Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have another opportunity to speak to Bill C-55 to reiterate some of the concerns I have. One of those concerns, which does dovetail with something that was just mentioned by the member for Calgary Centre, but which I note was actually originally mentioned by the Bloc Quebecois, the member for Argenteuil--Papineau--Mirabel, is the whole question of the interim orders as described in this legislation giving ministers the power to issue essentially regulatory orders. Under any act, the Quarantine Act, the pest control act, the environment act and the criminal code, that basically has no check for 45 days.
One of the things the Bloc Quebecois pointed out very early on in this debate is the fact these interim orders, according to a clause in Bill C-55, would be exempt from the relevant sections in the Statutory Instruments Act. In other words, the minister would issue essentially an interim order that could have an enormous impact and it would not require scrutiny by the Privy Council Office, which is the way things are done now, and it could be allowed to stand without cabinet approval for up to 45 days. I would agree that this is a very serious aspect of the bill that needs to be examined very carefully in committee.
I will say, though, that I think the bill is very defensible in what it tries to do. The member for Calgary Centre has said that the Emergencies Act covers most of the contingencies that might be contemplated by Bill C-55. There I would disagree, because I note that these interim orders do not speak of a national emergency. They speak of a situation of significant risk. That is quite different from what is contemplated in the Emergencies Act, which would be a state of war or a state of attack, the use of a nuclear weapon and that kind of thing.
What Bill C-55 addresses, and why these interim orders, I presume, are seen to be necessary, is a limited terrorist attack, if you will. I will just focus on one type of scenario that I think justifies what is attempted in Bill C-55, even if we do not agree with the means as we see before us.
The world has changed very significantly just in the last year with the realization that Canada, the United States and other western countries are vulnerable to a limited biological or chemical terrorist attack. We would have here, just as an example, that an interim order could be issued with respect to the Quarantine Act.
If we go to the Quarantine Act, we can see where the reasoning is coming from. It is that if there were a suspected limited attack, say on a city or wherever else, we would want the appropriate minister to be able to activate as quickly as possible whatever measures he or she deems necessary to contain the consequences of the attack. I think a biological attack is probably the most dangerous and the most difficult to really put our finger on, to even know that we are being attacked, so I think very rightly the government wants to provide means for a very quick response. That very quick response could involve the quarantining of an area and actually blocking it off so that whatever the problem is does not spread. It could require the shutting down of certain public services and it could require the imposition, the forcing of people to submit to medical examination.
These powers are very profound because they would interfere, we would all agree, with some of our fundamental civil liberties, but I think that in the kind of limited emergency that is now contemplated as a result of September 11 and, more precisely, the growth of international terrorism, also fueled, if I may so, by the Internet, it is now possible for terrorists to communicate over the Internet and get information over the Internet that was previously unavailable, so the world has become a significantly more dangerous place for limited attack.
I support the intention of the legislation. I support the intention of the interim orders. Where I have difficulty is that I think the interim orders, as was mentioned by members of the Bloc Quebecois, the member on our side from Mount Royal and now the member for Calgary Centre, are too wide open as they sit right now. I think when the bill goes to committee we will have to examine very carefully how narrowly we want to limit those emergency orders.
My own feeling is that they should be limited to no more than, say, five days. I would think that is a sufficient length of time for a prompt emergency response to a significant risk situation, whether it is biological, chemical or any other kind of terrorist attack. That would give time for the governor in council to kick in and to look over the order that has been issued by the minister.
It would also give time for the Privy Council Office to oversee it as well because we have to remember that in the Privy Council Office, even though as a member of parliament I sometimes get annoyed with what I feel is the constant finger of the bureaucracy on what we try to accomplish here, the reality is that there is an awful lot of collective wisdom in the senior levels, not only in departments like the solicitor general or Health Canada but also in the Privy Council Office. I would not like to see the senior bureaucracy cut out of the loop when Canada finds itself in a limited temporary emergency.
I would also say, though, that I would agree with the member for Calgary Centre that we should look very carefully at and make comparisons with Bill C-55 and the Emergencies Act. I would hope the committee would very, very carefully scrutinize the powers that are contained in Bill C-55. If there are instances where there is a broader question where a significant risk as defined in Bill C-55 really constitutes a broader emergency, then perhaps it should belong under the Emergencies Act. I think it is very necessary for the appropriate committee to compare very closely the reach of the Emergencies Act versus the intent of Bill C-55 in responding to what could be limited risk situations but very profound risks.
I would say that it is no coincidence that Bill C-55 also has provision for Canada ratifying the biological and toxin weapons convention. This, shall we say, is the name of the kind of threat that we have to maturely consider as parliamentarians, always mindful that we must not overreact to the national security or the public safety issues, because I think we would all agree that any limitations on civil liberties have to be very closely and carefully defined because the terrorists will win if we over-respond to these threats. We have to be very careful. I would say this affects all of parliament. I feel I am very much on both sides of the House on this issue. I think as MPs we have to find the most careful balance and set aside partisan considerations as we consider the bill.
Finally, in that context, I think the requirement to look at the passenger manifests of aircraft again reflects a reality that we can no longer ignore, but I point out that in this legislation it is very well defined. Parliament is authorizing the examination of passenger manifests only on aircraft, so I submit that this is not an extension into other areas of society. This is a very narrowly defined extension.
It is unfortunate but we are moving into a very difficult and frightening world. While I support what the government is trying to do here, the bill really needs to be examined closely in committee, particularly in the area of the interim orders.