Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my friend, the hon. member for Brossard—La Prairie.
To begin, I want to say how delighted I am that we are having the debate. This is Parliament at its best. This is what we are supposed to in here.
I also would like to thank the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence for their willingness, not only to participate in this debate but to extend that courtesy in private meetings with members of Parliament and to take the time to consider this important step at which we are looking.
Finally, I would like to thank the Prime Minister himself for encouraging the debate both within caucus and in Parliament, for urging us to take the time necessary so we can satisfy ourselves about some questions.
I think everybody in the House shares a common view about the war on terrorism. Our repugnance, our horror at what happened in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 has demanded and evoked from Canadians an appropriate response, a response to fight terrorism wherever it is, a response to defend our continent with the United States against terrorist attacks and a response which has seen our participation in Afghanistan, which has served as a launching pad, a staging ground, for terrorism. That commitment to Afghanistan will continue this coming summer as we try our best to ensure that Afghanistan does not slip back into a state in which it would be once again a failed stated and, hence, a potential home for terrorists. I think we are all on the same page on the war on terrorism.
The problem is there is a bit of a dispute, I suppose, among our friends, the Americans, as to what constitutes a clear and present danger.
We can see, as recently as this week's news, that is the horrific bombings in Saudi Arabia, that the enemy has not disappeared. We have no evidence of the deaths of Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar. We have a lot of evidence that the network continues and it will need all our attention. That is where we need to concentrate our resources immediately. That is why, in his state of the union speech in January 2002, I think Canadians were genuinely puzzled that the President seemed to be taking his eye off the ball against the war on terrorism and moving it onto some other subject, which is called the axis of evil. At that point we were puzzled.
We now see that is part of a larger doctrine, which is known variously as the project for the new American century, or the Bush doctrine, or the national security strategy of the United States of America, as announced last September. We now have some sense of what was animating Mr. Bush when he made the shift in his state of the union speech, and we have seen the Bush doctrine in action in the war in Iraq.
One of the questions we have to ask ourselves is, how does this new context work? That is to say the context of the Bush doctrine, a doctrine which supposes unilateralism, military superiority in every sphere without any other country challenging, a doctrine which encourages unilateral interventions and pre-emptions of attack to occur, as was the case in Iraq, a new doctrine in which the context of national missile defence has to be seen.
One of the arguments put forward in order to ask questions is that we need to have a dialogue, or talks or conversations with the United States and that this is something different from negotiations. If one were to look back over 40 years of defence talks with the United States, one would find that inevitably they led to negotiations. There is a continuum, there is no point at which this suddenly ceases to be a conversation and becomes a negotiation. We have to see this as a continuum and we have to admit it.
There are those who argue quite persuasively, and I put the Minister of Foreign Affairs in that category, that we cannot ask the questions unless we have the conversations, and I accept that. Conversations have taken place with other officials and will continue to take place, but conversations at the level of ministers are important. However those conversations leading to potential negotiations have to have two qualities.
One is we have to be able to ask questions and get satisfactory answers. The second is based on what we learn. We need a negotiating position which sets out some preconditions. Just as the Minister of Foreign Affairs today has indicated, as I hear him and I hear him loud and clear, a deal breaker would be that national missile defence would contain an element of the weaponizing of space. At that point Canada would not participate.
It is in that spirit that I would like to raise 25 questions, if I can get them out, that would form part of that conversation and which would in turn lead to the negotiating position which would have some preconditions. Let me group them.
One would be about rogue states, the rogue state doctrine. What is the rogue state doctrine which is affecting us so much? This is the definition from the American Cato Institute:
The rogue state doctrine is predicated on the claim that those states act irrationally, and therefore cannot be deterred with America's offensive nuclear arsenal. Armed with ballistic missiles, they may strike the U.S. at any time. Therefore, the argument goes, the U.S. must deploy an [national missile defence system]...
One, does Canada accept or reject the rogue state doctrine, as laid out in that argument, and the assumption that rogue states are irrational and, thus, undeterrable by conventional means, if one can describe nuclear retaliation as such?
I would only ask members to consider the problem with the rogue state doctrine because any land based missile always has a return to sender address and any rogue state attacking the United States could expect swift, massive and total retaliation. Is this the way of the dictators of the sort we have seen, whether it is Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-il, or do they actually seem to enjoy the perks and pleasures of power, the palaces and the special trains. I will not go into the other inappropriate perks and pleasures power, but do we think they have behaved that irrationally or do they actually enjoy being dictators? That is a big question.
Two, if Canada accepts the rogue state doctrine, is this not an argument for the United States and others to expend more energy on disarmament and non-proliferation? How do we intend, if we join the national missile defence, to have some equal energy put into non-proliferation? How do we ensure that this stuff, the fissile material, does not fall into their hands? Will we abandon that part or will we give extra effort to that part? How do we ensure that countries which are marginal are on our side right now? We wink at them when they acquire the stuff, but we have to recognize that they may in turn become a rogue state one day and will always have the bomb.
Three, does Canada believe that national missile defence will give other states more or less incentive to develop long range missiles?
Four, does Canada believe that national missile defence will increase or decrease the likelihood of U.S. interventions abroad, particularly in the context of the Bush doctrine which is an interventionist doctrine? That is what is different from the situation we found ourselves in with the Clinton administration when we did not sign it either.
The next set of questions has to do with Canada's continental national security.
Five, does the current and projected ballistic missile threat to Canada, as determined by Canada, justify involvement in the U.S. deployment of national missile defence?
Six, how does the current and projected ballistic missile threat to Canada compare to other risks to national security? What is the risk analysis, in our view, compared to the sorts of things that may be entering our harbours today and going forward to New York tomorrow in some container? How do we make that assessment?
Seven, based on that assessment, how does the estimated return on investment in national missile defence compare to the estimated return on investments of other homeland defence measures?
Eight, if Canada does not participate in national missile defence, how would we interact with the United States government in regard to friendly and enemy missiles over our territory?
The next set of questions have to do with Canada's missile defence, and I have a feeling I will not make it to the end.
Nine, what specific role is Canada considering playing in national missile defence? What role will the United States allow us to play under the Bush doctrine?
Ten, what is Canada bringing to the table by way of potential contribution to national missile defence negotiations?
Eleven, would Canada consider the placement of interceptor missiles or NMD-specific radar on its territory?
Twelve, what is an acceptable debris zone for Canada? And it will not be Don Valley West if I have anything to do with it. We hear talk of this Orwellian phrase “debris acceptance”. Are we allowed to reject it?
Thirteen, what are the odds that an intercepted warhead might detonate when it falls back to earth?
Fourteen, what is the risk of collateral damage to Canada from an NMD intercept?
Fifteen, how will Canada define national missile defence technology as successful, especially if we are counting on it for some purpose?
Sixteen, what are the current and potential long term financial costs of participation in NMD? We are told today that no one has asked us for any money. There is a bill before the U.S. congress called the missile defence burden sharing act from a democrat representative from Maine that asks that all who are protected should pay their share. How do we know they will not come back to us?
Seventeen, what is the range of estimates of financial benefits to Canadian companies if Canada joins NMD?
Eighteen, what is the opportunity cost of joining national missile defence? Would joining diminish Canada's capacity to take a leadership role in restoring multilateralism and promoting nuclear disarmament?
Those are but a few questions and I will post the rest on my website.