Mr. Speaker, I rise on behalf of the constituents of Surrey Central to address Motion No. 6 at report stage consideration of Bill C-17, an act to amend certain acts of Canada and to enact measures for implementing the biological and toxin weapons convention in order to enhance public safety, otherwise also known as the public safety act.
Like its predecessors, Bills C-42 and C-55 of the last session, Bill C-17 is an omnibus bill that amends or introduces nearly two dozen acts within the jurisdiction of nearly a dozen federal departments or agencies.
Motion No. 6 is very interesting. It takes the interim orders philosophy in Bill C-17 and ensures that will be included in the Pest Control Products Act in the event of that act getting royal assent before Bill C-17 does. Let us think about this. The Pest Control Products Act was written without interim orders and now the government is so concerned that it has modified Bill C-17 to apply to a bill to be passed in the future. It is fascinating.
In many cases, in the place of specific provisions designed to reassure the travelling public and the public in general, the bill gives four ministers the authority to issue interim orders. A very significant portion of Bill C-17 deals with interim orders. Ten parts of the bill amend various statutes to provide a new or expanded power permitting the responsible minister to make interim orders in situations where immediate action is required. Essentially, the thinking from the government behind interim orders is “trust me”. In other words, it is saying, “Give me various undefined powers and when there's an emergency, trust me to do the right thing”. That is what the minister will say.
First, we cannot forget that the very same government that has taken over 19 months to react to September 11 is the one now saying “trust me”. Second, we should not overlook the fact that if the government really knew what it was doing, it would have clearly defined both its responsibilities and its powers. In the United States, the U.S. aviation and transportation security act was drafted just 10 days after September 11. However, even then, while a shocked America pondered the unthinkable crisis that had just happened, American legislators knew that “trust me” was not going to cut it with the American public.
The U.S. aviation and transportation security act is specific. It delegates powers but it also assigns responsibilities. It contains deadlines. It specifies the amount of money that may be spent on particular initiatives. It sets management objectives and requires regular evaluations as well as audits. It is very specific, not vague like the legislation that we are debating.
There is a clear understanding of who does what why, when, and with what authority. Checks and balances are present. The U.S. aviation and transportation security act is a planned, strategic response by a superpower to a defined threat.
In Canada Bill C-17 uses interim orders while the U.S. uses specifics. The interim orders all follow a similar pattern. They allow a minister, under certain circumstances, to make an order that would normally have to be made by the governor in council. Thus, when the chips are down and cabinet cannot meet, an interim order lets a cabinet minister take actions that would normally need cabinet approval.
In most cases in Bill C-17 the interim order must be published in the Canada Gazette within 23 days, must be approved by cabinet within 14 days, and expire at the end of the year. Similarly, an interim order must be tabled in Parliament within 15 days after it has been made.
Members from the Canadian Alliance, the Bloc, and the NDP tried to propose constructive amendments to Bill C-17 regarding interim orders when it was referred to the special legislative committee. In the case of 14 Canadian Alliance amendments put forward by our transportation critic, who has done a very good job, each was motivated by the spirit of the Emergencies Act. Its preamble reads, in part:
WHEREAS the safety and security of the individual, the protection of the values of the body politic and the preservation of the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the state are fundamental obligations of government;
AND WHEREAS the fulfilment of those obligations in Canada may be seriously threatened by a national emergency and, in order to ensure safety and security during such an emergency, the Governor in Council should be authorized, subject to the supervision of Parliament, to take special temporary measures that may not be appropriate in normal times;
We therefore thought the standard of parliamentary scrutiny, laid down in the Emergencies Act, might be applicable to the type of situations in which interim orders might be made under Bill C-17. Subsection 61(1) of the Emergencies Act reads:
Subject to subsection (2), every order or regulation made by the Governor in Council pursuant to this Act shall be laid before each House of Parliament within two sitting days after it is made.
Subsection 61(2) reads:
Where an order or regulation made pursuant to this Act is exempted from publication in the Canada Gazette by regulations made under the Statutory Instruments Act, the order or regulation, in lieu of being laid before each House of Parliament as required by subsection (1), shall be referred to the Parliamentary Review Committee within two days after it is made or, if the Committee is not then designated or established, within the first two days after it is designated or established.
Each of the 14 amendments was motivated by the same philosophy: if during an emergency, the government can subject orders and regulations to parliamentary scrutiny within two sitting days after they are made, there is no reason why a lower standard should apply to Bill C-17. The Canadian Alliance was not alone in this thinking. A similar philosophy was advanced by the NDP and the Bloc.
It is my hope that the three parties might be able to agree on a common approach so that a higher level of parliamentary scrutiny may be offered to interim orders made by a government that wants us to trust it 20 months after September 11. However, the Liberal desire to escape parliamentary scrutiny appears intractable. Rather than agree to any new restrictions on interim orders, the only interim orders amendment that the Liberal members proposed in committee was the addition of clause 111.1 so that the interim orders would be included in the Pest Control Products Act.
In conclusion, the widespread use of interim orders is troubling. The government's reliance on interim orders shows that even 20 months after September 11 the Liberals are still unable to provide Canadians with the legislation to combat terrorism at home and abroad. Delegating broad powers into the hands of single ministers is a dangerous trend. The committee stage version of Bill C-17 is an improvement over Bill C-42 as first presented 17 months ago, but more changes, particularly in the area of increased parliamentary scrutiny, are required.
Canadians were prepared to sacrifice their liberties for the promise of increased scrutiny and security in the aftermath of September 11. That feeling has faded in the intervening year and a half. For this reason, the government would be wise to carefully consider increased parliamentary scrutiny on the same level as the Emergencies Act if it wants opposition parties to support Bill C-17.