Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to speak to the provisions in Bill C-292, which is an act to amend the criminal code dealing with the sale of wildlife. If passed, the bill would create a new part in the criminal code, that is part XI.1, and would create three new offences relating to the selling of wildlife. These offences would apply despite the provisions of other federal acts of parliament. However, the bill expressly states that the section setting out offences does not alter the application of any existing aboriginal or treaty rights.
The offences proposed in Bill C-292 would address three activities: the selling of wildlife in whole or in part; the killing or capturing of wildlife for the purpose of selling that wildlife in whole or in part; and finally, possessing wildlife for the purpose of selling wildlife in whole or in part. It is worth noting at the outset that in contrast to the penalty provisions found in the Canada Wildlife Act, the Migratory Birds Convention Act of 1994, the Wild Animal and Plant Protection and Regulation of International and Interprovincial Trade Act and Bill C-5, which is a bill respecting the protection of wildlife species at risk in Canada which is currently before the House, the offences in Bill C-292 are considered to be so serious that they must be proceeded with by way of indictment.
This approach is inconsistent with the classification of offences elsewhere within the criminal code. For example, the offence of sexual assault is classified as a dual procedural offence, which means that the crown may elect to proceed by summary conviction or by indictment. It would appear to be inconsistent from a policy point of view to classify the selling of wildlife as an indictable offence when other offences considered more serious by society are classified as dual procedure offences.
Also, there would be a cost implication to the provinces and territories if straight indictable offences were created. All persons charged with any offences under the act would have the choice of a trial, including the possibility of a jury trial. The maximum penalties available in Bill C-292 range from two years to eight years depending upon whether the offence is a first or subsequent offence and also depending upon whether the wildlife involved is a threatened or endangered species. As an indictable offence, there is no limit to the amount of the fine that may be imposed.
Most members in the House would agree that the goal of discouraging the selling of wildlife and wildlife parts, particularly wildlife which is threatened or endangered, is a laudable one. The question though is whether or not this particular bill is the best way to achieve this goal. This in turn raises a larger question. Are the provisions of Bill C-292 in their essence about the prohibition of morally blameworthy behaviour which is traditionally associated with parliament's exercise of its criminal law power? Alternatively, is Bill C-292 more accurately characterized as a public welfare offence, which is traditionally associated with regulatory offences in a civil context?
It is the position of the government that from a constitutional perspective, Bill C-292 in its pith and substance is concerned with the regulation of wildlife rather than with prohibiting morally blameworthy behaviour. As such, the proposed amendments to the criminal code cannot be supported.
I would like to take this opportunity to briefly outline some of the features of the bill that are traditionally associated with the creation of offences in the regulatory context rather than with criminal code offences.
One important feature of the bill is that it does not apply equally to all Canadians. It expressly exempts from application any person who is authorized pursuant to a federal or provincial permit or licence to commit the acts which otherwise would qualify as an offence, as long as the wildlife involved is not a threatened or endangered species. Exemptions of this nature are extremely rare in the context of the criminal code.
Bill C-292 also permits the Minister of the Environment to exempt from the application of the act “any person or class of persons” in respect of a threatened or endangered species where “in the opinion of the Minister”, and I will underline the word opinion, “the exemption is necessary or in the public interest”. A provision of this nature is at risk of being declared unconstitutional on the basis that the criteria are so subjective and general that they do not provide any real limits on the behaviour to be exempted.
Another feature of the bill, which is not normally found in the criminal code, is that the Minister of the Environment is given the power to designate by regulation an animal as wildlife for the purposes of the act. Another provision would permit the Minister of the Environment to designate a species of wildlife as either an endangered species or a threatened species, provided that the minister had consulted with the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada. Again, these provisions are more consistent with legislation aimed at the protection and regulation of wildlife than they are with provisions found in the criminal code.
As noted by constitutional law expert Professor Peter Hogg, “A criminal law ordinarily consists of a prohibition which is to be self-applied by the persons to whom it is addressed. There is not normally any intervention by an administrative agency or official prior to the application of the law”.
A final feature of the bill I would like to note is that in the criminal code context, search and seizure powers given to peace officers and public officers are very carefully crafted. This is in keeping with the principle that the state powers of intrusion on the privacy of individuals should be used with restraint. The search and seizure provisions in the bill are not entirely consistent with those elsewhere in the criminal code. I think there has to be a very clear policy reason for diverging from provisions used in respect of all criminal code offences, including the most serious offences.
Finally, I think the interests of justice are served by a consistent and co-ordinated approach to the subject areas within the legislative competence of the federal government. Some of the provisions of Bill C-292 overlap those in the current wildlife legislation and also those in Bill C-5. This is problematic to the extent that discrepancies exist between these various pieces of legislation.
In view of the constitutional competence of the provincial governments to regulate the use of wildlife on provincial lands, I would urge those jurisdictions that are experiencing problems with the sale of wildlife or wildlife parts to work with their respective governments to address this problem in a regulatory context. This approach is preferable to that in Bill C-292, which incorporates into the criminal code mechanisms that are more often seen in regulatory offences.
In conclusion, the provisions of Bill C-292 cannot be supported because they are potentially in conflict with other federal legislation and are inconsistent with other provisions of the criminal code.