Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Bill C-471, an act to amend part XXIV of the Criminal Code regarding dangerous offender designations and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, introduced by the hon. member for Crowfoot.
The objective of the bill is to jail indefinitely anyone convicted for a second time for any one of three specific sexual offences against a child under the age of 18: section 271, sexual assault; section 272, sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm; and section 273, aggravated sexual assault.
The bill would require new criteria for these specific offenders to be granted parole, specifically requiring at least two psychiatric assessments indicating the risk posed by the offender, and with both assessments indicating that there was no risk of reoffending.
The bill proposes to meet these objectives by amending the dangerous offender provisions of the Criminal Code, specifically section 753, regarding the establishment of new mandatory criteria for judges to consider in dangerous offender applications against this specific group of offenders. The bill would add a new provision to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act establishing mandatory criteria parole hearings regarding these specific offenders.
I commend the overall objective of the bill of enhanced security for children from sexual predators. I do not think anybody in the House would do otherwise. As stated in the Speech from the Throne earlier this month, this is also a priority of the government and has been for the past decade.
However, I do not believe that the bill would accomplish what it is setting out to do, that is, to enhance child safety. I would like to examine how the scheme proposes to operate and in so doing clearly demonstrate why I believe it simply will not work.
The heart of the bill is the proposal to amend section 753 of the Criminal Code. This particular provision defines the criteria that a judge must consider to designate a convicted offender as a dangerous offender. The proposal in Bill C-471 seeks to dramatically change the way a particular class of offenders is designated as dangerous offenders.
This proposal would make dangerous offender designations automatic where the defendant has had two or more convictions for the enumerated sexual offences where the victim was a person under the age of 18. That is what the member for Crowfoot indicated when he introduced his bill on October 6, 2003, and again this morning in his speech.
I must submit that I have serious concerns about this proposal. The bill says quite clearly that individuals convicted of a sexual offence listed in subsection 752(b) where the victim was under 18 years of age is subject to this new provision if they had a previous conviction under the same offences. Again, these offences are for sexual assault, committing a sexual assault while carrying, using or threatening to use a weapon, and aggravated sexual assault.
As I understand it, these specific offences are currently listed in subsection 752(b) in order to define the term “serious personal injury offence”. I note that these provisions are there to do exactly what the member for Crowfoot wants, that is, to make dangerous offender designations against sexual offenders easier. It seems to me that it is working.
At last count, of the 200 designated dangerous offenders since the last major revision to part XXIV, proclaimed August 1, 1997, over 90% of the designations were for sexual offences, and the vast majority were for the three listed offences, I believe about 80%. I would also point out that the Crown success rate for such applications is extremely high, over 90% in most provinces.
Right now there are over 340 dangerous offenders in the corrections system. Of those, over 90% are sexual offenders. About 80% of sexual dangerous offenders are there because of a section 271, 272, or 273 offence. Clearly, the current provisions are hitting the mark. These are the offenders that the provisions target and with great success. The bill seems to imply that this is not good enough.
Under the current provisions, one of the prerequisites for making a dangerous offender designation is that the defendant must have committed a serious personal injury offence with the criteria being defined in subsections 752(a) or (b). That is, if the offence was one of the listed ones in subsection 752(b), then no further inquiry by the court would be needed regarding the serious personal injury offence requirement.
The court must then turn to the test outlined in subsection 753(1)(b). This requires the court to satisfy itself that the Crown has met the prerequisites of proving that the individual, by his conduct, has shown a failure to control his sexual impulses and, further, that there is a likelihood that he will cause injury, pain or other evil to others in the future as a result of his failure to control his sexual impulses.
I would emphasize that the prerequisites for a dangerous offender designation for individuals convicted of the listed sexual offences are already significantly less stringent than for all other offences. Specifically, I would point out that if the Crown were to seek a dangerous offender designation for an offence other than the three mentioned in subsection 752(b), the first step for the Crown would be to meet the burden of establishing that the offence was a “serious personal injury offence” as defined in subsection 752(a).
This would require, first, that it be an indictable offence with at least a maximum penalty of 10 years and, second, the Crown must prove, under subsection 753(1)(a), that the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons. Subsections (i) through (iii) provide the criteria which the court would use for making such a determination.
I make these points and I know they are technical, but they are important points. I make these points to clearly demonstrate to the House that part XXIV of the Criminal Code already makes dangerous offender applications against individuals committing the listed sexual offences easier than non-sexual offenders. That is not in fact my primary concern with the bill. Far from it. My real concern lies with the mandatory imposition of the dangerous offender designation.
I would draw the attention of the House to subsection 753(1), which states that the court may impose the dangerous offender designation on the offender if the Crown satisfies all of the criteria I have mentioned above. This is the same for both categories of offenders, the designated sexual offenders and all others. This wording provides the court with discretion on whether to impose the designation. It is there for a reason and that reason is critical to the constitutionality of this provision.
When we lock up any individual, we are depriving that individual of his or her liberty, but we do so for specific reasons and we only do so where we provide due process and protection of fundamental rights of the individual. Since 1982 that right has been clearly entrenched in the Constitution by section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I would point out that even before 1982 those fundamental rights existed and were in fact vigorously protected by the courts.
Since 1982 that right has been codified and entrenched. The Supreme Court of Canada has had a lot to say about how section 7 interplays with the desire to protect society from habitual and violent offenders. The leading cases on this are the decisions of the Supreme Court in Regina v. Lyons 1987 2 S.C.R. 309, and more recently Regina v. Johnson, 2003 S.C.C. 46.
In Lyons, the court made it clear that Parliament could indeterminately imprison offenders in order to protect Canadians from harm, but if and only if the charter rights of these individuals were protected. In Regina v. Johnson, the Supreme Court reviewed the provisions as they are now and again found them to be constitutional. However, it emphasized, as it did in Lyons, the importance of the discretionary aspects of the provisions as a fundamental method to ensure that the rights of these offenders were protected.
Both of these cases provide an exhaustive examination of the constitutional viability of part XXIV, both before and after the 1997 changes. Both cases emphasize the discretion afforded the courts in refusing to impose a dangerous offender designation as a critical aspect of the viability of the scheme.
The bill before us today simply goes too far. It says that the court shall have no discretion and if there are two convictions it is automatic. I simply cannot support the bill regardless of the laudable objectives--and I know my colleague has put a lot of work into the bill--of protecting children. I simply do not believe the courts would uphold it. It would be irresponsible to amend the Criminal Code knowing that it would be unconstitutional. Along with the fact that part XXIV already successfully targets these specific offenders, I submit that this proposal does not merit the support of the House.
In theory we must envision the constitutional aspect. The Constitution is real and not just theory. The constitutionality of our laws is very important.