.
The Speaker pointed out at that time that the motion was broader in scope than the bill and it was on the strength of that, that Mr. Speaker allowed, at the time, to supersede the rule of anticipation even though the subject was similar. It was a motion versus a bill and the motion was broader than the bill. It is only because of that, that the rule of anticipation was superseded.
Obviously the Chair has already recognized I am sure, in its usual objectivity, that this case is different. The motion proposed by the opposition House leader is the same in effect, almost word for word as a matter of fact, as the motion already put before the House by the chair of the procedure committee. Both would have the effect of amending the Standing Orders in virtually the same manner.
Since the motion of the opposition House leader would accomplish the same end as the motion already before the House, it should not be proceeded with, Mr. Speaker, because of the rule of anticipation. I draw to the Chair's attention Chapter 12 of Marleau and Montpetit, page 477 in that regard.
Mr. Speaker, you will be left with no other conclusion and will rule that in this particular case what the hon. member across the way has now brought before us as his opposition motion is irreceivable by the Chair.
That being said, and I do not want to be difficult with these matters, if the opposition House leader wants for his opposition day to proceed, I would be willing to give my consent that the motion that has been withdrawn be put back on the order paper so that he does not lose the opposition day that he had sought for himself and his colleagues. I would be prepared to do that in an effort of cooperation. I do not want people to think that the opposition will somehow lose a day here. Far be it for me to propose such a thing today.
Mr. Speaker, I want to draw your attention page 477 of Marleau and Montpetit where it states:
The Speaker has nonetheless ruled that the opposition prerogative in the use of an allotted day is very broad and ought to be interfered with only on the clearest and most certain procedural grounds.
Footnote 210 on the same page states:
However, the Speaker advised the House that neither the consideration of the opposition motion nor the vote taken on it could prejudice in any way the progress of the bill to which the motion is related.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, a vote on the motion would not affect the disposition of a bill that was already before the House or one of its committees.
What we have here today is quite different. It is unprecedented as is any attempt to invoke that the rule, as established by the jurisprudence of 1975 established by Speaker Jerome, would apply here. I believe that this is different and that the rule of anticipation makes it such that Mr. Speaker cannot put the motion that the official opposition, by way of its House leader, has asked to be considered as the order of the day.