Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to the point of order raised by the member for Winnipeg—Transcona.
The other place has reported to this House that it has divided Bill C-10 into two bills and has designated the part dealing with firearms as Bill C-10A and has sent it to this House without amendment.
Standing Order 80 states that money bills are not alterable by the Senate. That said, the House may choose to waive its privileges to accept Senate amendments to money bills.
Beauchesne's 6th edition, on page 187, states:
When the House receives a Message from the Senate stating that it has amended a tax bill, the House may concur in the amendments but disapprove of any infraction of its privileges or rights by the other House. In this case, the House waives its claim to insist upon such rights and privileges, but the waiver of the said rights and privileges is not to be constituted as a precedent.
Beauchesne's goes on to state:
It involves a question of the privileges of the House which have been enshrined in Standing Order 80.
The most recent example of the House accepting Senate amendments to a financial bill was in 1997 when the Senate amended Bill C-70 respecting changes to the GST. In concurring in the Senate amendments, the House indicated that it was waiving its privileges with respect to financial bills.
There are two precedents which are particularly relevant in the matter of Bill C-10. First, in 1941 the Senate amended a war revenue bill and incorporated a separate bill into the revenue bill, in effect creating an omnibus money bill. The Senate specifically requested the concurrence of the House for these amendments. The House chose to waive its privileges and accepted the Senate's amendments. Second, in 1988 the Senate divided Bill C-103 establishing ACOA and the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation. Initially the Senate had included in its message to the House a request for the concurrence of the House for the division, but this request was deleted from the final Senate message to the House.
In 1988, the then Speaker of the House, drawing on the 1941 precedent I mentioned earlier, concluded that because the Senate did not seek the concurrence of the House on the division of Bill C-103, the Senate's actions were inconsistent with established precedents and infringed upon the privileges of the House.
The Speaker at the time stated:
In the case of Bill C-103, it is my opinion, and with great respect of course, that the Senate should have respected the propriety of asking the House of Commons to concur in its action of dividing Bill C-103 and in reporting only part of the bill back as a fait accompli has infringed the privileges of this place.
I would like to address considerations related to the division by the Senate of a money bill. All financial legislation must first receive a royal recommendation as set out in section 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and Standing Order 79 of the House.
The House, in dividing money bills, including the precursor of Bill C-10, does not require a new recommendation. Since the recommendation is a message to the House, it is within the House's privileges to divide a money bill without altering the fundamental authorization for spending under the different parts of the bill.
In the same way, the division of a bill in the Senate would not affect the constitutional or legal validity and application of the initial royal recommendation given for the larger bill.
Members will also know that financial legislation must “originate” in the House of Commons. This principle is set out in section 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and Standing Order 80 of the House.
Some observers have wondered whether the division into separate bills would result in two separate bills which originated in the Senate, not the House. Given that the Senate's division of the bill does not result in an origination of two new bills, each bill could still be considered to have originated in the House with the original royal recommendation. As a result, both parts of a divided Bill C-10 would meet the constitutional requirement of origination in the House of Commons.
Under Standing Order 80, this House asserts that financial legislation may not be amended by the Senate, which is an extension of sections 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This extension is not a necessary result of the Constitution, but rather an assertion by the House of its privileges with respect to financial legislation.
The House traditionally asserts the principle that Senate amendment of financial legislation is a breach of the privileges of the House of Commons.The House enacted the standing order in 1867 and it has remained unchanged since. It provides that the Senate may not alter financial legislation, although as I have indicated, the House may choose to waive its privileges in this area.
It is significant that there have been many cases where the Senate has not requested the concurrence of the House for amendments to financial bills, and the House has concurred in the Senate's amendments.
There have also been many cases where the House concurred in Senate amendments to financial bills without specifically stating in the concurrence motion that it was waiving its privileges with respect to financial bills.
This suggests Senate amendments to financial bills may be viewed on at least two levels. First, the 1988 ruling of the Speaker suggests that the Senate's division of a money bill, or the 1941 omnibusing of a money bill, may be of a level of significance that this should be accompanied by a Senate request for House concurrence and a House waiver of its privileges with respect to financial bills.
On the other hand, other Senate amendments to money bills covers may be seen by this House as less significant, and not necessarily requiring a Senate request for the concurrence of the House and a specific statement by the House waiving its privileges with respect to financial bills.
The Senate's division of Bill C-10 is different from the 1988 division of Bill C-103 in two very important ways. First, both parts of Bill C-103 were money bills requiring royal recommendations. However, I understand that the only provision of Bill C-10 that requires a royal recommendation is the provision that establishes the commissioner of firearms. This proposal originated in the House of Commons with a royal recommendation. The Senate has passed this provision, and indeed all of Bill C-10A, without amendment. The second difference between the 1988 precedent and Bill C-10 is that the Senate has sought the concurrence of the House for the division of Bill C-10 and the amendments respect Bill C-10A.
This addresses a concern expressed in the then Speaker's ruling with respect to the Senate's division of a money bill. In keeping with that ruling, as Beauchesne's indicates, the House may therefore choose to waive its privileges, consistent with the precedents, and concur in Bill C-10A.
In conclusion, while there is no specific precedent for the House accepting the division of a money bill by the Senate, the Speaker's 1988 ruling, the 1941 precedent of the Senate omnibusing a money bill, and the established practices of the House indicate that it would be acceptable for the House to waive its privileges and agree to the Senate's division of Bill C-10.
The government has given notice of a motion to agree to the Senate's division of Bill C-10, while at the same time indicating to the Senate that we do not waive our privileges in this respect, nor should this action be considered a precedent.
Subject to your ruling, Mr. Speaker, it would be the government's intention to proceed with this item as soon as possible.