Mr. Chair, I remember back in 1979 when the forces in Tanzania invaded Uganda and removed Idi Amin. Publicly there was condemnation by African leaders of the invasion of the territorial sovereignty of Uganda, but privately they were rejoicing that Nyerere's government had finally rid Africa of one of the worst blights, being Idi Amin.
The sensitivity is there about any kind of military operation. The question would be, if one does not have the political support of African states, what kind of composition of force would take place? It is very clear, as we have seen in other cases, that winning the battle does not necessarily win the war. I think it is a fair question, but it is very hard to predict the kind of force one would need, how long it would be there, what kind of stabilizing force would need to be there in the longer term and what kind of reconstruction would be needed.
There are great sensitivities. Before we invoke that we certainly need to look through the diplomatic channels at what would be the tools necessary in order to bring that about, if that were, and I would suggest probably, the last resort. At the moment, the African Union troops there need to have not only the diplomatic support but certainly the tools to carry it out. They cannot be sent in to do a job for which they are ill equipped.
It may be an issue that we may have to come back to. Hopefully we will not, but if we do, I think we have to look very carefully at what kind of composition and mandate we would be looking at.