Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in debate on Bill C-13. This of course is a bill of great moral gravity which, if passed, will have tremendous implications for the legal status of human life as it is assaulted by new and emerging technologies and as we seek to harness those technologies to advance the dignity of human life in certain respects.
It is unfortunate that this legislation has been so long in coming. Of course, as we heard in debate earlier, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies was appointed in 1989. It is now nearly 14 years after that date. Indeed, many of the horrific Frankenstein-like technologies which were at that time of an almost fictitious nature have now apparently become all too real.
Today, unfortunately, this and previous governments have avoided taking swift enough action on some of the issues addressed in the bill upon which there is a broad social, moral and ethical consensus, such as banning cloning and banning human-animal hybrids and the like.
I would also like to say at the outset that I regret that the government has chosen to ignore the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Health, which spent nearly a year in an exhaustive review of draft legislation. That committee of course recommended that the bill's provisions be split between those on which there was a general consensus, such as the prohibition of cloning and animal-human hybrids, and more contentious and difficult issues, such as the treatment of embryonic stem cell research, upon which there still is no social consensus. Had the bill been split, I believe that all members of the House speedily could have passed legislation restricting these most offensive practices, while more closely debating the need for statutory protection for nascent human life and the prohibition of creating life for the purpose of manipulating it and destroying it.
Let me further say at the outset that the bill is not founded on sound philosophical principles. It is imperative in a legislative exercise of this importance that first philosophical principles be established explicitly in the bill, preferably in the preamble, as a guide to us as legislators, to the regulators who will interpret and apply the bill and indeed to the courts who will adjudicate it.
For instance, the bill fails in its preambular section or anywhere else to assert the sanctity of human life per se. The bill clearly fails to assert the inviolable dignity of the human person. The bill fails to attribute to nascent human life, embryonic human life, the clear status of human life, let alone of personhood. Therefore, I believe, as do many who have critiqued this legislation, that it is founded on weak principles which will lead to weak application of the law if passed.
Let me turn to the amendments in Group No. 1 now before the House. I have no objection to the first and second amendments put forward by the Minister of Health, which are technical in nature. I would like to speak in favour of Motion No. 4 brought forward by my colleague from Saskatoon—Wanuskewin, which seeks to remove from the bill the language in clause 2, paragraph (e), which states:
persons who seek to undergo assisted reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against, including on the basis of their sexual orientation or marital status;--
I object to the inclusion of this provision, and not because I support unjust discrimination because indeed I do not, but I do believe that we discriminate, if that word is properly defined, to make choices. We choose to give preferential options in legislation every day in this place to advance the social good. That we might call just discrimination, discrimination in favour of a social good. The social good in whose favour I think we ought to discriminate is the social good of the human family.
I submit that the focus of this legislation ought not to be the putative rights, the rights claims, of adults who seek to benefit from certain reproductive technologies, but rather the human beings, the children, who will be created by these technologies. It is their rights and their best interests which ought principally to govern this legislation, not the whims of individuals already seeking to use this reproductive technology.
In this respect I believe it is a self-evident and essentially irrefutable fact of human history, sociology and anthropology that the human family with a mother and a father is, generally speaking, the best environment in which to raise children, children with a sound and loving environment. That of course can be provided in non-traditional families, but the evidence is overwhelming that children benefit most, on average, in a family that includes a mother and a father. I believe that the focus of the bill ought to be to give that kind of environment to the children whose lives are in part created through reproductive technology. I will vote in favour of Motion No. 4.
Motion No. 5 put forward by my hon. colleague from Mississauga South is critically important, because it seeks to clarify that chimera may include animal-human hybrids. The definition of chimera in clause 3 now states “an embryo that consists of cells of more than one embryo, foetus or human being”, but this motion would amend that to include “a non-human embryo into which any cell of a human embryo, human foetus or human being has been introduced”. We know that there are researchers who seek to explore animal-human hybrids, and this of course has very troublesome ethical, moral and physiological implications, which I think the bill clearly should prohibit and which Motion No. 5 seeks to do.
Motion No. 7 clarifies the definition of a donor and makes it clear that ownership of an embryo cannot be transferred away from its human parents. This, I think, is the intent of the bill. The motion is a positive way to clarify its intent.
Motion No. 9 seeks to extend protection to polyspermic embryos, about which the bill as currently worded is mute. Essentially, polyspermic embryos are deformed embryos. I would hope that this Parliament has learned the lessons of the history of eugenics in the 20th century and understands that imperfect or flawed human lives deserve statutory protection, which is what Motion No. 9 seeks to do.
My time is coming to a close, so I will simply say that I look forward to speaking to other groups of amendments. I hope the government will take serious consideration of the thoughtful amendments that colleagues have brought forward.