Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate myself with the sentiments expressed by my colleague regarding the critically important distinction between animal rights and animal welfare. While I understand that the bill does not explicitly define an entitlement of animals to rights, we know based on the experience of our charter and judicial activism over the past two decades that there is a tendency in this country for legal activists to consciously expand the meaning of legislation to the point where it no longer in any way resembles the original intent of parliament, particularly with respect to putative rights claims.
In support of my colleague's contention, I would point out the fact that there is a strong and growing movement within certain spheres of academia by certain so-called rights theorists, such as the new head of bioethics at Princeton University, the ignominious Peter Singer, to define animal rights as carrying the same moral quality as human rights. In fact, Dr. Singer proposes that a pig carries more rights than a newborn human infant and in fact has published articles to this effect in prestigious international academic journals. The notion articulated by my colleague is not an outlandish one. In fact, it is very much rooted in new post-modern ethical theories that are being articulated in major western universities. Therefore, the spectre of animal rights is very much a prescient one which should concern all of us in this bill.
I would also point out, in support of my colleague's argument, that the entire tradition of western civilization, the entire intellectual edifice, is predicated in part on the idea that there is a difference in kind and not degree between human beings and animals. While we are all creatures of a common God, mankind is created in the image of that God who grants animals to us for our stewardship. This is an idea which is consistent in every tradition of moral philosophy, from the ancient Hebrew scribes through to the classical Greek philosophers. Aristotle in De Animus articulated this. Thomas Aquinas articulated this in Summa Theologica . Even the enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke articulated the very clear moral distinction between man and beast, to use the traditional language. Therefore, I would support my hon. member's contention on that.
I have a question for him based on the broadening of the definition of “animal”, in fact an entrenchment of a definition which heretofore have been left to the common law. Bill C-15B proposes to define animal as including non-human vertebrates and “any other animal having the capacity to feel pain”.
My colleague from Portage--Lisgar, the official opposition justice critic, has raised a very interesting question which I would like to pose to my colleague from Kootenay--Columbia, namely this: given that the courts in Canada have defined the human fetus, prior to full delivery from its mother, as a non-human and given that the human fetus is clearly a living entity of some sort, in fact a vertebrate, and given that the human fetus according to all scientific evidence begins to feel pain from something like six months from the onset of gestation, would my colleague not agree with me that there are at least very strong potential grounds in the bill that advocates for the rights of the unborn human fetus could use it in a way unintended by the government to assert a right of protection against unreasonable pain for the human fetus? I would like him to comment on that.