Mr. Chairman, I wish I could approach this take note debate with a light heart but I am afraid I cannot do that.
There needs to be an inquiry into the destruction of the Canadian Coast Guard since it was absorbed by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and it is a sad tale indeed. One cannot live on the British Columbia coast without becoming aware of what is happening to what was a very proud service.
I am a former member of the fisheries committee. I have worked with most of the members who have spoken tonight. I think they are quite in tune that when it comes to marine issues, I am fairly up to speed.
What is happening with our Coast Guard, albeit that it is much smaller than the Department of National Defence, is similar from the standpoint that it is underfunded, suffering from rust out and is somewhat lacking in leadership at some critical positions.
Why is it, I keep asking myself, that our most valued services, the ones that the people believe are central to the goal of their federal government, are always the ones that get the short end of the stick? If we look at budget reductions to the Canadian Coast Guard since 1995, it has lost $100 million. Those are non-inflated dollars, which means a drop from $542 million to $442 million. There is a very significant drop in coast guard figures. Those are from public accounts.
Why is it that every time I make a speech in British Columbia and talk about the Coast Guard and say that it is time to take it out of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and either stand it on its own or put it in with the armed forces, of all outfits, I get an immediate, spontaneous ovation? It is ironic, given the public concerns that are also apparent about the chronic underfunding of the Department of National Defence. Still, with all that baggage, they would prefer to see that rather than what is happening with the Coast Guard before their very eyes.
We know that in order to maintain our asset base we need to reinvest. The Canadian Coast Guard commissioner himself has said that requires about $140 million to $150 million of capital funding each year. In contrast, over the last 10 years the average has been in the order of $30 million or $40 million.
An audit was done by the Auditor General and the December 2000 report was considered by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. The central conclusion arising from the audit was that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans was not managing its fleet in a cost effective way. Almost all the elements that would discourage good management and functional accountability in any organization are to be found in the Canadian Coast Guard.
We have a problem. Here is just a symptom. I like real life examples. We have the Canadian Coast Guard with its director of operational services saying to his commanding officers of coast guard ships, “I have some concerns with regard to keeping the regional fleet on budget on the operating and maintenance fuel allotment side. In light of this I am requesting that you take extra measures to reduce fuel consumption. They are short of dollars. I am aware that commanding officers are already taking steps to conserve fuel, such as reducing speed and operating on fewer engines where possible. However, as of today's date, September 26 of this year, I am directing commanding officers to reduce discretionary steaming to a bare minimum”.
This is the kind of thing that is going on with our once proud services. They have been reduced to beggars and to second tier in DFO ranks. Basically the feeling among Coast Guard personnel is that all DFO wanted was their budget. DFO in the meantime has lost its moral right to manage the fishery. At the same time it has lost its moral right to carry out the search and rescue function.
We had protests from the commercial fishermen this summer who, as a direct consequence, thought that their livelihood was at stake. After years of being treated poorly by DFO they saw that this was the year they had to take a position.
We have the ongoing saga of an aboriginal fishery pilot sales program that has been found wanting for statutory authority which the minister continues to operate to the point where he was turning a blind eye to openings this summer rather than announce them simply because it was another way to circumvent his problem rather than deal with the real issue.
In terms of the search and rescue function being completely turned on its head, we have two prime examples of where this has been completely mismanaged on the west coast. We have the example of the hovercraft which has been well explained. This is unconscionable.
The Vancouver Airport Authority emergency plan requires two hovercraft. We have one hovercraft. We do not know when the other one will be delivered. Every hovercraft has to be taken out of operation for servicing. When that happens there will be no coverage for the Vancouver airport or for the flats. If there is an accident out there, a major loss of life could be involved.
The other example is with the Coast Guard rescue divers. I want to review that from my perspective. The ministerial actions in terms of the lead-up to the Cap Rouge II disaster have led to what I consider an incomprehensible cop-out by the minister in terms of accepting responsibility for a very serious tragedy.
We had loss of life which led the previous minister to cancel the Coast Guard rescue diving program on the west coast and turn it over to the armed forces. In February 2001, I warned the minister in the House of Commons that this was not a good move. I said:
it will not work to drop the coast guard rescue diving in the Vancouver area and substitute the Department of DND from Comox or Esquimalt on Vancouver Island to do the rescue diving.
The Vancouver coast guard rescue diving program record over the last six years demonstrates that the vast majority of calls were responded to within 20 minutes. For example, mobilization and flight time for DND from Comox is one and a half hours and it is worse on nights and weekends. The minister is saying that these are equivalent services when they are so obviously not.
That is the crux of the matter. After the Cap Rouge II the opposition was accused of federal opportunism to be critical of the west coast search and rescue capability. I find that quite unconscionable.
Rather than the minister accepting responsibility for the lack of direction that the divers were under when they had previously been told that they could not do these dives, it has led those divers into a no win situation. What does a diver do when the media and everyone are second guessing the next incident? This is life threatening for them.
I will conclude with that because I am getting the time sign. I certainly would have a lot more to say if I had the time.