Mr. Speaker, I, perhaps, have a somewhat tamer point of order which is in response to a previous point raised. I want to clarify the facts referred to in the comments made by the member for Burnaby—Douglas on Tuesday, October 17, when responding to the point of order I raised in respect to Bill C-14.
Before making a ruling, I believe it is important to note that the member was incorrect when he asserted that the denial of citizenship to an adopted child was a de facto denial of an immigration visa and permanent residence status. The member made this argument to persuade you, Mr. Speaker, that there was no difference between citizenship and immigration matters so that you would conclude that the immigration appeal division of the Immigration and Refugee Board may hear citizenship matters.
The fact is that citizenship and permanent residency each have a very different status in law. Indeed, so substantial are the differences that each is defined in separate statutes, as are the procedures and applications relevant to them.
Mr. Speaker, the member would have you overlook the fact that there is nothing in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that provides the Immigration and Refugee Board with powers or a mandate to deal with citizenship. The procedures and process for citizenship are limited to the Citizenship Act. None of those procedures or processes refer to or relate to the IRB.
More fundamental to the argument by the member for Burnaby—Douglas is his incorrect assertion that one can look past the lack of a citizenship mandate of the IRB by finding that citizenship decisions have an impact on the applicant's visa or permanent residence status application. The member, simply put, was wrong.
The fact is that denial of citizenship has little impact on permanent residence status. It is certainly incorrect to say that a denial of citizenship is a de facto denial of permanent residence. Under the current law it is possible for a permanent resident to apply for citizenship and be denied with the denial having no effect on his or her permanent residence status.
The second significant error to the member's submission that I wish to clarify is his suggestion that the incompleteness of the amendments may be addressed by regulations to Bill C-14 by stating:
...that requirements as to its operation can be delineated in regulations developed to implement the act, and therefore the amendment meets all the tests of completeness.
The member made this argument hoping to persuade you, Mr. Speaker, to overlook the fact that the legislation that creates the Immigration and Refugee Board does not already recognize citizenship or a role for itself in dealing with citizenship matters.
The member's submission that a new role for the IRB can be delineated in regulations to Bill C-14 is incorrect. I gave my remarks on October 6 on the inadmissibility of an amendment that requires subsequent amendment of an act that was not before the committee. I do not propose to repeat those comments here but to simply respond to the member for Burnaby—Douglas' contention and clarify that there are no provisions in the Citizenship Act or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that would permit the making of regulations that would change the existing mandate of the immigration appeal division.
If his submission is to be taken as being that the regulations to Bill C-14 can speak to the mandate and powers of the immigration appeal division and broaden them to allow the immigration appeal division to deal with a citizenship matter, then I would refer to my previous comments on October 6 only to add that regulations to an amendment of the statute may not amend another statute that was not before the committee.
In this instance, regulations to an amendment to the Citizenship Act may not amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which creates the mandate and powers of the immigration appeal division.
With respect to the royal proclamation, the argument essentially was that since there would no longer be appeals under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, somehow these funds could be applied to appeals under the Citizenship Act, is somewhat circular in the sense that if there is no appeal provision in respect to the adoption provision in the Adoption Act, moneys would be saved and in order for the appeal to happen we would require additional funding which would require a royal proclamation. For that reason, also, it would not be acceptable.