Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to indicate that I will be sharing my time with my colleague from Mercier who, as our critic for foreign affairs, is particularly interested in today's debate. As far as I am concerned, I am taking part in this debate as the Bloc critic for industry, science and technology.
I have the curious and unpleasant feeling that this is a bit a déjà vu. We already had a debate in this House on what might happen if the U.S. were to decide to impose a tariff. A number of weeks ago, when we debated this issue, we felt like we were in a nightmare where someone was chasing us and, although we ran as hard as we could, we were not moving. We could not get away. When we wake up, we suddenly realize that we are being eaten alive. Not a nice feeling.
On countless occasions, we warned the government about what could happen and what finally did happen. Members will recall that this problem dates back many years. In fact, the dispute with the United States started to develop in the early 1980s. From negotiations to discussions to trade disputes, Canada finally accepted to sign an agreement with the United States in 1996, agreement from which it emerged as the loser. Let us be clear about that. Canada did emerge as the loser because, even though the agreement gave it guaranteed access to the American market for a certain percentage of its production, that access was less than the access it had without the agreement but with the constant threat that such access could be denied.
It decided to sign this agreement that was not in its favour but that did guarantee a certain access to the American market for a few years. As the agreement was nearing its expiry date, we kept warning the government about the danger of finding ourselves in a situation as bad if not worse than the one that prevailed before the agreement was signed in 1996. The government told us that it would make its views and expectations clearly known to the Americans. It wanted to return to full free trade as prescribed under NAFTA.
However, we always felt that the government was not as committed to this issue as we had a right to expect. The result is that the decision finally hit us. When the agreement expired, the international trade commission reserved judgment. Recently, it was announced that, as of May 23, 2002, a duty would be imposed on Canadian softwood lumber.
The decision made by the Americans will have a huge impact. We are talking about a 27.22% countervailing duty that will be imposed on softwood lumber from Quebec and Canada.
For Quebec only, this represents costs of about $550 million. In the short term, the lumber industry may lose some 2,000 jobs in Quebec only.
Eventually, this number could reach 10,000 in an industry of about 40,000 workers.
Since April 4, we have witnessed an 11% decline in production in Quebec only. A dramatic situation is forthcoming. Like they say, there are no friends when doing business, and I believe we have here a very eloquent example of this. Immediately after the September 11 tragedy, the United States turned to their friends to ask them for their help in the fight against terrorism.
Without any hesitation, Canada stepped forward. Our country even went farther than other U.S. allies by sending troops to Afghanistan. We all know what happened recently when four soldiers from Canada and Quebec were killed, not by the Taliban or Al-Qaida terrorists but by a bomb mistakenly dropped from an American airplane.
Several days later, the American government finally got around to offering official apologies to Canada. Paraphrasing the president, and in so doing trying to correct a statement made by the president when he came to office, the secretary of state, Colin Powell, stated before a U.S. commission that the United States had no better ally than Canada.
Well, I think the United States have a funny way of treating its best ally.
In order to avoid implementing the restructuring plan proposed by the Bloc Quebecois and having to take money from its own surplus which will supposedly exceed $10 billion, the government said it would use existing dispute settlement mechanisms under NAFTA and the WTO.
What a spurious argument. Spurious indeed, because we have so many times used the dispute settlement mechanism under NAFTA and the WTO but the United States have completely ignored the result and took us back to square one.
It is as if we had all sat down around the table, agreed to the rules of the game of Monopoly, for example, and started playing. The Americans, however, whenever they think they are losing at Monopoly, decree that when they pass “Go”, they collect not $200 but $400.
The rules of the game cannot be changed along the way. Right now we get the feeling that the Americans do tend to change the rules when the situation is not in their favour. So the government cannot hide behind existing dispute resolution mechanisms since, while it argues and makes brilliant presentations before dispute resolution bodies, men and women in Quebec and Canada will lose their job, sawmills will close, and the industry will be permanently affected.
We expect the government to do what it was elected to do. It must take the interests of the public into account in this situation and help businesses hard hit by the duties imposed by the Americans and workers facing the consequences.