Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to Bill C-205, An Act to amend the Statutory Instruments Act (disallowance procedure for statutory instruments), introduced by the member for Surrey Central as Bill C-202 during the last session.
I would begin by echoing some of the comments made last June by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice when the previous bill, Bill C-202, was debated in the House. The present bill relates to the critical role that parliamentarians have to oversee the exercise of legislative powers that are delegated by Parliament. These powers are mainly delegated to government ministers, most often acting collectively in what is generally known as the governor in council. However, legislative powers are also delegated to individual ministers as well as to a wide range of other bodies.
It is important to appreciate that the delegation of power does not involve a surrender or relinquishment of power. Parliament can withdraw delegated powers at any time. It continues to be ultimately responsible for the exercise of these powers and accordingly has a mandate to monitor their exercise and ensure that they are used in a way that continues to meet the purposes for which they were delegated.
The Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations has performed, and continues to perform, an invaluable service to the House and the Senate, as well as to the Canadian public generally, in its review of statutory instruments made under acts of parliament. Through its careful examination of these instruments, it provides this House with valuable assistance when it comes to the oversight of delegated legislation.
Chapter 14 of the Standing Orders reinforces this oversight role. It makes provision for what is often called the disallowance procedure for statutory instruments. This procedure involves the tabling of a report by the standing joint committee containing a resolution that a statutory instrument be revoked. If the resolution is adopted, it becomes an order of the House to the government to revoke the statutory instrument in question.
To date, I believe the disallowance procedure has been used to adopt a total of eight resolutions. The fact that the government has complied with all these resolutions is clear proof that the disallowance procedure in the Standing Orders is working well.
Today we are being asked to consider a bill that would significantly extend these procedures. It would amend the Statutory Instruments Act to include disallowance procedures similar to those that, as I have just mentioned, already exist in the Standing Orders of the House.
However, there are some important differences between the current disallowance procedures and those proposed in the bill, and these differences continue to raise serious concerns that I would once again like to draw to the attention of the House.
First, the bill proposes to move beyond the traditional role of holding the government accountable to the House. It proposes to have the House revoke statutory instruments itself. Another difference is that the proposed procedures would extend to all statutory instruments and not just to those made by the government, as is the case with the procedure in the Standing Orders.
I would now like to explore these differences and indicate why they raise concerns. As I have mentioned, the procedures in the bill provide that a resolution of the House would be effective to revoke a statutory instrument. Under the existing procedures in the Standing Orders, it is up to the government to decide whether and when to revoke a statutory instrument in response to a resolution.
I believe that decisions about whether or not to revoke a statutory instrument should remain with the government. It is responsible for making the instrument and it should be responsible for revoking it. This responsibility is owed to the Canadian people as well as to the House. The government is answerable to the House for its conduct, and it is answerable to the Canadian people by vote. A procedure that removes its responsibility is antithetical to the traditions of responsible government that underlie our parliamentary institutions.
This is an argument based on principle, but I would also argue that this is an argument against the bill which is based on practicality. Revocation by parliamentary resolution raises the prospect of gaps in the law. The procedures proposed by Bill C-205 are entirely negative in their consequences. They do not, and indeed cannot, entail the enactment of provisions to replace those that are struck down.
Yet there may often be a need for regulatory measures of some sort and if the disallowed measures are not appropriate, then obviously alternative provisions are needed to replace them. Under this legislation there is no provision for alternative provisions. The development of alternative provisions, that is, alternative statutory instruments or regulations, usually requires significant capacity to develop regulatory policy as well as a familiarity with the regulated community. This requires technical expertise and consultative processes that the government is putting and has put in position and provides. This is recognized by the very fact that Parliament has indeed delegated to the government the regulatory powers in question.
A further difficulty is the timeframe for revocation that Bill C-205 would put in place. Under this legislation, a statutory instrument would be revoked 30 days after the resolution is adopted, yet often much more time is required to develop regulatory measures. The government's regulatory policy requires extensive consultation with interested persons before a regulatory proposal is adopted. Then, proposed regulations have to be published in the Canada Gazette for a minimum of 30 days to allow those interested to comment and voice their concerns. These opportunities would be completely swept away under the rigid timeframe of the procedures proposed by Bill C-205.
A second main difference between the bill and the current procedures in the Standing Orders is that the bill would extend the disallowance procedures to non-ministerial regulations. It would provide that the disallowance procedures would apply to any statutory instrument. This would include a vast number of documents, many of which are made by bodies that operate independently of the government.
Let me provide the House with a few examples. We have administrative agencies, such as the CRTC and the Canadian Transport Commission that, under their legislation, have the ability and the right to effect such statutory instruments or regulations. Under Bill C-205 those regulations could be revoked within 30 days of having a resolution adopted.
Our courts, one of the three pillars of a democratic society in government, make rules of procedure. They would fall under and be captured by Bill C-205. What about the separation of the judiciary and government? Not under Bill C-205.
We have aboriginal law making bodies, such as Indian bands, agricultural marketing boards and local port authorities.
Although the current disallowance procedures are appropriate for regulations made by ministers of the Crown, it is not at all clear that they would be appropriate for the wide variety of other law-making bodies that make statutory instruments.
I would like to conclude by stating that the government, as is the Minister of Justice and his cabinet colleagues, is committed to addressing the concerns raised by the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations and ensuring that officials of their departments take these concerns every bit as seriously as they do.
The government is prepared to entertain any suggestion for improving the relationship between parliamentarians and the government. Lastly, it is my sincere belief that it would be far more advantageous to try to settle the concerns around delegated legislation within the framework of the existing mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny.
Lastly, if it is a Standing Order it is not court challengeable, whereas if it is a piece of legislation, it is.