Mr. Speaker, I want to say a couple of words about this report stage motion on Bill C-34. Bill C-34 is an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act with regard to the ethics commissioner and Senate ethics officer and other acts in consequence.
The motion before the House is with regard to clause 38. Its intent is to delete clause 38. The purpose of clause 38 is to ensure that the activities of the ethics commissioner and the Senate ethics officer are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The amendment is interesting. At first blush, my impression is that it again raises the question about the supremacy of parliament and the issue of court made law.
In Bill C-34, there are a couple of the provisions that are useful. I think it is probably worth putting into the record. With regard to the mandate of the ethics commissioner as stated in the bill, proposed section 72.07 states:
The mandate of the Ethics Commissioner in relation to public office holders is
(a) to administer any ethical principles, rules or obligations established by the Prime Minister for public office holders;
(b) to provide confidential advice to the Prime Minister with respect to those ethical principles, rules or obligations and ethical issues in general; and
(c) to provide confidential advice to a public office holder with respect to the application to him or her of those ethical principles, rules or obligations.
The aspect of confidentiality is very clear in terms of the mandate of the ethics commissioner. It also raises the question about whether or not there should be an ethics commissioner who reports to parliament.
As the previous speaker said, in fact it is laid out that the ethics commissioner position is a position which is in fact nominated by the Prime Minister, but let us look at that. It is the governor in council, “by commission under the Great Seal”, that appoints an ethics commissioner “after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the House”, so there is a consultation process that takes place. As well, it states “after approval of the appointment by resolution of that House”, so there will be a vote in the House.
This raises for me the reflection of the whole question about whether or not there should be an ethics commissioner who is responsible to parliament and reports to parliament. I can recall that this issue has surfaced time and time again: it is the matter of whether or not an ethics commissioner could properly discharge his responsibilities, be open with the House in all its detail, and still protect, for instance, cabinet confidentiality. I do recall that the ethics counsellor ultimately appointed was of the opinion that he would be unable to discharge the responsibility if he were to report directly to parliament, simply for the reason that cabinet confidentiality could not be compromised. It is an interesting point, but I think the will of the House has always been to promote accountability for and transparency of the activities of public office holders, and in the event there were some allegations or suggestions of an impropriety or a breach of basic ethical rules this place should be able to be assured that this was being looked at with independence and transparency in regard to the process.
I am not so sure it was the wish of the House or the intent of the House or of anybody else that the full details of any alleged impropriety be dealt with and discussed on the floor. We know what happens when we deal with allegations. Obviously there is a process to be followed, which would protect the integrity of the process but at the same time protect the rights and the reputations of those who may be involved in the discussions with regard to an allegation of a breach of ethics.
There is much more to this than just simply asking that we in fact delete clause 38 and allow the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal to have access to the information with regard to the ethics commissioner. I would tend to agree that Parliament and parliamentary supremacy are very important. That brings with it some parameters which I think we all understand. We went through this when we discussed the role of Parliament and the role of the courts. I believe that the preponderant position taken by the people in this place is that Parliament is the supreme court of the land and that parliamentary supremacy is to be protected and defended.
We have other issues before us that are going to challenge that concept, but there comes a point when parliamentary privilege and the supremacy of Parliament have to be defended. I believe that clause 38 is consistent with the premise that the privileges of Parliament have to be protected. We have certain privileges in this place. Unfortunately from time to time maybe they do not serve the public well because even in this place members are protected from prosecution should they make public allegations. Within the confines of this chamber they are not subject to challenge and to being dealt with in regard to their statements or comments or allegations which outside this place would probably lead them into some difficulty.
I do not believe that is where we should be going or that we want to continue to perpetuate this aspect, but by the same token we need to be sure about the business of Parliament, particularly since the mandate of the ethics commissioner is to deal with matters on a confidential basis and to deal with matters that are very sensitive and do impact the lives of public office holders. There is a way to deal with them without in fact potentially damaging unduly the reputations of public office holders. I think we want to protect those things.
For me it also raises, in terms of matters to do with whistle-blowers, which I have discussed with the President of the Treasury Board, another aspect of how one deals with allegations of impropriety in terms of following policies and procedures of the public service and how to assure people who have concerns. I mentioned to the minister that in my own profession of chartered accountancy there are rules within our code of conduct which state that in the event I become aware of the impropriety of a colleague, a member of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, it is incumbent on me to bring it to the attention of the ethics commission of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. It is up to the commission to discharge the determination of whether any work should be done or any action should be taken. In the event that it subsequently comes to the commission's attention that I knew of but did not disclose that information, there is a consequence and there are sanctions against me.
In this regard I think there is some precedent for organizations and institutions, whether it be the public service or a profession, or indeed Parliament. There is certain business in its activities that should be dealt with within the organization simply because it is important to protect the integrity and the good name of people.
At this point I will conclude simply by saying that I believe the amendment does not fit what should be the premise of this place, that Parliament is supreme, that the privileges of Parliament must be protected and that maintaining clause 38 is consistent with that position.