Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to the House of Commons about the provisions of Bill C-15B, an act to amend the criminal code, dealing with cruelty to animals and firearms, and the Firearms Act.
Before turning to the substance of the bill, I would first like to acknowledge the very fine work that was conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in its careful review. The applause I hear is a worthy statement of how we feel about that work because it did a very careful review of all the provisions in Bill C-15B.
The committee had the benefit of hearing from a wide spectrum of witnesses with a wealth of experience and knowledge. This information assisted the committee in its review and modification of Bill C-15B. I am grateful to the committee for its work in advancing the debate and understanding of the legislation.
Turning now to the content of the bill, I will start with consideration of the animal cruelty provisions.
I am pleased to say that there is overwhelming support for the objective of Bill C-15B to modernize and update the sections of the criminal code dealing with animal cruelty. This objective has three aspects.
The first aspect is to recognize animal cruelty offences for what they are. Animal cruelty offences are crimes of violence. They ought to be treated as such. Their seriousness ought to be reflected in the penalties available for these offences.
The vast majority of Canadians who have voiced their opinion on this subject have made it very clear that they want cruelty offences to be treated more seriously. The public was consistent in its message on this point during the consultations in 1998 when the department solicited views on the current animal cruelty provisions in the criminal code. They have continued to voice their support in increased penalties, as evidenced by the many petitions and letters the Department of Justice and members of parliament have received over the past three years.
The Canadian public is demanding that our laws on animal cruelty be updated and the penalties increased. In this regard, it should be noted that the committee adopted an amendment to raise the maximum fines available for intentional cruelty and criminal neglect offences when prosecuted by summary conviction to $10,000 and $5,000 respectively.
This brings me to the second aspect of modernizing the law on animal cruelty.
In the course of discussions on Bill C-15B, some people have suggested that there is no need to change the current provisions of the code beyond raising the penalties. The problem with this argument is that it ignores the anachronisms and unnecessary complexities of the current law.
In some of the current animal cruelty provisions in the criminal code, the proprietary status of an animal determines whether or not a successful prosecution can be brought, even though the basic policy of the cruelty provisions is to protect all animals from intentional cruelty and criminal neglect. An example of this is section 445 of the criminal code which only applies to animals kept for “a lawful purpose”.
Bill C-15B addresses the unnecessary complexity of the current law. Let me give an example.
It appears that subsection 446(1)(a) of the criminal code is restricted to wilful infliction of unnecessary pain, suffering or injury. This provision however must be read in conjunction with subsection 429(1), which states that wilfully includes recklessly. Further, it is only through reading subsection 446(3) that it is clear that paragraph 446(1)(a) actually creates two offences: one of intentional cruelty and the other of causing unnecessary pain, suffering or injury through criminal neglect.
Bill C-15B rids the law of these complexities and anachronisms and clearly sets out two main categories of offences: intentional acts of cruelty and those acts which cause pain, suffering or injury to animals by reason of criminal negligence. The creation of these two categories of offences in Bill C-15B provides clarity in the law in terms of precisely defining the mental and physical elements of the offences. Clarity and precision in the law operate to the benefit of all Canadians.
In the interest of promoting certainty in the law, I would like to note for the record that based on a concern raised by research and industry about the applicable level of criminal intent in one of the criminal neglect provisions the committee adopted an amendment. The amendment specifies that the offence of abandonment must be committed with “wilful or reckless” intent and that all other offences in the criminal neglect section must meet a standard of criminal as opposed to civil negligence.
A third aspect to modernizing the law is to fill a gap in the law. At the present time a person who has a lawful purpose for killing an animal but who does so brutally and viciously cannot be charged with cruelty unless they also cause unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to the animal.
Bill C-15B creates a new offence of intentionally killing an animal brutally or viciously whether or not the animal suffers pain. For example, such conduct could include tying an animal to a railroad track, fastening an explosive device to an animal, or putting an animal in a microwave oven.
In my remarks today I would like to address a point about which there appears to be much confusion. Some members have suggested to the House that if the defences in subsection 429(2) did not exist, industry would be guilty of committing cruelty offences. The main animal cruelty offence of causing unnecessary pain, suffering or injury is structured in such a way that industry and research practices are factored into determining whether a cruelty offence has even been committed. This is an extremely important point and I would like to take a few minutes to elaborate on it.
The first part of the analysis in determining whether an offence of causing unnecessary pain, suffering or injury has been committed is to examine the lawfulness of the purpose for which the pain was inflicted. On the basis of the recognition of industry and research practices in case law, common law, codes of practice, provincial, territorial and federal legislation and conventions concerning animal use, there is absolutely no question that the use of animals in industry or research always has been and will continue to be legal.
Even if the purpose is legal, the inquiry does not end there. The second issue to examine is whether or not the means used to achieve the purpose imposed avoidable pain, having regard to other means reasonably available “given costs and social priorities” as noted by the court in the leading case on cruelty.
An offence of causing unnecessary pain, suffering or injury is only made out if the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused inflicted avoidable pain on an animal in these circumstances. This has been the test for liability in the criminal code for this offence since 1953 and it continues to be the test.
The government has stated repeatedly that what is lawful today will remain lawful after Bill C-15B comes into force. It is simply not an accurate statement of the law to suggest that because of subsection 429(2) of the criminal code, industry is effectively exempt from animal cruelty provisions because they have a lawful purpose for inflicting pain, suffering or injury. No one is exempt from the application of the criminal law on animal cruelty. They never have been and they will not be in the future.
Reasonable industry practices are not criminal because they do not meet the threshold of criminal liability and not because they are exempt.
Members of the House may be reassured to know that a witness who appeared before the committee on behalf of the Criminal Lawyers Association stated that it was the view of its members that moving the cruelty provisions out of part XI of the criminal code was appropriate and that no defences were lost to accused persons because of this move.
I have a last word on the issue of defences. Over the past 50 years the defences in subsection 429(2) have never been raised in a reported case involving the intentional infliction of unnecessary pain, suffering or injury. There is an obvious reason for this. As a practical matter, there are very few circumstances giving rise to a defence for intentional cruelty offences.