Debates of Jan. 31st, 2003

Statutory Instruments Act

[Gurmant Grewal, Canadian Alliance, Surrey Central, BC]

moved that Bill C-205, an act to amend the Statutory Instruments Act (disallowance procedure for statutory instruments), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the constituents of Surrey Central, I am pleased to rise to speak on my private member's bill, Bill C-205, an act to amend the Statutory Instruments Act.

I would like to thank the hon. member for seconding the bill. The last time the bill was in the House it was seconded by the Liberal member for Scarborough Southwest. I had originally planned for a member from the NDP, the hon. member for Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, to second it, but I appreciate his intention to support it. That is how things have gone. I very much appreciate it.

I first introduced the bill last June, known as Bill C-202, and then reintroduced it in October after prorogation of the House. Last time I had the support from all parties. I am very happy that members from different parties will be speaking to the bill and I look forward to them supporting it.

The bill provides for a disallowance procedure for all statutory instruments or delegated legislation, commonly known as regulations, subject to review and scrutiny by the Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations. Its enactment would ensure that Parliament would have the opportunity to disallow any statutory instrument made pursuant to authority delegated by Parliament or made by or under the authority of the cabinet.

Disallowance is one of the traditional means at the disposal of the legislature to control the making of delegated legislation. A disallowance procedure gives parliamentarians an opportunity to reject a statutory instrument made by a delegate of Parliament.

For the information of those watching the debate on television, statutory instruments give form and substance to legislation. As the saying goes, “the devil is in the details” or sometimes in the fine print. However, in this case, the devil is in the regulations.

We know that 20% of the law in the country stems from legislation debated and passed in the legislature, and in this case in Parliament. The remaining 80% of the law is made up of regulations. Members of Parliament passionately debate proposed legislation in the House and after debate we vote either yea or nay, depending on the merit of the proposed law.

Regulations, on the other hand, receive virtually no debate in the House or in the other place, no public study or input, or even media scrutiny. This is an affront to democracy.

The Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations does the only scrutiny, and that too is only limited scrutiny, of regulations of Parliament. Members of Parliament and Senators on the committee, legal counsel and staff work very hard scouring through thousands of papers on dry, technical and legal subject matter as part of their thankless task of reviewing regulations or statutory instruments.

The committee is generally misunderstood and ignored, but it is an essential watchdog, protecting democracy, controlling bureaucracy and holding the government to account. If I may say so, the Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations is a non-partisan committee, or at least less partisan and more objective than other committees of Parliament.

The committee does not judge regulations on the basis of policy matter, general merit or necessity. Its study of regulations is instead limited to the questions of validity and legality, and members follow uniform and clearly defined criteria in their examination.

The committee works meticulously and, with the complex nature of its undertaking, work proceeds at a slow pace. The inevitable result, especially considering the large volume of regulations introduced each year, is a huge backlog of work in progress. Staff and resources allotted to the committee are nowhere near adequate.

I am four term co-chair of the Scrutiny of Regulations Committee representing all members in the House, and speak from personal experience. The committee works to improve and correct defects in the regulations. Its ultimate weapon, however, is to disallow defective regulations. This is a weapon only used when strictly necessary. In a case where the joint committee considers that a regulation should be revoked, it makes a report to the House of Commons containing a resolution to the effect that a regulation, or a part thereof, should be revoked. Once that report is tabled in the House, the applicable procedures will depend on a decision by the responsible minister.

Unfortunately, the current disallowance procedure is seriously defective. The procedure resulted from a recommendation of the special committee on the reform of the House of Commons, the McGrath Commission, in 1986. Before that time there was no general disallowance procedure in place at the federal level in Canada. The government of the day placed a disallowance procedure in the Standing Orders with the intention it would remain there on an experimental and temporary basis until such time as a decision could be made to its effectiveness.

If a success, it was the intention of the government to implement a statutory procedure. Temporary is of course a relative word, but it should not mean indefinitely. In the last 16 years we have seen the effectiveness of having a disallowance procedure but still nothing has been done to give it a statutory footing. This experiment has been going on for 16 years. It is about time we conclude that experiment and look at the success of the disallowance procedure and put it on a statutory footing.

I will explain why it is not on a statutory footing. My bill would put it on a statutory footing and thereby increase the effectiveness of parliamentary control or delegated legislation.

The current procedure limits the possibility of disallowance to those statutory instruments that are made by the governor in council or by ministers of the crown. As a result, a considerable body of delegated legislation created by quasi government agencies or boards, for example by the CRTC, the National Energy Board, CIHR, the Canadian Transportation Agency or even the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, is not subject to the disallowance procedure. Thus, a large number of delegated legislation or laws escape the control and scrutiny of Parliament.

This is a consequence of the choice made in 1986 to implement the disallowance procedure by means of amendments to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons rather than by legislation. When the Standing Orders were amended to accommodate the disallowance procedure, it was not on statutory footing. It should have been done by legislation.

The present procedure relies on the executive to take further action, not on Parliament, to give effect to an order that an instrument to be revoked. A statutory procedure eliminates the need for this and guarantees compliance with the decision of the House to disallow a statutory instrument or regulation.

Mr. Speaker, you might remember that in 1992 the Subcommittee on Regulations and Competitiveness noted the deficiencies in the present procedure and recommended that it be replaced by a statutory procedure covering all statutory instruments, not just selected instruments.

I think all members will agree that it is desirable that all statutory instruments subject to review by Parliament under the Statutory Instruments Act be subject to disallowance. There is no reason why a regulation made by the governor in council or a minister can be disallowed by Parliament while a regulation made by some other delegate of Parliament cannot.

Parliament delegates authority to quasi agencies and boards to make regulations but does not have authority to scrutinize them, disallow them or correct them or to see their validity or legality. How can Parliament give authority but not have control over those regulations that completely escape the scrutiny of Parliament?

The procedure only applies to the House of Commons and not the Senate. That is another serious issue which needs to be reviewed because Parliament contains both houses. The other place and this place need to work together on disallowance procedure.

Another defect of the current procedure is that it relies on the co-operation of the governor in council or the minister concerned to carry out a disallowance after the House of Commons has ordered it. An order of the House of Commons cannot affect the revocation of a regulation. The authority that made the regulation to be disallowed must still formerly intervene to revoke that regulation following the making of a disallowance order.

While the House could deal with the matter as one of contempt of Parliament, there are no other legal sanctions or even consequences that arise from a failure to comply with a disallowance order. For instance, a report can be tabled in the House for disallowance and concurred in but there is no guarantee that regulation or statutory instrument will be disallowed because it depends on co-operation from others. Even though it could be contempt of Parliament, there are no legal repercussions after that. It is pathetic.

As a matter of law and order of the House of Commons that a particular regulation be revoked is not binding on the author of the regulation and cannot be enforced by a court of justice. Under the status quo procedure, the revocation of an instrument disallowed by the House of Commons would ultimately depend on a decision of the governor in council or the appropriate minister to obey the order of the House of Commons or not. The will of Parliament does not impose upon the decision of Parliament.

Placing the disallowance procedure on a statutory footing, as this bill recommends, would remove the need for a regulation making authority to take subsequent action to give effect to an order o the House, thus eliminating the potential for conflict between the legislature and the executive.

Proposed subsection 19.1(9) is a new provision. By putting the disallowance procedure on a statutory footing, the procedure also would be made more efficient as there would no longer be a need for the House of Commons to address an order of the cabinet ordering the revocation of a statutory instrument. The legislation itself would now deem a disallowed instrument to be revoked.

By eliminating the need for further action by the governor in council or the minister who adopted the disallowed instrument, compliance with a disallowance decision would be improved by eliminating any possibility of a regulation making authority not complying with a disallowance order of the House.

It seems a little complicated and technical, I know. However those veteran members of the standing joint committee will understand and I am sure that other members have a fairly good idea of what I am saying, though it is a dry topic and a little technical and complicated.

Bill C-205 provides that the revocation of a regulation does not take effect before the expiration of a 30 day deadline. By doing so, the bill would ensure that the regulation making authority responsible for the disallowed regulation would have an opportunity to take measures to mitigate any negative impact that the revocation might have, including the enactment of alternative regulations.

So the 30 day period will give the opportunity to mitigate any negative impact, by disallowing that particular regulation, that it can have on the industry, on safety, or on other issues. Again, it will also give the opportunity to the regulation making authority to enact an alternative regulation or to correct the defect and so on.

Proposed subsection 19.1(10) provides for a situation in which a minister has filed a motion to reject a proposed disallowance and the motion is not adopted. In that case, proposed subsection 19.1(9) would deem the regulation or other instruments to be revoked at the expiration of 30 days from the day on which the motion to reject the disallowance was considered but failed to obtain the approval of the House.

As members of the House of Commons, elected representatives of Canadians from coast to coast, it is our duty to protect democracy. It is incumbent upon all of us in the House, irrespective of political affiliation, to make the disallowance procedure more transparent and more effective.

This is a non-partisan issue. The last time the bill was in the House, it was the Liberal members who seconded it. All opposition parties in the committee are represented, including the governing party. On the other side, senators are there. We had a discussion about this. Our legal staff is involved in it and there is almost unanimous consent. I cannot say unanimous because I have not spoken to each and every member, but the members in the committee have an intention to have a disallowance procedure.

By providing a clear legislative basis for the current disallowance procedure, Bill C-205 would, first, allow Parliament's authority to extend to all instruments subject to review under the Statutory Instruments Act instead of only those made by the governor in council or a minister. Second, it would remove the necessity for additional action on the part of the regulation making authority in order to give effect to an order of the House that a regulation be revoked. How simple it would be if we had a disallowance procedure on a statutory footing.

Bill C-205 thus not only gives effect to recommendations made by numerous parliamentary committees that have studied the matter, but it would both strengthen the current disallowance procedure and make the procedure more effective by putting it on a statutory footing.

Members from across party lines, including senators, have voiced their concerns on the bill. I have support from small, medium sized and large businesses, various organizations and stakeholders, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters and various Chambers of Commerce. There is wide support even in the industry.

I am certainly aware that regulations reforms are needed and that there is room for improvements and amendments and strengthening of the bill, which can take place when it goes to the committee. Let us send it to the committee.

I wish to thank the members from all parties who will be speaking to Bill C-205, as well as the many senators who are supporting the bill, including my co-chair of the Standing Joint Committee on the Scrutiny of Regulations, Senator Hervieux-Payette, who extended her support.

It is very important to restore transparency and democracy in parliament. This private member's bill is a non-partisan issue and I am optimistic that all members of the House will support it, as it has been a long overdue initiative.

I am sure that since this initiative is in the best interests of all parliamentarians and the public in general, members from all parties will enthusiastically support it and send it to committee for further action. I am open to recommendations and amendments to the bill.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to Bill C-205, An Act to amend the Statutory Instruments Act (disallowance procedure for statutory instruments), introduced by the member for Surrey Central as Bill C-202 during the last session.

I would begin by echoing some of the comments made last June by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice when the previous bill, Bill C-202, was debated in the House. The present bill relates to the critical role that parliamentarians have to oversee the exercise of legislative powers that are delegated by Parliament. These powers are mainly delegated to government ministers, most often acting collectively in what is generally known as the governor in council. However, legislative powers are also delegated to individual ministers as well as to a wide range of other bodies.

It is important to appreciate that the delegation of power does not involve a surrender or relinquishment of power. Parliament can withdraw delegated powers at any time. It continues to be ultimately responsible for the exercise of these powers and accordingly has a mandate to monitor their exercise and ensure that they are used in a way that continues to meet the purposes for which they were delegated.

The Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations has performed, and continues to perform, an invaluable service to the House and the Senate, as well as to the Canadian public generally, in its review of statutory instruments made under acts of parliament. Through its careful examination of these instruments, it provides this House with valuable assistance when it comes to the oversight of delegated legislation.

Chapter 14 of the Standing Orders reinforces this oversight role. It makes provision for what is often called the disallowance procedure for statutory instruments. This procedure involves the tabling of a report by the standing joint committee containing a resolution that a statutory instrument be revoked. If the resolution is adopted, it becomes an order of the House to the government to revoke the statutory instrument in question.

To date, I believe the disallowance procedure has been used to adopt a total of eight resolutions. The fact that the government has complied with all these resolutions is clear proof that the disallowance procedure in the Standing Orders is working well.

Today we are being asked to consider a bill that would significantly extend these procedures. It would amend the Statutory Instruments Act to include disallowance procedures similar to those that, as I have just mentioned, already exist in the Standing Orders of the House.

However, there are some important differences between the current disallowance procedures and those proposed in the bill, and these differences continue to raise serious concerns that I would once again like to draw to the attention of the House.

First, the bill proposes to move beyond the traditional role of holding the government accountable to the House. It proposes to have the House revoke statutory instruments itself. Another difference is that the proposed procedures would extend to all statutory instruments and not just to those made by the government, as is the case with the procedure in the Standing Orders.

I would now like to explore these differences and indicate why they raise concerns. As I have mentioned, the procedures in the bill provide that a resolution of the House would be effective to revoke a statutory instrument. Under the existing procedures in the Standing Orders, it is up to the government to decide whether and when to revoke a statutory instrument in response to a resolution.

I believe that decisions about whether or not to revoke a statutory instrument should remain with the government. It is responsible for making the instrument and it should be responsible for revoking it. This responsibility is owed to the Canadian people as well as to the House. The government is answerable to the House for its conduct, and it is answerable to the Canadian people by vote. A procedure that removes its responsibility is antithetical to the traditions of responsible government that underlie our parliamentary institutions.

This is an argument based on principle, but I would also argue that this is an argument against the bill which is based on practicality. Revocation by parliamentary resolution raises the prospect of gaps in the law. The procedures proposed by Bill C-205 are entirely negative in their consequences. They do not, and indeed cannot, entail the enactment of provisions to replace those that are struck down.

Yet there may often be a need for regulatory measures of some sort and if the disallowed measures are not appropriate, then obviously alternative provisions are needed to replace them. Under this legislation there is no provision for alternative provisions. The development of alternative provisions, that is, alternative statutory instruments or regulations, usually requires significant capacity to develop regulatory policy as well as a familiarity with the regulated community. This requires technical expertise and consultative processes that the government is putting and has put in position and provides. This is recognized by the very fact that Parliament has indeed delegated to the government the regulatory powers in question.

A further difficulty is the timeframe for revocation that Bill C-205 would put in place. Under this legislation, a statutory instrument would be revoked 30 days after the resolution is adopted, yet often much more time is required to develop regulatory measures. The government's regulatory policy requires extensive consultation with interested persons before a regulatory proposal is adopted. Then, proposed regulations have to be published in the Canada Gazette for a minimum of 30 days to allow those interested to comment and voice their concerns. These opportunities would be completely swept away under the rigid timeframe of the procedures proposed by Bill C-205.

A second main difference between the bill and the current procedures in the Standing Orders is that the bill would extend the disallowance procedures to non-ministerial regulations. It would provide that the disallowance procedures would apply to any statutory instrument. This would include a vast number of documents, many of which are made by bodies that operate independently of the government.

Let me provide the House with a few examples. We have administrative agencies, such as the CRTC and the Canadian Transport Commission that, under their legislation, have the ability and the right to effect such statutory instruments or regulations. Under Bill C-205 those regulations could be revoked within 30 days of having a resolution adopted.

Our courts, one of the three pillars of a democratic society in government, make rules of procedure. They would fall under and be captured by Bill C-205. What about the separation of the judiciary and government? Not under Bill C-205.

We have aboriginal law making bodies, such as Indian bands, agricultural marketing boards and local port authorities.

Although the current disallowance procedures are appropriate for regulations made by ministers of the Crown, it is not at all clear that they would be appropriate for the wide variety of other law-making bodies that make statutory instruments.

I would like to conclude by stating that the government, as is the Minister of Justice and his cabinet colleagues, is committed to addressing the concerns raised by the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations and ensuring that officials of their departments take these concerns every bit as seriously as they do.

The government is prepared to entertain any suggestion for improving the relationship between parliamentarians and the government. Lastly, it is my sincere belief that it would be far more advantageous to try to settle the concerns around delegated legislation within the framework of the existing mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny.

Lastly, if it is a Standing Order it is not court challengeable, whereas if it is a piece of legislation, it is.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, listening to the member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, I thought she was going to conclude by saying that we had the best regulatory system in the world, but she refrained from going so far. It may well be the only thing we do not have, since according to our colleagues opposite, we have the best of everything else.

All kidding aside, this is an interesting private member's bill. Despite being a technical bill, it is still interesting. In fact, it reveals a sensitivity, or an awareness of the lack of say that parliamentarians have in different committees or on different issues. Allow me to explain.

The bill introduced by the member of the Canadian Alliance, if it was boiled down to the essential, would allow for a disallowance procedure that would apply to all statutory instruments, subject to review and scrutiny by the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. In so doing, this enactment would ensure that Parliament will have the opportunity to disallow any statutory instrument made pursuant to authority delegated by Parliament or made by or under the authority of the cabinet. Unless I am mistaken, this is how the current system would be changed under this legislation.

The way the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations currently operates is similar, as one would expect, to how other parliamentary committees operate. It is in this committee that my friend from the Canadian Alliance has experienced some frustration, as have members of the Bloc Quebecois and other opposition parties and often members of the governing party, and I will come back to this a little later. Therefore, committees sometimes unanimously come to the realization, after a bill has been passed and after several rounds of discussion here in Parliament, that the regulations that frame the legislation, or implement it, go beyond or against the discussions surrounding the bill, or its intent. In such cases, the regulations must be amended.

Officials—either unconsciously, or consciously— may have gone too far when drafting the regulations to frame or implement the legislation. The Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations reviews these regulations and has seen that they sometimes infringe upon or go beyond the intent of the legislation, and overstep the value of the bill in question.

Like other committees, when we notice this, we issue a report that is tabled in the House. One can understand our frustration when, even if the report is adopted unanimously, the government, more often than not, says, “Thank you very much”. It then takes the report and shelves it and waits.

If specific regulations hinder the application or goes against the intent of legislation, it is our duty as parliamentarians, having debated it at first reading, second reading, in committee, and at third reading and having voted in this House on the intent or application of a specific piece of legislation, to say so. Take the Young Offenders Act. When we vote on and pass legislation such as the Young Offenders Act we have certain objectives. If the regulations go beyond what parliamentarians intended, then it only seems right to give those who passed the legislation the ability to repeal certain regulations. I have a hard time understanding the Liberals' opposition when they had agreed with Bill C-202. They woke up—I am not sure when or how—and are saying that, as far as Bill C-205 is concerned, they no longer agree.

It is difficult to understand how we can value our role as parliamentarians to pass legislation and entrust the application or regulation of this legislation to another level. That seems odd. However, this is not the first time and certainly will not be the last time that we will have difficulty understanding the consistency of the government's positions.

I have examples. The members of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs can decide unanimously or by a strong majority that private members' bills are votable. The Liberals, who make up the majority on this committee, vote on this. The government members who sit on this committee decide that private members' bills are votable. This is the committee's decision. Then, in the House of Commons, the government says no. Even though it is a majority or unanimous decision, it is set aside.

It is very frustrating for parliamentarians, especially when the 1993 and subsequent red books indicated that the power or role of parliamentarians must be increased and improved, and that the government then stubbornly refused to do so. When it comes to implementing regulations, it gets even more frustrating, because there is an obvious problem.

Examples were provided as a background to the bill, ain particular a report of the Joint Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. The report, unanimously adopted, sought to repeal certain regulations. It was tabled over a year ago, over two years ago, and still nothing has been done. So, the act continues to be enforced erroneously. This situation must be rectified.

There is talk of tradition. There was a tradition about a hundred years ago that consisted of voting to send troops into combat. Now, the Liberals are ignoring this tradition and have decided, during a debate that did not lead to a vote, to send troops into combat. Sometimes traditions are fine, sometimes not. You cannot have it both ways.

If a House tradition shows how obsolete regulations are, it is our duty to correct this situation. In this regard, I fully understand the hon. member of the Canadian Alliance. This is our most difficult task because, as legislators, we must ensure that the laws we discuss and on which we vote will be enforced according to the spirit of the debate held in the House.

In committee, it is by improving the too often traditional and obsolete aspect of the British parliamentary system that we give meaning to the role of members. So, we clearly set out the scope of the acts we wish to propose. I find it difficult to understand why there would be any opposition to this bill.

I spoke to a certain aspect of this bill, and I would like to make one final point. Parliamentarians are also called upon to repeal regulations that go beyond the intention of a proposed bill or act. But this goes further; it indicates a problem with how we function as parliamentarians.

It goes further than this when there are debates on urgent and important issues. The role of an MP should also include the ability to vote on certain issues such as sending troops into combat in Iraq, which is of concern to us at this time.

We can see that the government's position is set and that a second UN Security Council resolution is not needed. We see how imminent the deployment of those troops is.

If the situation is being described as hypothetical, the fact that aircraft carriers, troops and military personnel are already being sent out, and that considerable sums are already being invested—it strikes me that the situation is less hypothetical than it is for the present Prime Minister—this is another aspect of our role of parliamentarians that ought to be taken into consideration in this debate.

It is in fact being described as a technical debate, a private member's bill that is technical in nature and concerns the disallowance of certain regulations. All of this addresses our role as legislators, that is to ensure that statutory instruments are properly enforced, but also our role as representatives of our constituents, a very strong majority of whom, in the case at hand, are opposed to sending troops into combat roles in Iraq. Our role as parliamentarians obliges the government to hear us out so that a vote may be taken on this.

I thank the hon. member for his work on the Standing Joint Committee on the Scrutiny of Regulations. I encourage him to continue with this clarification, and we are going to be in favour of his bill.

[Peter Stoffer, NDP, Sackville—Musquodoboit Valley—Eastern Shore, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today on behalf of the federal NDP to acknowledge the hon. member for Surrey Central for his persistence in bringing the bill before the House of Commons and his outreach across the country to get broad support for this bill. I am sure he can also add the federal NDP and provincial NDPs from across the country in this particular area.

A lot of the folks watching probably do not fully understand exactly what this bill would mean. I would like to go into it in brief detail so I myself can fully comprehend it as well.

The status quo ad hoc disallowance procedure applies only in the House of Commons and not the Senate. Second, disallowance is limited to statutory instruments made by the governor in council or by ministers of the crown.

Moreover, the SJCSOR disallowance report is not binding. It is left to the discretion of the minister of the crown or the governor in council to revoke or amend the regulations identified in the reports. Further, and this is very important, our courts are unable to enforce it. This creates a potential conflict between Parliament and the executive.

Amending the scope of the disallowance procedure and providing statutory footing will remedy these defects, making the procedure more transparent and effective. Even advocates for better parliamentary control of delegated legislation recommend that these two defects be remedied.

The purpose of Bill C-205 is to update the Statutory Instruments Act to afford the disallowance procedure legal statutory footing and to establish a disallowance procedure. Bill C-205 provides parliamentarians with an opportunity to strengthen, and this is something I really appreciate, our democratic process by establishing a procedure for disallowance and affording its legal footing in the House of Commons.

Parliamentarians must have the opportunity to reject a subordinate law made by a delegate of Parliament. The governor in council or a minister must act in the sense ordered by the House. While I say that, we had a motion in 1989 to eradicate child poverty by the year 2000. That was a motion and direction by Parliament, but still has not happened.

We had motions passed in the House regarding retrofitting of buildings and regarding businesses giving transit passes to their employees to reduce car traffic in the cities. These were motions passed by the House and directed at government to enforce, but it still has not been done.

Parliamentarians must protect democracy and therefore make the disallowance procedure more transparent, effective and enforceable. After 15 years, putting the present procedure on a statutory footing would not only ensure Parliament's effective control of the delegated legislation it authorizes, it would also authorize simplification of the current procedure.

Other commonwealth jurisdictions, including the provinces, are way ahead of the federal government on red tape reduction. Who could not use a little less red tape in our government?

Since 80% of the laws that Canadians face are through SI, this bill is of very significant public concern. Businesses, various organizations, stakeholders, the CFIB, Canadian manufacturers and exporters and chambers of commerce support the bill. I would say to the member for Surrey Central that many members of Parliament from various parties also support the bill.

It is very good when a cross-section of political thinking comes together on a particular bill. I only hope that on my own bill, Bill C-206, the caregivers compassionate leave bill, we will have the same consideration.

There is support for Bill C-205 and reduction of red tape is an integral part of the legislation. I thank the hon. member for Surrey Central. It is this type of bill that in many ways has ramifications down the road and a very positive effect. Anything that gives members of Parliament more empowerment to represent their constituents in the manner they choose is good for all of Parliament.

[Gerald Keddy, Progressive Conservative, South Shore, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to the bill on behalf of the Progressive Conservative Party. Bill C-205 amends the Statutory Instruments Act.

Everywhere we look in legislation we see far too much red tape and far too many regulations brought in after the fact by ministerial decree. If in any way, shape or form the bill could help to reduce that overburden of unnecessary and burdensome regulations, then it certainly has nothing but support from the Progressive Conservative Party.

The view of the Progressive Conservative Party is that the government should work toward the co-operative elimination of excessive regulations, overlap, duplication and waste in the allocation of responsibilities among the federal, provincial and territorial governments.

Canada is probably the most overgoverned, overregulated and overlegislated country in the world. Worse than that, we create new legislation without reviewing the old legislation. It causes a multitude of problems for individuals, for small businesses, for industry and even for overlapping government departments, from the municipal to the provincial to the federal.

On top of our excessive dependence on regulations, we also pass bills without sunset clauses. Never is there a bill passed in the House in which there is a sunset clause. Apparently the government thinks that when a bill is passed by the House, it goes on forever.

Surely the majority of the bills that are passed in the House should contain a sunset clause, which would mean the bill would come up for review in five or 10 years. Perhaps in the case of the long gun registry the legislation should have come back for review after three months. Maybe then only $900 million would have been wasted instead of $1 billion.

There are many pieces of legislation that have been passed by this House which have never been looked at again and where regulations have been added which have caused an unnecessary burden on taxpayers. I have a favourite example, but it is not my favourite issue, of how wrong-headed the government has been in its excessive dependence on regulations and its abuse of regulations.

I would dare say the majority of members in the House are not aware of the fact that under the new CCRA regulations, if a person challenges Canada Customs and Revenue Agency after an audit and actually happens to win the challenge, there is nothing in the regulations that prevents CCRA from charging the person again under another section of the law. It can continue to do that until it wears the taxpayer down. Whether the taxpayer is innocent or not, the person will simply give up and pay the penalty, whatever it may be.

Certainly, if a person has been charged by CCRA in violation of back payment of taxes or whatever the issue may be and the person has challenged it, ended up at a court hearing and has actually been exonerated, that should be the end of it, but not with that agency. It simply makes a lateral move under a different regulation and the person is charged all over again, along with penalties, back taxes and everything that goes with it. It is ludicrous.

Looking at regulations per se, we all know that regulations cover just about all areas of our lives and impact on us daily. Especially on the fiscal side there is a hidden form of taxation oftentimes, which raises the cost of doing business and we end up paying a higher price for goods and services. Perhaps the government is using unnecessary regulations to jack up the price of goods and services and collecting a little more GST. It is not beyond the realm of the possible for that to be the case.

In light of the effect that unnecessary regulations have on the economy of the country and on the lives of our citizens, it does make good sense that all new regulations be scrutinized by a standing committee of the House. I applaud the fact that we have members of Parliament who are willing to sit on and are interested in those types of committees.

It is not the type of committee that everyone would want to sit on. I think it would be fairly detailed and may cause people to get bogged down once in a while, but it is an absolute necessity in a democracy to have some type of watchdog on government legislation and, therefore, the regulations that come in behind it.

There is no better place for it. I disagree vehemently with the member of the government who said that the government already did the checks and balances. There is no better set of checks and balances than a committee of the House that is actually empowered, has teeth, and can do the job. There is no reason that it cannot be done in a non-partisan way. To say any different than that I think is to cast aspersions against the independence of members of Parliament.

One other thing I would suggest with regard to the bill is that a Progressive Conservative government would ensure that all proposed regulations were put on a departmental website prior to being posted in the Canada Gazette. What would be wrong with that? Most people have access to the Internet today and are able to pull up a government website.

If farmers were expecting new regulations to come down from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency that would have a direct impact on the way they did business and perhaps more than likely increase the costs of being able to do business, then it would be good for those farmers to know ahead of time and actually be able to contact a member of Parliament or a member of the government and lobby those members to minimize the impact these regulations would have. They could use that information to convince the politicians that the regulations were not needed to begin with because a whole list of regulations already existed that did the same thing. There have been regulations on the books forever and no one ever thinks to look at them.

I wish to congratulate the member for Surrey Central because this is an important piece of legislation. I congratulate him on the fact that he was able to make this a votable item. I would certainly hope and actually expect all members of Parliament to look at this piece of legislation in a non-partisan way and recognize its value. It should be referred to committee, debated and amendments made if needed. It should be recognized for its value and worth, and hopefully it can be a contribution to this place.

[Carole-Marie Allard, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me to speak today on Bill C-205, an act to amend the Statutory Instruments Act (disallowance procedure for statutory instruments), introduced by the member for Surrey Central.

First, I would like to mention a point that was put forward earlier in today's debate, regarding the fact that the current disallowance procedure, set out in the Standing Orders, works well.

This procedure is a very useful tool for Parliament to control the exercise of regulatory authority. This procedure has existed for some 15 years and, until now, only eight reports containing a resolution to revoke a statutory instrument have been adopted. Each time, the government implements the resolutions.

Since the disallowance procedure works well and the entrenchment of a disallowance procedure in the Statutory Instruments Act would be problematic for several reasons, I cannot support the bill introduced by the hon. member.

I would, however, like to go into greater detail regarding one of the government's concerns with this bill. It is important to point out that this bill goes much further than the current procedure set out in the Standing Orders.

Under current procedure, adoption of a resolution under Standing Order 123 constitutes an order of the House to revoke the statutory instrument in question. With this bill, adoption of the resolution would have the effect of automatically revoking the regulatory instrument in question on the thirtieth day following the day on which the motion was agreed to.

In our opinion, such an automatic revocation measure is fraught with consequences. It can cause a legal vacuum and hence serious problems to those administered under the regulatory instrument in question. This automatic revocation procedure deprives the government of the necessary flexibility legislative measures require.

First of all, it is possible that the government has not had time to gauge the impact of such an automatic revocation on the legal system in place. As well, the government might find itself hard pressed to fill this legal vacuum or to make the necessary adjustments to the system without having the time required to properly assess the impact of the revocation or new measures.

For example, there was a recent case involving the fresh fruit and vegetable regulations. This was reported on by the Standing Joint COmmittee on the Scrutiny of Regulations, in a report tabled in keeping with the disallowance procedure set out in the Standing Orders. The report in question was Report No. 67, tabled on June 7, 2001.

The Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Regulations set out the requirements governing the registration of establishments in which fresh produce is prepared and packed. Sections 57 and 58 of these regulations stipulate grounds for suspension or cancellation of the establishment's registration. These grounds were the same for both types of measures.

Since the grounds for suspension and cancellation were the same, the Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations felt that the establishment operators were at the mercy of the civil servant who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulations and which sanction will apply.

The committee decided on the revocation of one of the two provisions, namely section 58, which deals with the cancellation of registration.

The government complied with an order of the House and revoked section 58 of the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Regulations. The revocation was registered under the designation SOR/2002-68.

This revocation came into effect some eight months after the committee's report was tabled.

It is important to note that, in this case, other regulations were affected, namely the Honey Regulations and the Maple Products Regulations, as they had similar provisions to those at the heart of the report. Therefore, there was a need to make similar changes to these regulations.

This is a good example of why the government needs some latitude, not only to avoid a legislative vacuum, but also to be able to adequately adjust the existing regulatory system.

In this example, it is clear that simply revoking the power to cancel registration would not effectively solve the problem on its own.

There must be time to consider an alternative solution and to implement new regulatory measures.

However, I believe that it is most important that the government have the flexibility needed to solve such issues. The government must have the time needed to pass new regulatory measures in order to fill the legal vacuum and to adjust the regulatory system that is in place.

The automatic disallowance process being proposed here today fails to meet this need for flexibility. Furthermore, passing new regulatory measures hastily to replace provisions that are automatically repealed may be very risky. It could also have terrible consequences, not only for government but more specifically for citizens.

I would like to point out that a great many regulations are legislative texts just like the bills that are debated here in the House. Therefore, it is very important that these texts be developed with the utmost care, for the benefit all Canadians.

In most cases, the government needs time to establish policy in order to implement regulations that are effective.

[The Deputy Speaker]

The time provided for the consideration of private members' business has now expired and the order is dropped to the bottom of the order of precedence on the order paper.

It being 2:30 p.m., the House stands adjourned until Monday next at 11 a.m. pursuant to Standing Order 24.

(The House adjourned at 2:31 p.m.)