Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for Chambly, who also has great experience with administrative tribunals. We used to run into each other at the Confédération des syndicats nationaux.
His speech leads me to draw a parallel. It is not the same thing, but it has to do with fear.
In Quebec, during the process of accrediting a union, we know full well that employees can be threatened by the employer, as we saw recently in the Wal-Mart case. That is why when a union submits enough cards, it is presumed that the majority of employees are in favour of the union. We know that the accreditation system requires 50% plus one, which, in a democracy, is entirely normal. Accordingly, if the labour relations board finds that the cards are valid, accreditation is given without a vote.
In the rest of Canada, most of the provincial jurisdictions have an accreditation method whereby, even though cards are submitted, a vote is held if it is not clear that there is a majority of cards plus one. This gives the employer the chance to threaten employees on accreditation before a vote is held. In a way, in the Quebec accreditation model, we have reversed the burden of proof. It is up to the employer—who has the upper hand—to demonstrate that it is not true that the majority of employees want to unionize or not.
I find what the hon. member for Chambly is suggesting interesting. It is the exact same thing here. Those who have the information and who have the upper hand, are the criminals. We are reversing the burden of proof to have them tell us how they acquired their financial assets or property when the income they declared over the years simply does not correspond to their wealth.
In a way, Quebec's approach of reversing the burden of proof is reflected in the motion and the bill.