Mr. Speaker, I know that the government House leader must go to a cabinet meeting. I will make sure he gets my notes and I am sure he will anxiously have his staff tape my speech so he can watch it tonight to help put him to sleep.
I am very happy to participate in this modernization committee debate. The first thing I would like to discuss is a recommendation from our Building Trust II document, which my party presented here at the start of this Parliament. I would also at this time like to thank my colleague from Fraser Valley who initially a couple of years ago brought in a document called Building Trust I, which was followed by a modernization committee.
Mr. Speaker, you chaired our modernization committee meetings, which were very fruitful and brought forth some very positive changes here in the House of Commons.
The issue I want to address surfaced two weeks ago during the procedural wrangling over the vote on the secret ballot elections at all committees. What Canadian Alliance is recommending in Building Trust II is that the Standing Orders be amended to ensure that motions to concur in committee reports be put to a vote. This recommendation seems rather minor on the surface, but its impact on the authority of committees would be huge.
As hon. members know, the authority of parliamentary committees stems from the adoption of their reports by the House. Prior to the adoption of the McGrath committee recommendations in the mid-1980s, committees could deal only with the matters referred to them by the House. They could not undertake studies or make recommendations without being directed to do so by the House. Giving committees freedom from this restriction was probably the most important committee reform that came out of the package of reforms. However, this was only the first step. Other steps are required to give committees true independence and real authority.
The second step toward the goal of freedom and democracy for committees came two weeks ago, when the House adopted a Canadian Alliance motion that amended Standing Order 106 and introduced secret ballot elections at committees. This reform will enhance the independence of the chairmen, releasing them from the heavy-handed control of the Prime Minister's Office.
What is missing is a mechanism to ensure that motions to concur in reports come to a vote. This is vital to the authority of committees. Currently, the government, simply by talking on a report for a morning, can prevent a report coming to a vote. In these cases, the motion to concur in a report becomes a government order and can thereafter be moved only by a cabinet minister.
I refer you, Mr. Speaker, to the order paper. There we will find the concurrence motions regarding the report of the procedure and House affairs committee calling for secret ballot elections at committee. Below each motion to concur in the committee report is a note in italics, which reads “Cannot be moved (see Government Business No. 5)”.
How did that happen? The simple answer is that the government leadership did not want that report to come to a vote. The government suspected, and it was correct, that this report would get the support of the majority of members of the House and the government did not want that to happen. As we saw on Thursday, November 19, 2002, the government moved the concurrence motion and talked it out until 2 p.m., at which point the motion was automatically adjourned and the motion became a government order, to be moved at the prerogative of the cabinet. What kind of power do these committees really enjoy when their reports, which are where their powers lie, can be shelved by a few government members delivering their canned speeches?
We ended up getting a vote on the secret ballot procedure for committees through a supply day, but even after that it did not come easy. The government House leader went to extraordinary efforts to try to derail a vote on our supply motion. He was expecting a double hit for his manoeuvre to talk out and shelve the committee report. He argued that because the concurrence motion was moved and adjourned, the Alliance motion dealing with the same subject matter should not be allowed to be moved. Not only was he not satisfied with complete control over committee reports, he wanted complete control over the subject matter of supply motions.
His obsession for total control is reflective of his master, the Prime Minister. By seeking such control for a lame duck Prime Minister, the government House leader, and I do not like to say this because he is a good friend and a colleague, has become a lame duck himself. He should have known enough to say no to the Prime Minister. It is not that difficult to do so. He should have joined the 56 members of his caucus who did say no. He at least would be on the right side of the parliamentary reform debate. His reputation going into the next phase of modernizing the House has been tarnished by his actions to prevent a simple reform such as secret ballot elections at committee from going forward.
Getting back to committees and the government manoeuvre to shelve their reports, when the media refer to committees as powerful, as they sometimes do, they do so out of ignorance. Committees have no power while this government manoeuvre exists.
The government House leader has suggested in the past that we restrict the moving of concurrence motions until the government has had a chance to respond to a committee report. Not all committee reports deal with the government. We did not need the government's opinion on secret ballot elections at committee. This was, as the Prime Minister said, a matter of procedure and a matter for the House.
Reports sending for persons and papers have nothing to do with the opinions of the government. Most likely the committee is responding to a stubborn government department that refuses to comply with a committee's request. Reports defending the authority of the committee in matters of contempt have nothing to do with the government. It is the height of arrogance to assume that every report needs the government's approval before proceeding.
Once we get the independence of committees straightened out by ensuring that their recommendations can come to a vote in the House, we need to give them a little more power over government appointments.
The resistance for this reform is once again the Prime Minister but he has a new partner. His tag team partner is none other than the member for LaSalle—Émard. Both the Prime Minister and the member for LaSalle—Émard believe that the House should not enjoy a veto over order in council appointments that do not deal with officers of parliament. They base their beliefs on the notion that they are preserving parliamentary tradition and responsible government.
How wrong they are. Let us consider a few responsibilities of the government and the role of the House.
Legislation that proposes to spend money required a royal recommendation and, while it is the exclusive right of the cabinet to attach such royal recommendations to legislation, the final decision to proceed with legislation rests with the House. If the House does not concur in the government's legislation the legislation dies.
Let us consider the government's other prerogative, the way in which taxpayer money is spent. Through the estimates process, the final say as to that spending rests again with the House. Raising taxes through ways and means motions are another exclusive prerogative of the government, yet it can only continue if the House permits it. The government proposes officers of parliament, yet it is the House that has the authority to ratify or deny such appointments.
Let us recap. The House has a veto over government legislation. It has a veto over how the government spends money. It has a veto over the government's prerogative to change a tax. It has a veto over the appointment of officers of parliament.
How can the Prime Minister and the member for LaSalle—Émard possibly argue that it is inconsistent or unparliamentary for the House to have a veto over order in council appointments? Clearly, it is inconsistent for these appointments to be excluded from the veto power of the House.
How do we see this power being exercised by the House? It would begin with committees. We do not expect them to review every appointment. In cases where an appointment is particularly bad, and Alfonso Gagliano is an excellent example, committees should have the power to review and recommend that an appointment be withdrawn or not proceeded with. The House should then have the opportunity to vote on the committee's recommendation through concurrence of its report.
You can now see how this all fits together, Mr. Speaker.
During the public debate on secret ballot elections at committee, the television media used the review process of Mr. Gagliano's appointment as an example of how a partisan chairman, chosen by the Prime Minister, can hinder the independence of committees. We saw on the news how the chairman of the committee reviewing Mr. Gagliano's appointment acted very partisan. She was not acting in the interest of the committee process but in the interest of the Prime Minister. The media was suggesting that had the chair been duly elected by the committee the outcome might have been very different.
If all the reforms I am recommending here today were in place I believe the outcome of that particular committee review would have been very different. The chairman, being elected by a committee, would likely allow the committee to do its work if the committee were free to decide that the appointment of Mr. Gagliano should be removed, which I think most members and Canadians believe, then it could report that recommendation to the House and the House would be given the opportunity to consider the recommendation of the committee without procedural obstacles and with the powers to remove an appointment. Canadians would not have the embarrassment of having as their ambassador to Denmark, Alfonso Gagliano.
I want to comment on the authority of the House with respect to motions calling on the government to take action. We have passed motions calling for action and often the government does not take that action. The establishment of the sex offender registry is one great example. Going back over 10 years there was the NDP motion regarding child poverty. Both were ignored yet passed by the House.
When the House passed a motion directing the procedure and House affairs committee to make all private members' business votable, the government's first reaction was to throw up its hands and give up.
On October 24, 2002, the House adopted a motion that read:
That, before the Kyoto Protocol is ratified by the House, there should be an implementation plan that Canadians understand, that sets out the benefits, how the targets are to be reached and its costs.
My concern is that the government is planning on ignore the motion and ratify the Kyoto protocol without regard to the conditions of the motion passed in the House. However the motion is different from motions calling on the government to act. The motion refers to the House only.
The House, by adopting that motion, placed a restriction on itself from considering any motion or legislation that would ratify the Kyoto protocol until certain conditions are met. When the government voted for that motion it probably did not consider that angle. We will no doubt be arguing that one in the weeks to come so I will return to the type of motions that give an instruction to the government because there are certain things that private members cannot do and the House would have to rely on the government to act, such as changes to a tax, spending money, et cetera.
If motions that call on the government to act are not binding then what good are they? Most of my speech addressed the lack of authority afforded committees but we have a more serious problem with the lack of authority of the House with respect to these types of motions.
We must find a way to ensure that the government gives effect to the motions that the House passes. If it is a matter of disrespect, then perhaps through its powers of contempt it can enforce its authority in obvious cases when the government ignores the wishes of the House. There may be budgetary restraints that give the government legitimate reasons not to comply but there are some examples where the government is obviously being very dismissive of a motion.
The other reforms we need to look at are supporting the election of senators who would then have a democratic mandate to carry out their constitutional responsibilities. We can start by encouraging the Prime Minister to appoint senators who have been elected. At present there is an Alberta vacancy and an Alberta senator duly elected by the people in the province of Alberta, and he should be the one appointed to the Senate to fill that vacancy, and the sooner the better.
In Building Trust II, we suggest reforms to the way we consider regulations and there are suggestions how to improve the consideration of supply. We address the issue of smaller committees, which was also a recommendation of the McGrath committee that cannot be carried out in a five party House so we have a suggestion to remedy the problem of large, unruly committees. Scheduling conflicts between committees and the House is also in the document.
We will be proposing a petition reform idea that would empower citizens to bring issues for a decision to Parliament and not just use the process to be heard.
There are all kinds of goodies in Building Trust II and I will be submitting a copy of that to the modernization committee for its consideration.
I look forward to the weeks ahead where I know that the House leaders and other members of each of their parties will be sitting with you, Mr. Speaker, as the chairman of this modernization committee. I sincerely hope that when we have completed our task we will bring forward the recommendations that, not only my party but other parties have looked forward to, to modernize Parliament and make it a place where every member of Parliament has a voice, has a say.
The fact is that after the election of committee chairs was passed last week, the next day the government immediately agreed to all private members' business being votable. It was a major step forward in the House. It means that a member can come here, even an independent member who is not part of a caucus, and still get one piece of legislation on the agenda that will be votable and may be passed to bring good legislation to the country. I think that is an extremely good example of how things have to be improved. A member has to know that he or she is part of a system that helps make the laws in Canada and not one that is run out of the office on the third floor, the PMO.
I look forward to the modernization meetings over the next few weeks but I look forward even more to a report that will make serious changes to Parliament so that all members of Parliament can be involved in the day to day activities and the changing of laws for the good of all Canadians.